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The Rôle of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
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Our intention is …to put Afro–Arab cooperation on the map as a dimension of international economic cooperation which all countries, especially the rich industrial nations, must reckon with. Arab aid and cooperation efforts should be in a context of a new world economic order, based on equality and justice.
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References
page 625 note 1 Ayari, Chedly, ‘A Global Strategy for Arab-African Cooperation’, Banque Arabe pour le déeveloppement économique en Afrique, Khartoum, 1975.Google Scholar
page 625 note 2 Egypt was expelled from membership as a consequence of Arab rejection of the ‘Camp David’ Agreement. Somalia, Djibouti, and the two Yemens are the other Arab League states which are not included in the Bank.
page 626 note 1 See Johnson, Willard R., ‘Africans and Arabs: collaboration without co-operation, change without challange’, in International Journal (Toronto), Autumn 1980, pp. 766–93;Google Scholar also Johnson, Willard R. and Wilson, E. J., III, ‘The “Oil Crises” and African Economies: oil wave on a tidal flood of industrial price inflation’, in Daedalus (Cambridge, Mass.), Spring 1982, pp. 211–41.Google Scholar
page 627 note 1 B.A.D.E.A., Annual Report, 1982 (Khartoum, 1982), p. 74.Google Scholar
page 627 note 2 Most payments were completed by 1976, and the following year the S.A.A.F.A. was transferred to the B.A.D.E.A., which was also charged with the administration of the relatively small Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Arab and African Countries, ‘effectively consolidating all Arab development efforts for Africa in one institution’. Ibid. p. 38.
page 627 note 3 See Blair, John M., The Control of Oil (New York, 1976), p. 273.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 627 note 4 Petroleum Economist (London), 08 1980.Google Scholar
page 628 note 1 World Bank, World Development Report, 1981 (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. 91.Google Scholar
page 629 note 1 Curtis, Michael and Gitelson, Susan Aurelia (eds.), Israel in the Third World (New Brunswick, N.J., 1976), p. 25.Google Scholar
page 629 note 2 ‘Arab-Backed Drive Hurting Israel's Standing in Africa’, in New York Times, 12 01 1973.Google Scholar
page 629 note 3 Evans, R. and Novak, R., in The Boston Globe, 4 March 1977, editorial page.Google Scholar
page 629 note 4 See Mazrui, Ali A., ‘Black Africa and the Arabs’, in Foreign Affairs (New York), 53, 4, 07 1975, pp. 725–42.Google Scholar
page 629 note 5 For a fuller analysis of the programme and its implementation, see Johnson, ‘Africans and Arabs’.
page 631 note 1 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D.C., 1981), Table 37.Google Scholar
page 632 note 1 B.A.D.E.A., Annual Report, 1982, p. 7.
page 633 note 1 Ibid.
page 633 note 2 International Currency Review (London), 12, 3, 07 1980.Google Scholar
page 634 note 1 Initially, no specific list of ‘eligible’ African states was issued, but it was the announced intention to exclude those violating the boycott against Israel, as well as South Africa. Subsequently, those captive to the South African economic domination of Southern Africa who had no diplomatic relations with Israel were allowed to receive B.A.D.E.A. and other Arab assistance, namely: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique.
page 634 note 2 B.A.D.E.A., Annual Report, 1982, Appendix II.
page 635 note 1 Compiled from Ibid.-Appendix I. If we exclude ‘other private flows’, representing generally negative capital exports-i.e. net return of payments on mostly commercial lending-then the level of net concessional lending would drop to 56 per cent.
page 635 note 2 This assessment is based on the assumption that interest charges below 7 per cent for the period of B.A.D.E.A. activity represents some degree of concessionality. Ibid. p. 21.
page 635 note 3 Ibid. Table II. The comparable annual figures for the B.A.D.E.A. are 42.1%, 36.9%, and 23.9% for 1978 to 1980 against general rates of 25.4%, 16.7%, and 15.8%.
page 636 note 1 Ibid. p. 28.
page 636 note 2 Interview with Chedly Ayari at the headquarters of the B.A.D.E.A., Khartoum, 29 November 1978.
page 637 note 1 Ibid.
page 637 note 2 B.A.D.E.A., Annual Report, 1982, p. 30.
page 637 note 3 Ibid. p. 8.
page 638 note 1 See ‘Afro-Arab Cooperation and BADEA, 1973–78’, Khartoum,
page 638 note 2 These percentages are calculated from the annual reports for the relevant years for the Islamic Development Bank, the Kuwaiti Fund, the Saudi Fund, and the United Arab Emirates Fund.
page 638 note 3 Cf. Trilateral Commission, O.P.E.C., ‘The Trilateral World and the Developing Countries: new arrangements for Cooperation, 1976–1980’, New York, 1979; Z. A. Nasr, ‘The Kuwait Fund and Trilateral Cooperation’, Kuwait, February 1977; and O.E.C.D., ‘Conference on Special Approaches to Trilateral Co-operation’, Paris, 26–8 January 1977.
page 639 note 1 Nasr, op. cit. p. 13.
page 640 note 1 Interview with A. Al-Hamad at the headquarters of the Kuwaiti Fund, Kuwait, 18 October 1977.
page 640 note 2 East African Development Bank files, Kampala.
page 641 note 1 African Development (London), 01 1976, p. s33.Google Scholar
page 641 note 2 Fraternitè matin (Abidjan), 27 10 1975.Google Scholar
page 641 note 3 Ayari, Chedly, African-American Leadership Conference, Khartoum, November 1978.Google Scholar
page 641 note 4 Jeune Afrique (Paris), 21 03 1975.Google Scholar
page 642 note 1 Interview, Khartoum, 29 November 1978.
page 642 note 2 African Development, January 1976, p. s33.
page 643 note 1 Interview, Khartoum, 29 November 1978.
page 643 note 2 Ibid.