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The Life and Death of South Africa's National Peacekeeping Force

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Douglas G. Anglin
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Extract

The National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) was designed to meet a serious security challenge anticipated in the run-up to South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994. Its establishment was an imaginative and constructive, but ultimately disastrous initiative. Its failure – however inevitable in retrospect – constituted a major tragedy, less as it proved for the free and fair conduct of the elections than for the longer-term prospects of forging a truly national army. This study seeks to explore: (i) the genesis and evolution of the concept of an integrated South African peacekeeping force; (ii) its character, composition, command structure, and cohesion; and (iii) the causes and consequences of its fateful deployment on the volatile East Rand.

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Articles
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The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 21 - 52
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, ‘Second Interim Report’, Johannesburg, 29 04 1992, p. 5.Google Scholar

2 See Currin, Brian, ‘Presentation to UN Special Envoy: Resolution 765’, Lawyers for Human Rights, Johannesburg, 07 1992, p. 44;Google ScholarHuman Sciences Research Council, Towards Violence Free Elections in South Africa (Pretoria, 08 1993), p. 36;Google Scholar and Heitman, Helmoed-Römer, ‘Cannons on the Loose’, in Paratus (Pretoria), 44, 11, 11 1993, pp. 14–16.Google Scholar

3 Nelson Mandela initially favoured a full-scale UN peacekeeping operation, but later realised that the idea was unrealistic. See The Times (London), 16 07 1992,Google Scholar and Business Day (Johannesburg), 11 08 1992.Google Scholar Also, The Star (Johannesburg), 13 02 1993,Google Scholar and New Nation (Johannesburg), 26 02–4 03 1993.Google Scholar

4 Business Day, 5 January and 7 October 1993;Google ScholarInternational Commission of Jurists, Voting for Peace (Geneva, 11 1993), p. 33;Google ScholarSouthScan (London), 18 02 1994, p. 49;Google ScholarThe Star, 23 February and 18 April 1994; and South Africa: between yesterday and tomorrow (Amsterdam, AWEPA, 1994), p. 28.Google Scholar Major-General Bantu Holomisa, the pro-ANC military ruler of Transkei, was the most consistent proponent of an international peacekeeping force. Business Day, 19 January and 31 August 1993;Google ScholarSowetan (Johannesburg), 15 07 1993;Google ScholarSunday Nation (Johannesburg), 5 12 1993;Google Scholar Letter from Holomisa, H. B. to the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), 4 January 1994; and SouthScan, 11 February 1994, p. 42.Google Scholar

5 Annual National Conference of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), Durban, 6–10 July 1992. The adopted resolution was subsequently endorsed by the Methodist Church at its annual conference in October, and by the Church Leaders Meeting in November. By that time, Mogoba was no longer arguing that existing police and military forces needed to be ‘dismantled’. The Star, 11 November 1992.

6 UN document S/24389, 7 August 1992, p. 13. See ‘Presentation on the State of the Nation to the United Nations Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, by a Delegation of Church Leaders, July 24th 1992’, and attachments. Vance visited South Africa, 21–31 July 1992, in response to UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/765, 16 July 1992.

7 Currin, , op. cit. pp. 6 and 42–70. See also, the updated version by Lawyers for Human Rights, ‘Representation to the Goldstone Commission on Violence and Intimidation re the Role of a National Peacekeeping Force in Creating an Environment for Free and Fair Elections’, May 1993.Google Scholar

8 Cited by Cilliers, Jakkie in The National Peacekeeping Force, Violence on the East Rand and Public Perceptions of the NPKF in Katorus (Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council and Institute for Defence Policy, 06 1994), p. 9.Google Scholar See also, SouthScan, 30 April 1993, p. 122.

9 Human Rights Commission (Johannesburg), ‘Summary Report on Repression for the Month of July 1993’, p. 3.Google Scholar

10 The Star, 6 November 1992; Daily News (Durban), 4 12 1992;Google ScholarCape Times (Cape Town), 14 03 1993;Google ScholarThe Guardian (London), 3 08 1993;Google Scholar and Business Day, 4 August 1993.Google Scholar

11 Transitional Executive Council Act No. 151 of 1993, especially section 16. The TEC held its first meeting on 7 December 1993. Recruitment for the NPKF had to await the appointment of members and staff of the TEC Sub-Councils on Defence and on Law and Order, and of the NPKF's Command Council.

12 The UN Secretary-General reported that ‘the prospect of such a Force coming into being effectively before the elections is remote’. UN document S/1994/16, 10 January 1994, p. 13.

