Nationalism Versus Coexistence: Neo-African Attitudes to Classical Neutralism

Dike Nworah

doi:10.1017/S0022278X0005391X

Nationalism Versus Coexistence: Neo-African Attitudes to Classical Neutralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008

Dike Nworah

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The dynamics of world neutralism, either as an international doctrine or as a state policy,1 have witnessed variable responses from African states since the inception of the ideology known as peaceful coexistence. Between 1920, when Lenin talked of a ‘peaceful cohabitation with the peoples of all nations’, and 1961 when the Communist Party defined peaceful coexistence – by an official imprimatur – as ‘an objective necessity for the development of human society’, and denounced ‘war as a means of settling inter-national disputes’, the chrysalis of classical neutralism could be said to have spanned the decade between the close of World War II and the Bandung Conference of 1955.2

Type: Articles
Information: The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , June 1977 , pp. 213 - 237

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X0005391X [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

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^{Page 213 note 1} For a definitive analysis, see Lyon, Peter, Neutralism (Leicester, 1963), pp. 59–120Google Scholar; also Mates, Leo, Non-alignment: theory and current policy (Belgrade, 1972).Google Scholar

^{Page 213 note 2} Cf. Tadic, Bojana, ‘Non-alignment – a Conceptual and Historical Survey’, in the symposium on Non-Alignment in the World of Today (Belgrade, 1969), pp. 113–30.Google Scholar

^{Page 213 note 3} Ibid. pp. 43–4.

^{Page 213 note 4} See Poplai, S. L. (ed.), Asia and Africa in the Modern World (New Delhi, 1955), pp. 211–14.Google Scholar

^{Page 214 note 1} Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1–6, 1961 (Belgrade, 1961).Google Scholar

^{Page 214 note 2} Ibid. pp. 27–8, 36, 41, and 74–5.

^{Page 214 note 3} Ibid. pp. 88–96, 98–100, 175, and 231.

^{Page 214 note 4} At the summit, Tito referred to ‘moral success’, Sukarno to ‘accumulated moral force’, Nasser to ‘moral potentialities’, Bourguiba to ‘moral authority’, Haile Selassie to the ‘moral element’, ‘moral force’, and ‘moral influence’, Nehru to ‘moral force’, and Makarios to ‘moral principles’. Ibid. pp. 16, 23, 41, 76, 89, 119, and 180. Mrs Bandaranaike, in a powerful statement, denied the ‘moral superiority’ of non-aligned states, and so could not justify their ‘wish to pass moral judgements on the policies of nations’. Ibid. p. 186.

^{Page 215 note 1} Ibid. P. 207.

^{Page 215 note 2} See Gott, Richard, ‘The Decline of Neutralism: the Belgrade Conference and after’, in Survey of International Affairs, 1961 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 365–87.Google Scholar

^{Page 215 note 3} For an analysis of the importance of this Conference, see Nworah, Dike, African Slates and Non-Alignment, 1961–1973: a dimension in the international policy of the Organisation of African Unity (Lagos, 1976), a N.I.I.A. monograph.Google Scholar

^{Page 215 note 4} AHG/Res. II (I), 17–21 July 1964. According to the official report, Gabon, Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic, Niger, Rwanda, and Upper Volta were absent from the Cairo Conference.

^{Page 215 note 5} Africa (London), 20, 9 10 1964.Google Scholar

^{Page 216 note 1} The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 1964, special edition of Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), xv, 11 1964, pp. 42–4.Google Scholar This document is hereinafter referred to as the Cairo Conference.

^{Page 216 note 2} Ibid. pp. 52, 74, and 76.

^{Page 216 note 3} Africa, 9 October 1964.

^{Page 216 note 4} Cairo Conference, p. 16.

^{Page 217 note 1} Ibid. p. 17. See also Tefli, Diallo, ‘The Organisation of African Unity in Historical Peripective’, in African Forum (New York), 1, 2, Fall 1965, p. 23Google Scholar: ‘Non-aligmuent has been written into the Charter as a positive principle to guide the external policy of African governments. Thus a concept that could have been at best elaborated into a policy is elevated to the level of a principle. The significance of this can hardly be over-emphasized. It was born out of a deep conviction that if Africa is to contribute to the maintenance of peace it can do so only by effectively insulating itself from the Cold War. There is also a sincere belief that the essentials of the Cold War have nothing to do with present problems.’

