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The Ogoni and Self-Determination: Increasing Violence in Nigeria

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Claude E. Welch Jr.
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Extract

The execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, noted advocate of rights for the Ogoni people of the Niger delta, who was hanged with eight of his colleagues in Port Harcourt on 10 November 1995, drew universal condemnation from governments, human rights organisations, and literary figures. Following the trial of these Ogoni activists, the Nigerian régime headed by General Sani Abacha decided that the verdict of the appointed tribunal should be endorsed and implemented without delay, despite an international campaign for clemency. In the view of many, Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike, an independent judicial court would not have found the accused guilty of the murder in May 1994 of the four prominent Ogoni who had been killed during a riotous rally. For the military administration, however, the claims for self-determination made by Saro-Wiwa had run counter to national policy, nOt least by having highlighted long-standing tensions between the country's ethnic mosaic and its political centralisation.

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Articles
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The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , December 1995 , pp. 635 - 650
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

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12 Saro-Wiwa, Ken, On a Darkling Plain: an account of the Nigerian civil war (London, 1989), p. 199. The author had been appointed in 1967 as Administrator of the war-ravaged oil port of Bonny, thereafter holding the portfolios of Education and Information in the Government of Rivers State from 1968 to 1973.Google Scholar

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14 In addition, the Ogoni ‘bill of rights’ called for political autonomy within Nigeria, adequate and direct representation within national institutions (hence basing them on ethnicity rather than territory and/or majorities in diverse areas), development of Ogoni language and culture, and the right to protect the environment from further degradation.

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20 Mosop, ‘Briefing Note’, p. 1.

21 ttached ‘Review of Events’ to letter from J. K. Tillery, Divisional Manger, Willbros West Africa, Inc., to J. R. Udofia, General Manager of Shell, Port Harcourt, dated 3 May 1993.

22 Human Rights Watch/Africa, ‘First-Ever Testimony by Nigerian Soldiers on the Military Campaigns in Ogoniland’, Washington, DC, 27 03 1995.

23 ‘Joint Resolution by the Ogoni and Andoni Communities, Rivers State Government, the Rivers State Peace Conference Committee and the National Council on Inter-Governmental Relations (NCIR) Abuja in the Matter of the Ogoni/Andoni Disturbances’, 6 October 1993.

24 Letter of 19 October 1993 from Professor Claude Ake to Chief Rufus Ada George, Executive Governor of Rivers State. This document, and several of those cited in footnotes above, are reproduced in ‘Ogoni Background Material November 1993’ by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, The Hague.

25 For example, Amnesty International, Index AFR 44/07/93, London, 20 July 1993.

26 I attended the Cerd hearing in Geneva on 10 August 1993 when several references were made to the Ogoni, obviously on the basis of Mosop and the other NGO material. The Nigerian representative played down the gravity of the situation, as expected, and a senior African member of the committee, concerned by the amount of attention given to a matter that did not figure in the official report submitted by Nigeria, responded with a lengthy personal statement, criticising ‘political’ intrusions into Cerd's work. This stands as a sharp reminder that members of UN human rights treaty bodies do not unreservedly, welcome, support, or utilise NGO inputs.

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28 The high-pitched shriek of flaring natural gas cuts through their Niger delta air at many points. Had this valuable resource been tied better into national development (as in generating electricity), Nigeria's economic doldrums might not be so deep.

29 Even supposedly homogeneous African societies are characterised by potentially serious divisions. The exacerbation of clan identification and conflict in Somalia – long touted by some African specialists as a model pastoral democracy, relatively free from destructive internal rivalry based on group identification — stands as a case in point.

30 However, the sense of ethnic unity may also be a product of enclosure within a colonial state. As argued over three decades ago by Hodgkin, Thomas, Nigerian Perspectives: an historical anthology (London, 1960), pp. 2–3, the concept of being ‘Yoruba’ may be no older than that of being ‘Nigerian’.Google Scholar

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35 There is an enormous literature on self-determination. See, for example, listed in date order: Umozurike, U. O., Self-Determination in International Law (Hamden, CT, 1972);Google ScholarBuchheit, Lee C., Secession: the legitimacy of self-determination (New Haven, CT, 1978);Google ScholarRonen, Dov, The Quest for self-Determination (New Haven, 1979);Google ScholarAlexander, Yonah and Friedlander, Robert A. (eds.), Self-Determination: national, regional and global dimensions (Boulder, CO, 1980);Google ScholarEspiell, Hector Gros, The Right to Self-Determination: implementation of United Nations resolutions (New York, 1980);Google ScholarCristescu, Aurelio, The Right to Self-Determination: historical and current developments on the basis of United Nations instruments (New York, 1981);Google ScholarPomerance, Michla, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: the new doctrine in the United Nations (The Hague, 1982);Google ScholarMakonnen, Yilma, International Law and the New States of Africa: a study of the international legal problems of state succession in the newly independent states of Eastern Africa (Paris, 1983);Google ScholarNeuberger, Benyamin, National Self-Determination: an interdisciplinary annotated bibliography (New York, 1987);Google ScholarWilson, Heather A., International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford, 1988);Google ScholarHannum, Hurst, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: the accommodation of conflicting rights (Phildelphia, 1990);Google Scholar and Quaye, Christopher O., Liberation Struggles in International Law (Philadelphia, 1991).Google Scholar Also Anaya, S. James, ‘The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims’, in Iowa Law Review (Iowa City), 75, 1990, pp. 837–73,Google Scholar and McCorquodale, Robert, ‘Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context and Its Potential Impact on Africa’ in African Journal of International and Comparative Law (London), 4, 1992, pp. 592–608.Google Scholar

36 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960. Significantly, paragraph 6 declared that ‘Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’Google Scholar

37 Donnelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, 1989), p. 148.Google Scholar

38 An interesting essay in this regard is McDonald, Michael, ‘Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism’, in An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed (ed.), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: a quest for consensus (Philadelphia, 1992), pp. 133–61.Google Scholar