13 Letter dated 27 May 1993, quoted in Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 15 05 1994.Google Scholar According to Africa Confidential (London), 26 08 1994, p. 5, the SADF accepted a broad-based NPKF in return for an ANC undertaking to postpone integration of the armies until after the elections.Google Scholar

14 SouthScan, 23 July 1993, p. 217, and Business Day, 4 January 1994. Cilliers, Jakkie, director of the Institute for Defence Policy, predicted a ‘bitter struggle’ over the NPKF within the TEC between its Sub-Council on Defence (led by the SADF and the MK, and supporting the NPKF) and its Sub-Council on Law and Order (with the Minister of Law and Order defending the SAP and the Internal Stability Unit), as reported in Sunday Times, 9 January 1994. See also, Africa Confidential, 21 January 1994, p. 2.Google Scholar

15 Lawyers for Human Rights had envisaged in July 1992, op. cit. pp. 46, 53, and 62, a peacekeeping force ‘based on the philosophy of community policing’, and ‘playing a facilitative role in respect of socio-economic projects’. This rôle was abandoned in May 1993, op. cit. p. 16.

16 Nathan, Laurie, ‘The Creation of a National Peacekeeping Force in South Africa’, in Southern African Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Project, Restructuring the Security Forces for a New South Africa (New York, Institute of International Education, 1994), pp. 40–1.Google Scholar

17 Ibid; Towards Violence Free Elections, p. 41; and Cilliers, Jakkie, ‘A South African Peacekeeping Force – is it practicable?’, in South African Defence Force Review (Durban), 11, 10 1993.Google Scholar The Commonwealth Observer Mission noted ‘concern among some security experts over the shift in emphasis during the genesis of the idea, from a service organization to a force trained along military lines’. South Africa in Transition: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa. Phase III: August-December 1993 (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994), pp. 65 and 101.Google Scholar

18 TEC Act, 1993, section 16 (10) (a). It should be noted that the NPKF was placed under the TEC's Sub-Council on Defence – not Law and Order.

19 ‘Role and Functions of NPKF’, in ‘Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group Handbook’, De Brug army base, February 1994, pp. 8–11. Later, Major Muff Andersson (ex-MK) stated that, on the East Rand, the NPKF would not simply police the area through firepower, but would set up community liaison facilities and would be holding public meetings to show that ‘we are ordinary men and women who have come to preserve the peace’. Business Day, 11 April 1994.

20 The initial submission by Lawyers for Human Rights in July 1992, op. cit. p. 49, had proposed, in addition, the recruitment of ‘members of community organizations, non-aligned experts [and] the public at large’. This idea was abandoned in May 1993, op. cit. pp. 18–19, since time is the essence’. ‘What we definitely do not need in South Africa is a force of citskonstabels’. This was a reference to a disastrous attempt by the SAP in the late 1980s to train instant police constables’ in six weeks.

21 TEC Act, 1993, section 16(10) (b).

22 Republic of Ciskei, ‘Preparatory Administration Decree’, No. 3 of 1994, in Government Gazette (Bisho), 22, 14, 4 02 1994. Although Ciskei as a member of the Freedom Alliance initially declined to join the TEC, Brigadier Oupa Gqoza, its military leader, agreed under intense pressure from the Ciskei Defence Force to despatch a CDF contingent to the NPKF training camp on 24 January. The TEC response was to order Ciskei soldiers to withdraw unless Ciskei formally applied to join the TEC by noon on 28 January 1994. Gqoza eventually complied – a week late.Google Scholar

23 SDUs were voluntary, part-time community-based armed units recruited in late 1991 following the ANC's suspension of the armed struggle in response to the growing violence in the townships. Although typically the ANC did not control the SDUs – no one did – it did acknowledge some responsibility for encouraging their creation. SPUs were similar structures albeit (despite denials) trained and effectively controlled by the IFP. Both were legal under the National Peace Accord, 14 September 1991, though many of their activities were not.

24 Wynand Breytenbach, Deputy Minister of Defence, explained that there would be ‘no sense taking in people in the NPKF if there is no consensus about such people’, as reported in The Star, 5 January 1994. Both Lawyers for Human Rights in May 1993, op. cit. pp. 19–21, and a multinational panel of experts in Towards Violence Free Elections, August 1993, pp. 39–40 and 42, had argued the need to have the ISU form the backbone of the NPKF. This was political anathema to the ANC.