^{Page 217 note 2} Cairo Conference, p. 17.

^{Page 218 note 1} Ibid. pp. 312.

^{Page 218 note 2} Ibid. pp. 40–1.

^{Page 218 note 3} Ibid. p. 46.

^{Page 219 note 1} Ibid. pp. 24–5.

^{Page 219 note 2} Ibid. p. 44.

^{Page 219 note 3} Ibid. p. 57. Banda denounced non-alignment in 1970.

^{Page 220 note 1} Cairo Conference, pp. 69–70.

^{Page 220 note 2} Ibid. p. 34. Nuhu Bamali was then Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

^{Page 220 note 3} Ibid. pp. 57–8.

^{Page 221 note 1} Ibid. pp. 63.

^{Page 221 note 3} See Thiam, D., The Foreign Policy of African States (London, 1963), and W. A. E. Skurnik, The Foreign Policy of Senegal (Evanston, 1973).Google Scholar

^{Page 221 note 2} Ibid. pp. 34.

^{Page 221 note 4} Cairo Conference, pp. 32–3. For an analysis of Kwame Nkrumah's ideas of a common foreign policy for Africa, see Padelford, Norman J. ‘The Organization of African Unity’, in International Organization (Madison), 18, 1964, pp. 530–1Google Scholar; Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite (London, 1963)Google Scholar; and Thompson, W. Scott, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966 (Princeton, 1969).Google Scholar

^{Page 222 note 1} Cairo Conference, p. 50.

^{Page 222 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 223 note 1} Ibid. pp. 63–4.

^{Page 223 note 2} Africa, 9 October 1964.

^{Page 223 note 3} DrMungai, N., Minister of Health; Kenya Digest (London), 26 09 1964.Google Scholar

^{Page 223 note 4} Africa, 9 October 1964.

^{Page 224 note 1} Quoted by Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World (Princeton, 1970), pp. 247–8.Google Scholar

^{Page 224 note 2} Ibid. p. 301.

^{Page 224 note 3} Cairo Conference, Declaration, pp. 80–2.

^{Page 224 note 4} Ibid. Special Resolution I, p. 88.

^{Page 225 note 1} See ECM/Res. 2(II), Resolutions, Recommendations, and Statements, p. 14.

^{Page 225 note 2} See Report of the Administrative Provisiønal Seerelary-General, CM/18, Cairo, 07 1964, p. 1.Google Scholar

^{Page 225 note 3} Cairo Conference, p. 40.

^{Page 225 note 4} Report, CM/18.

^{Page 225 note 5} See Touval, Saadia, ‘The Organization of African Unity and African Borders’, in International Organization, 21, 1967, pp. 102–27.CrossRef Google Scholar

^{Page 225 note 6} See Woronoff, Jon, Organizing African Unity (Metuchen, N.J., 1970), pp. 361–86 and 467–77.Google Scholar

^{Page 226 note 1} See ECM/Res. 13(VI), December 1965, Resolutions, Recommendations, and Statements, p. 94.

^{Page 226 note 2} Nigerian Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release (Lagos), II 11 1965.Google Scholar

^{Page 226 note 3} Ibid.

^{Page 226 note 4} Nyerere appears justified by the proceedings of the Accra Conference; see CM/Res. 62(v), October 1965, Resolutions, Recommendations, and Statements, pp. 80–1.

^{Page 226 note 5} Daily Times (Lagos), II 11 1966.Google Scholar But the Nigerian delegate, Colonel R. A. Adebayo, disagreed with the view that the latest O.A.U. Assembly was a failure, and denied that it was controlled by British and French interests. Morning Post (Lagos), 12 11 1966.Google Scholar

^{Page 227 note 1} The 4th O.A.U. Summit in Kinshasa in September 1967 unanimously resolved that independent African states should take joint action to secure the immediate withdrawal of Major Jean Schramme's force of some 130 Belgians from the lakeside town of Bukavu on the Rwanda frontier. If the mercenaries refused this ‘generous offer’, all African governments should offer the Congo every assistance within their power to put down the two-month-old rebellion.

