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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
THIS article attempts to relate some of the ideas put forward by Professor Hans Morgenthau in his Politics Amongst Nations (New York, 1949) to the world position of South Africa, and then essays some more general reflections on the Republic's external situation today.
Such a study should normally begin with an historical introduction, but South Africa's recent history is, perhaps, well enough known for this to be dispensed with, and for my present purposes it will suffice to recall that South Africa was recognised as a sovereign state after World War I, when she was a separate signatory of the Treaty of Versailles and of the League Covenant. There were, of course, constitutional developments after that which led first to the weakening and then to the breaking of the Commonwealth tie, but this did not affect South Africa's formal relations with foreign states. Her relationship with Britain was of great but decreasing importance; but from the standpoint of other powers this importance was political rather than constitutional, for South Africa could be influenced through the British connexion much as Panama can be influenced through the U.S.A.1
Page 41 note 1 The example of Panama is deliberately chosen as it exemplifies the dual nature of the relationship. Third countries can approach the U.S. Government touse its influence on Panama, or approach Panama and play upon the resentment of U.S. domination.
Page 41 note 2 This is perhaps no more than saying that all political processes involve the influencing of human beings. There were, of course, special features in the Commonwealth relationship. For example, the inter se doctrine enabled the Ottawa tariff preferences to be established without these automatically extending to countries with which Commonwealth members had mostfavoured-nation agreements.
Page 42 note 1 In some American thinking–e.g. Stoessinger, J. G., The Might of Nations (NewYork, 1962), p. 7–Google Scholar the assumption that state and nation correspond seems to be based on the conscious effort that has been made to weld Americans of whatever origin into one people. As this is written it appears that the last group, the Negroes, is rapidly on the way to identification with the American nation, if not to complete integration in it. In Europe, nationalism and international boundaries have come more or less into line during the nineteenth century, although a Belgian nation is still far from realisation. One may doubt whether even Louis XIV could have exclaimed, ‘La nation, c'est moi.’ The transforming of each nation into a state is the aim of self- determination. To give this concept an exact meaning could only lead to the splintering of many present nation-states. If there is a norm, it is the continued synthesis of the elements within a state to produce a nation co-extensive within the geographic confines of the state. In this sense South Africa is the reverse of normal, for a deliberate effort is being made to reverse the process and to separate rather than to synthesise. In other words, the rulers of this state are determined to restrict the nation to one group only, and in the latest development of their policy would even restrict the ‘nation’ to certain geographical divisions of the state. The contrast with Israel, for which the Jewish nation is a much wider group than the inhabitants of Israel, is interesting.
Page 42 note 2 Renan, E., ‘Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?’ in Discours et conferences (Paris, 1887).Google Scholar
3 An unequivocal statement of this proposition is set out in an address delivered to the Royal African Society by DrMuller, H., then South African Ambassador in London; African Affairs (London), 01 1963, p. 53.Google Scholar
Page 43 note 1 This does not imply hypocrisy by South Africans and their Government. For South African representatives defending the strict application of Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter, there are no doubts that they are upholding a matter of strict principle: those who attack South Africa in the face of this domestic jurisdiction clause are putting self-interest first. It is strange that a declared nationalist like Mr Louw should have had to await the proceedings of the United Nations before realising that nations are moved by self-interest. South African House of Assembly Debates, 1963, 7261.
Page 44 note 1 A minor exception was the proclamation of sovereignty over Marian and Prince Edward Islands on 12 January 1948 by the Smuts Government. It is also true that South Africa took an active part in the negotiation of the multilateral agreement on the Antarctic, and sends scientific teams there regularly.
Page 44 note 2 For a summary of South African claims to the Protectorates and negotiations with the British Government, see de Blij's, H. J.Africa South (Northwestern University Press, 1962), pp. 264 ff.Google Scholar
Page 46 note 1 It is difficult to establish, even on the largest-scale maps available, that Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland have a common border. The easternmost point of the Caprivi strip is defined as the confluence of the Linyanti and Zambesi rivers, and the Southern Rhodesian boundary comes so close to this that it is not clear whether Bechuanaland has a river frontage: on the map the position is further complicated by a number of islands of which the nationality is not clear. The High Commission Secretariat in Pretoria has, however, confirmed orally that it is possible to cross from Bechuanaland to Northern Rhodesia at Kasangula without touching Southern Rhodesian or South West African (Caprivi) territory.
Page 47 note 1 When I wrote this I had not seen Brett's, E. A.African Attitudes (Johannesburg, 1963).Google Scholar His study bears out my assertions, at any rate as far as some Africans are concerned. In his conclusions he states that: ‘The group exhibited a strong sense of identification with the outside states that had achieved political independence under an African Government, and the hope that they would influence, directly or indirectly, the course of events in South Africa.’ On the other hand he shows clearly that Africans feel no identity with other non-whites. I must stress that I only claim non-identification of non-whites with foreign policy–positive identification of Africans, Asians, and Coloureds within the Republic with a so-called ‘non-white group’ is very doubtful.
Page 50 note 1 That military defeat is often followed by social revolution seems too obvious to require proof; post-war Germany and Japan are perhaps better examples for my purpose than the dramatic revolution in Russia. The changes in a victorious country may be less violent, but may be as revolutionary, and are certainly as difficult to predict or control.
Page 51 note 1 South Africa has diplomatic missions in 19 countries abroad, including Consuls-General in the Lebanon and Japan. Envoys are sometimes accredited to more than one country, e.g. the Minister in Stockholm is accredited to Finland as well as Sweden–all told, about 25 countries are covered. There are consular posts in some countries in addition to diplomatic missions, and in Angola and Moçambique there are Consuls-General. By way of contrast, Israel is represented in some 88 countries.
A recent illustration of a rebuff to South African diplomacy occurred when Africans walked out of the I.L.O. meeting in Geneva in protest at South Africa's presence. On 24June 1963 the Director-General of I.L.O. made public his proposals for (a) the exclusion of South Africa from I.L.O. meetings other than the International Labour Conference; (b) the establishment of a commission to investigate labour conditions and freedom of association in South Africa; and (c) I.L.O. co-operation in any United Nations action arising out of the current case before the International Court ‘regarding the practice of apartheid’. The Star (Johannesburg), 25 06 1963.Google Scholar
Page 53 note 1 For the purposes of the Group Areas Act, Japanese are treated as white and have access to areas and premises reserved for whites. Statement by the Minister of the Interior in the House of Assembly, I May 1962.
Page 53 note 2 British Information Services, Johannesburg, Press Release No. 285, 1963.
Page 54 note 1 Mansergh's account of the events leading to the 1906 constitution in the Transvaal fits the granting of independence in African states in the 1960's so well that one has to keep reminding oneself of the half-century between them. There were the warnings (from Churchill) that ‘We must not by the gift of Responsible Government rid ourselves of our South African responsibilities’; and Sir Roy Welensky would surely have felt at home with a British Government that introduced the constitution by Letters Patent to avoid its being thrown out in the House of Lords by the Lord Salisburys of the day. Mansergh, N., South Africa 1906–1961 (London, 1962).Google Scholar