25 An initial intake of 2,000 new recruits, in addition to a police core, had been envisaged by the multinational panel of experts (August 1993, op. cit. p. 40, note 36); Bishop Mogoba had earlier suggested 5,000 (The Star, 11 November 1992); various analysts calculated that 25,000 would be needed (SouthScan, 23 July 1993, p. 217); and Lawyers for Human Rights belived that ‘a force of approximately 30,000 peacekeepers would suffice’ (May 1993, op. cit. p. 21).

26 The Star, 25 January 1994; Restructuring the Security Forces, p. 101, note 5; SADF, Bulletin (Pretoria), 4, 14 01 1994;Google Scholar and National Peacekeeping Force, p. 15.

27 TEC Act, 1993, section 16(10) (b) (i).

28 Including the Koeberg intake, the SADF, TDF, and MK contingents numbered 1, 131, 1,089, and 1,088, respectively. Many of the former SADF (and SAP) members were only nominally ‘volunteers’, and hence not all highly motivated.

29 Sunday Times, 9 January 1994, and National Peacekeeping Force, pp. 11–12. In October 1993,Google Scholar a confidential SAP strategy document argued that the NPKF ‘must not perform any duties in relation to the elections. These duties should only be performed by the SAP.’ Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 14–20 01 1994.Google Scholar

30 Ibid. 22–28 April 1994, and Southern Africa Report (Johannesburg), 22 04 1994, p. 6.Google Scholar The Deputy Minister of Defence stated that those qualified to join the NPKF would be ‘reasonably well-trained people’, as reported in The Star, 6 January 1994. According to National Peacekeeping Force, p. 19, the MK component of the Koeberg intake was considerably better trained, having been drawn from units based in East Africa.Google Scholar

31 Some 47 of the 70 or so women at the De Brug base were reportedly former MK members. Saturday Star (Johannesburg), 29 01 1994,Google Scholar and Restructuring the Security Forces, p. 100, note 4. The NPKF Command Council was enjoined by Section 16(12) of the TEC Act, 1993, to establish criteria for the recruitment, training, and selection of members ‘having due regard also to the interests of women’.Google Scholar

32 Business Day, 2 February 1994, and SAPA news agency, 15 February 1994. The SADF responded angrily in its Bulletin, 10, 9, February 1994: ‘Some scurrilous criticism emanating from a specific source has been levelled at the fact that there are not more whites in the SADF contingent assigned to the NPKF. This criticism attested to a lack of insight in the composition of the SADF, an organization that gives priority to its service systems and requirements rather than the colour of a soldier in deciding who will be deployed and where.’Google Scholar

33 The relatively few Zulu-speaking members of the NPKF strengthened this perception. In addition to the absence of KwaZulu Police recruits, the SADF contingent was drawn from the ethnically-mixed 21 Battalion rather than (as some had expected) the Zulu-speaking 121 Battalion. Sunday Times, 9 January 1994, and The Star, 14 April 1994.Google Scholar

34 Cape Times, 14 March 1994.

35 The Star, 11 November 1992, and Lawyers for Human Rights, July 1992, op. cit. pp. 42 and 57, and May 1993, op. cit. p. 20.

36 The IEC was not persuaded that the NPKF would be operational in time for the elections, and said so in the course of meetings with the TEC and its Sub-Council on Defence in January 1994. Instead, it boldly proposed recruiting an army of 10,000 under its own command on the basis of secondments from the SAP and the SADF, to guard voting and counting stations. The idea received no support. The International Commission of Jurists had favoured in Voting for Peace, p. 33, an international ‘force of four or five battalions’ at the disposal of the IEC.

37 TEC Act, 1993, section 16(12). Comprised of 19 (later 20) governments, political parties, and organisations, the TEC held its first meeting on 7 December 1993. Its Sub-Council on Defence had eight members, including General Kat Libenberg (SA Government), Wynand Breytenbach (National Party), Joe Modise (ANC), Ronnie Kasrils (SACP), and, initially, Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana (Venda). It first met on 22 December 1993.

38 TEC Act, 1993, section 16(5) and (12) (d). The NPKF Command Council was appointed on 4 January and the Commander on 25 January 1994.