^{Page 227 note 2} See the Council's decision on the ‘Memorandum on a Programme for Peace’ submitted by Liberia, in CM/Res. 105(IX), Resolutions, Recommendations, and Statements, p. 134. On 8 September 1967, Liberia had presented a plan for world peace based on international disarmament to the Council of Ministers of the O.A.U. in Kinshasa. The document was forwarded to all 38 O.A.U. member-states for use at international debates, including the U.N., and the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The Liberian plan called for a reduction in military spending everywhere, so that the money saved could be devoted to the economic and social progress of the developing nations.

^{Page 227 note 3} The O.A.U. Administrative Secretary-General's reports for the period, and the verbatim record of proceedings of the Ministerial Council confirm this continental focus.

^{Page 227 note 4} The second Afro-Asian Summit as scheduled to be held in mid-1965, but was deferred for several months, partly because of the deposition of Ben Bela by Colonel Boumediène, and also, since in the words of Radio Algeria, 29 June 1965, ‘the delegations whose participation was agreed upon have not yet arrived. A communiqué issued from Cairo by Chou-en-Lai, Nasser, Sulcarno, and Ayub Khan, nevertheless stated that they were convinced that ‘the postponment of the Conference was not a setback to Afro-Asian solidarity’. See New China News Agency (Peking), 30 06 1965.Google Scholar However, by October that year it was announced that the Afro-Asian Conference was postponed indefinitely.

^{Page 227 note 5} See Jansen, op. cit. pp. 355–400.

^{Page 227 note 6} Africa, 8, April 1965.

^{Page 228 note 1} See Nworah, Dike, ‘The African Group in the United Nations, 1963–1966: the absence of a mechanism for co-operation’, in International Studies (New Delhi), XIV, 4, 1975, pp. 633–41.Google Scholar

^{Page 228 note 2} Daily Times, 15 September 1967.

^{Page 228 note 3} Thomas, Ademola in the Sunday Post (Lagos), 22 09 1968Google Scholar: ‘It is hoped’, he added, ‘that the O.A.U. as it gradually solves its internal problems will take its stand on every major international issue.’ It must be pointed out, however, that several African countries at Algiers made a bid to obtain U.N. action to try to stop the foreign military aid to Portugal, and proposed an O.A.U. delegation to the U.N. Secretary-General calling on him to act on the issue of military aid to Portugal. Daily Times, II September 1968.

^{Page 229 note 1} Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969–1970 (London, 1970), pp. 24212–14.Google Scholar

^{Page 229 note 2} When 32 African Ministers on 30 August 1970 condemned Britain, France, and West Germany (and thus N.A.T.O.) for their röle in supplying arms to South Africa, the resolution was passed without voting, although the following eight countries declined to give it their endorsement: Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey, Madagascar, and Gabon from French-speaking Africa, and also Malawi, , Rwanda, , and Lesotho, . International Herald Tribune (New York), 31 08 1970.Google Scholar

^{Page 229 note 3} According to Africa Confidential (London), 09 1970Google Scholar, this end was achieved ‘mainly by everyone declining to go into concrete detail on plans or intention’. Also, ‘the sheer size of the organisation led to compromise rather than consensus’, and ‘compromise on the simplest slogoniferous lines’.

^{Page 229 note 4} It should be noted that this had been the policy of the African states since the acrimonious Lagos Ministerial Conference of 1964.