39 Cape Times, 14 March 1993, and New Nation, 25 March–April 1993. Bishop Mogoba called for 15 UN generals; The Star, 11 November 1992, and SABC ‘Focus on Faith’, 4 April 1993. A concern of Lawyers for Human Rights was that foreign military experts should participate fully in the NPKF command structure.Google Scholar

40 SADF, Bulletin, 7, 27 January 1994.

41 The Star, 25 and 27 January 1994, and Saturday Star, 29 January 1994. The TEC confirmed Ramushwana's appointment on 25 January, though he did not assume full-time command until 8 February. He resigned as ANC candidate and promised to refund the R580,000 ($160,000) that he had received. The Star, 9 February 1994.Google Scholar

42 TEC Act, 1993, section 16(12)(a), and Letter from Mac Maharaj, TEC Joint Secretary, to Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Commonwealth Secretary-General, 19 January 1994.

43 Modise, Joe, MK commander and member of the Sub-Council on Defence, had raised the possibility of a request with the four observer missions on 5 January, but the Sub-Council took no decision for another two weeks.Google Scholar

44 The Commonwealth Observer Mission had with commendable prescience warned London as early as November 1993 of the likelihood of a frantic last-minute appeal. The absence of a clear definition of the training needs, even in the January 1994 request, made advance planning difficult.

45 Commonwealth Observer Mission press release, 28 February 1994.

46 Sunday Times, 9 January 1994, reported that the first 31 NPKF instructors were assembling that weekend.Google Scholar

47 The Star, 25 January 1994. A some different version was published in Business Day, 11 February 1944. Considerable attention was devoted to graduated force drills, including practical exercises applying conflict-resolution techniques.Google Scholar

48 The Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group (CPAG) succeeded in removing shotguns from the arsenal of weapons, but failed to end the practiceof routiney arriving at the scene of an incident armed at the ready with semi-automatic weapons.

49 NPKF members were obliged ‘in circumstances where he/she is required to use force, [to] use the least possible degree of force, and only when persuasion, advice and warning have failed to secure cooperation and compliance with the law and the restoration of order’. This rule, formulated by the CPAG, was incorporated into The Legal Support Plan of the NPKF as Regulation 6(c).

50 Ibid. ch. 2. The disciplinary requirements were amplified in ch. 6.

51 The five South Africans represented the SAP, the MK, and the South African, Transkei, and Venda Defence Forces; the Commonwealth members came from Britain (2), Canada, India, and Zimbabwe.

52 Weekly Mail, 22–28 April 1994.

53 Ibid.

54 Nathan, Laurie, ‘Memorandum on the Peacekeeping Force: submitted to the Technical Committee on the TEC of the Multiparty Negotiating Forum, June 1993’, p. 3.Google Scholar

55 The Star, 25 January 1994.

56 See Restructuring the Security Forces, p. 43.

57 The Star, 11 February and 22 March 1994. The CPAG's co-ordinator described the degree of integration acheived as ‘extraordinary’.Google ScholarIbid. 13 April 1994.

58 Notably the Sunday Times, 6 February 1994. A partial exception was The Star, 8 February and 22 March 1994.Google Scholar

59 The Legel Support Plan, chs. 2 and 6, published in the Government Gazette, 21 February 1994.Google Scholar

60 The Star, 11 February 1994. Ten weeks later, Ramushwana admitted that 1,000 members had been dismissed, the majority for being absent without leave, and mostly MK.Google ScholarWeekend Star (Johannesburg), 23–24 04 1994. The commanding officer of one of the battalions had also been dismissed as a result of his poor evalution.Google Scholar

61 Business Day, 3 and 4 March 1994. Under the TEC's revised salary scale, a NPKF private received R4,295 a month – or 77 per cent more than a policeman's R2,432. The Star, 9 March 1994, and Weekly Mail, 31 March–7 April 1994.Google Scholar

62 Saturday Star, 29 January 1994. Ronnie Kasrils (SACP member of the TEC Sub-Council on Defence) and Jakkie Cilliers have both argued that other SADF bases stood half-empty or under-utilised, thereby reinforcing suspicions that some army officers deliberately sought to restrict the size of the NPKF. National Peacekeeping Force, p. 16.Google Scholar

63 Sunday Times, 6 February 1994; The Star, 22 March 1994; and Weekly Mail, 22–28 April 1994.

64 Business Day, 4 January 1994.

65 ‘Pre Elections Crisis in Bophuthatswana’, 18 January 1994, p. 8, a memorandum submitted to the TEC (and the IEC).Google Scholar

66 Plans were reportedly made to post the 4th Battalion to Inanda or KwaMashu near Durban, only to be cancelled four days before the scheduled date of 23 April. Proposals to deploy troops in kaNgwane and Gazankulu, both crippled by police strikes, and in the Western Cape, were also dropped. Weekly Mail, 22–28 April 1994; Sunday Times, 24 April 1994; and National Peacekeeping Force, p. 21.Google Scholar