^{Page 230 note 1} The 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State or Government mandated Kaunda, accompanied by the four Foreign Ministers of Algeria, Cameroun, Kenya, and Mali, to visit certain western countries in order to dissuade them from having any dealings with the minority, racist, and colonialist regimes in Southern Africa, and especially to prevail upon them to review their economic, trade, and military relations with South Africa and Portugal. The Mission was also to lay particular stress on the disastrous consequences for all involved if the U.K. Government resumed its sale of arms to South Africa. See O.A.U. Report of the Administrative Secretary-General Covering the Period from February 1971 to June 1971, CM/378 (Part II), Addis Ababa, 06 1971.Google Scholar

^{Page 230 note 2} Nyerere, Julius K., Non-alignment in the 1970s. Opening Address given on Monday, 13 April 1970, to the Preparatory Meeting of the. Won-Aligned Countries, 13–17 April 1970 (Dar es Salaam, 1970)Google Scholar, reprinted in Freedom and Development/Uhuru na Maendeleo: a selection from writings and speeches, 1968–1973 (Dar es Salaam and London, 1973), pp. 159–72.Google Scholar

^{Page 230 note 3} Ibid. pp. 163 and 166.

^{Page 231 note 1} Ibid. pp. 562–3.

^{Page 231 note 2} Ibid. p. 168. See also Co-operation Against Poverty. Paper Submitted by the United Republic of Tanzania to the Conference of Non-Aligned States, Lusaka, September 1970.

^{Page 231 note 3} The meeting of Foreign Ministers was attended by 52 states, under the chairmanship of Reuben Kajanga, the Zambian Minister of Rural Development. Draft resolutions were adopted which expressed ‘deep concern at the continued spread of war by the armed forces of the U.S. in South East Asia’; requested the non-aligned nations to consider measures to exclude South Africa from all U.N. specialised agencies; called on non-aligned countries to provide material assistance to guerrillas in Africa; and condemned France's supply of arms to South Africa. On the question of the contentious Cambodian representation at the Summit Conference, the Foreign Ministers decided that the seat should remain vacant. Among African states, Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Libya, Mali, and Mauritania supported the Government of Prince Sihanouk; while General Lon Nol was backed by Swaziland. Morocco among 55 other non-aligned states took no side on the plea of non-interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia.

^{Page 232 note 1} Third Non-Aligned Nations Summit Conference: Zambia, 8–10 September 1970 (Ndola, 1970), p. 77.Google Scholar

^{Page 232 note 2} Ibid. p. 8.

^{Page 232 note 3} Cf. Radio South Africa, 13 September 1970, which claimed that ‘artificial means’ were used at Lusaka ‘to create a feeling of unity among Afro-Asian states’. Not surprisingly, in the view of white South Africa. ‘The Lusaka Conference has made no contribution towards a solution of the problems of the times. If anything, it has complicated them by attempts at intimidation, by causing insults to be hurled to and for, and fostering misunderstanding where the thing the world is desperately in need of is understanding.’

^{Page 232 note 4} The Lusaka Non-Aligned Summit endorsed the O.A.U. resolution on the Kaunda Mission, and decided to extend it to cover all N.A.T.O. countries, as well as Switzerland and Japan. In October 1970, Kaunda, accompanied by four Ministers, and by officials of the General Secretariat of the O.A.U., visited Italy, West Germany, Britain, the United States, and France.

^{Page 232 note 5} See O.A.U. Report, CM/378 (Part II), June 1971. However, the relatively co-operative attitude of the Italian, French, and German Governments which displayed some understanding of the anxiety of African states is worth noting.

^{Page 232 note 6} The People's Daily (Peking), 16 09 1970.Google Scholar

^{Page 232 note 7} Tass (Moscow), II 09 1970.Google Scholar

^{Page 233 note 1} The Pioneer (Kumasi), 10 09 1970.Google Scholar

^{Page 233 note 2} Keesug's Contemporary Archives, 7 September 1970.

^{Page 233 note 3} Legum, Colin (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: annual survry and documents, 1973–74 (New York and London, 1974), p. B12.Google Scholar

^{Page 233 note 4} Ibid. pp. C217–18.

^{Page 235 note 1} L'Action (Tunis), II 09 1973.Google Scholar

^{Page 235 note 2} Daily Times, 5 september 1976.

^{Page 236 note 1} Ibid. 7 and 8 september 1976.

^{Page 237 note 1} Ingram, Derek, ‘Colombo Conference: non-aligned forge a new unity’, in African Development (London), 10 1976, p. 994.Google Scholar

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