67 Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Review: South Africa, 1993 (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 18;Google ScholarIndependent Board of Inquiry and Peace Action, ‘Before We Were Good Friends’: an account and analysis of displacement in the East Rand Townships of Thokoza and Katlehong, April 1994 (Johannesburg).Google Scholar

68 Weekend Star, 9–10 April 1994.

69 Based on a survey of 800 residents of Katorus (Katlehong, Thokoza, and Vosloorus), 18–21 April 1994, conducted by telephone, thus excluding the (IFP) hostels (and the informal settlements) and according the sample a pro-ANC bias. National Peacekeeping Forces, pp. 4–5, 44–6, and 51.Google Scholar

70 For example, The Star 13 and 20 April 1994; Business Day, 19 April 1994; and Sunday Times, 24 April 1994.

71 The Star, 22 April 1994.

72 Business Day, 20 April 1994.

73 Southern Africa Report, 22 April 1994, p. 6, and Weekly Mail, 6–12 May 1994.

74 Lieutenant-General Hattingh Pretorius, SADF co-chairman of the Command Council, did subsequently resign following criticism of what Colonel Vic Walker claimed was not a military but a ‘political decision made at the highest level in the country’. The Citizen (Johannesburg), 22 04 1994.Google Scholar

75 Business Day, 11, 14, and 20 April 1994; The Citizen, 22 April 1994; and Sunday Times, 17 and 24 April 1994. By that latter date, the full three battalions of the NPKF had acquired five base camps, the largest near Natalspruit Hospital in Katlehong. One SADF company remained in the area.Google Scholar

76 Business Day and The Star, 15 April 1994, and Sunday Times, 17 April 1994.

77 Weekly Mail, 22–28 April 1994. The TEC had resisted the appointment of a deputy commander, presumably because he would likely have had to come from the SADF.Google Scholar

78 Human Rights Committee, Monthly Report, April 1994, p. 9.Google Scholar

79 Sowetan, The Star, and Business Day, 15 April 1994, and Weekend Star, 16–17 April 1994.

80 According to the Thokoza Civic Association's deputy general secretary, NPKF members were ‘diving for cover and pleading for shelter from local residents. They obviously aren't up to the job’. There were also suggestions of ‘apparent cowardice and panic among troops’. See Business Day, 19 April 1994, and Sunday Times, 24 April 1994.

81 Business Day, 19 April 1994, and The Star, 19 and 21 April 1994. Other media representatives present were convinced that a panicky NPKF member accidentally killed award-winning photographer Ken Oosterbroek. It seems at least as likely that it was an SDU bullet.Google Scholar

82 The Star, 20 April 1994, and Business Day, 21 April 1994.

83 Business Day, 20 April 1994. The ISU initially claimed that the NPKF had fired on it, but later admitted privately that this was untrue, though not before the media had carried the story. The Star, 21 April 1994.

84 The Star, 20 April 1994, and Weekend Star, 23–24 April 1994. According to General Ramushwana, SDU members ‘were shooting at the hostels from under and on the sides of our vehicles and the IFP people saw it as part of the attack’.Google Scholar

85 SouthScan, 29 April 1994, p. 123, and 27 May 1994, p. 155.Google Scholar According to ‘an impeccable NPKF source’, MK members did filter information to the SDUs: ‘We would strategize what we ought to be doing and before implementing the strategy the word would have been passed to the [township] residents – especially to the SDUs.’ Weekend Star, 23–24 April 1994.

86 Business Day and The Star, 20 April 1994.

87 Quinton Painter, a veteran of the East Rand conflicts of the 1980s, took over as commanding officer of the 2nd NPKF Battalion in early March, following the resignation of the previous CO in the aftermath of the pay strike. He struggled hard to introduce changes needed to make the National Peacekeeping Force viable. Sunday Times, 24 April 1994.Google Scholar

88 The Legal Support Plan, Regulation 18(1); Weekly Mail, 22–28 April 1994; Weekend Star, 23–24 April 1994; and Sunday Times, 24 April 1994. An account in Business Day, 20 April 1994, claimed that NPKF members ‘had given Painter an ultimatum to empower them to search the [IFP] hostel for arms or leave the Steunpunt base in Thokoza. Officers alleged Painter had left.’Google Scholar

89 Business Day, 20 and 21 April 1994; The Star, 20 April 1994; and Southern Africa Report, 22 April 1994. p. 6. Although the ANC complained to the Sub-Council on Defence concerning Painter's alleged incompetence, he retained his command.Google Scholar

90 Weekend Star, 23–24 April 1994. Lambert Moloi, MK chief of operations and co-chairman of the Command Council (now a Lieutenant-General in the SANDF), reportedly involved himself in tactical and not just policy issues at the height of the East Rand battle.Google Scholar

91 Sowetan and Business Day, 21 April 1994.

92 ‘Violence Levels Plummet’ proclaimed the page one headline in The Star, 21 April 1994.

93 The Citizen, 22 April 1994, and Sunday Times, 24 April 1994.Google Scholar

94 Business Day and The Citizen, 22 April 1994, and Weekend Star, 23–24 April 1994.Google Scholar

95 NPKF Headquarters, Press Release, 9 May 1994, and The Star, 11 May 1994.Google Scholar

96 Restructuring the Security Forces, p. 101, note 5, and National Peacekeeping Force, p. 15.Google Scholar

97 The Star, 9 February and 4 May 1994.Google Scholar

98 Ibid. 11 February 1994, and Sunday Times, 24 April 1994.

99 ‘The NPKF has a non-military and completely different role to that of a new defence force. Therefore, it could never form the nucleus of a new defence force and should not be seen as part of the SA Defence Force.’ SADF, ‘Reaction to Comments by the Chairman of the Commonwealth Monitoring Team about the National Peacekeeping Force’, 3 March 1994.

100 Cilliers, Jakkie, Sunday Times, 9 January 1994.Google Scholar

101 National Peacekeeping Force, pp. 6 and 15.

102 Ibid. 24 April 1994, and SouthScan, 29 April 1994, p. 123. The NPKF's budget allocations totalled R385.5 million or $106 million; SANDF fax to Business Day, 24 June 1994.

103 The Star, 4 May 1994; Joe Modise (Minister of Defence), News Statement, 1 June 1994; and SANDF, Bulletin, 21, 1 July 1994.Google Scholar

104 The Star, 4 May 1994.

105 Weekly Mail, 6–12 May 1994. One element of doubt here is the suspicion that some closely connected with the SADF may have had a hand in orchestrating a press campaign to ridicule the NPKF.Google Scholar

106 Sunday Times, 6 February 1994; The Star, 22 March 1994; and Weekly Mail, 22–28 April 1994. According to the TEC Act, 1993, section 16(13)(b)(c), ‘requirements of the National Peacekeeping Force in respect of uniforms, transport, accommodation, equipment and other logistical support’, as determined by the Sub-Council on Defence, ‘shall be supplied by the South African Defence Force’.Google Scholar

107 Major-General Holomisa charged that, at a meeting with the MK on 28 December 1993, the SADF reneged on an agreement to support a force of 10,000 by calling instead for a total of only 3,000, and ‘flatly refused to provide equipment to the force’. Letter to the TEC, 4 January 1994. Jakkie Cilliers suggests that ‘the relationship of the SADF to the NPKF was, at best, ambivalent. It reflected the technically “proper” relationship between two independent organizations, but no more’. National Peacekeeping Force, p. 3. See also, pp. 16, 18, and 23.

108 Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 11 02 1994;Google ScholarSouthern Africa Report, 22 April 1994, p. 6; and Sunday Times, 24 April 1994.Google Scholar

109 Even the SADF conceded that ‘the existence of the force should not be regarded as totally negative. It provided an opportunity to learn from mistakes made and to ensure that they were not repeated in the NDF’. SANDF, Bulletin, 21, 1 July 1994.

110 In January 1995, the new army chief reported that integration was now proceeding ‘very smoothly’, and added: ‘We have learnt from the past and rectified what went wrong’. Southern Africa Report, 20 January 1995, p. 6, interpreted these remarks as suggesting that MK ‘allegations of sabotage may not have been too far off the mark’.Google Scholar See also, ibid. 4 November 1994, pp. 4–5.

111 The Star, 4 May 1994; Weekend Star 7–8 May 1994; and SouthScan, 29 July 1994, p. 236.Google Scholar

112 Weekly Mail, 7–13 October 1994; Southern Africa Report, 14 October 1994, pp. 4–5, and 4 November 1994, pp. 4–5; and Business Day, 24 October 1994. The mass walk-out lost the dissidents a good deal of sympathy within the Government, the ANC, and the press, but less obviously among the public in the townships. Africa Confidential, 26 August 1994, p. 6; Sowetan, 2 November 1994; and The Citizen, 3 November 1994.Google Scholar