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Guinea's Economic Performance Under Structural Adjustment: Importance of Mining and Agriculture

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Bonnie Campbell  and
Jennifer Clapp
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Extract

Domestic policy inadequacies have been targeted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the main reason for poor economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa generally.1 The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) sponsored by these international financial institutions (IFIs) over the past decade have sought to rectify such policies. But many countries following their advice have continued to experience economic decline, albeit according to the World Bank, as a result primarily of their failure to properly implement the recommended reforms. It was argued in the late 1980s and early 1990S that governments pursuing strong adjustment programmes, even in the face of inhospitable world economic conditions, still outperformed weak reformers.2 This analysis does not hold with the same weight for all African countries. In the case of Guinea, external factors have been equally important in explaining its economic record under adjustment.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , September 1995 , pp. 425 - 449
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 See, for example, World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action (Washington, DC, 1981)Google Scholar and Adjustment in Africa: reforms, results, and the road ahead (Washington, DC, 1994).Google Scholar

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6 Cournanel, Alain, ‘Économic politique de la Guinée, 1958–1981’, in Bernstein, Henry and Campbell, Bonnie K. (eds.), Contradictions of Accumulation in Africa: studies in economy and state (Beverly Hills and London, 1985), pp. 207–47.Google Scholar

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9 See, for example, Campbell, Bonnie, ‘Negotiating the Bauxite/Aluminium Sector Under Narrowing Constraints’, in Review of African Political Economy (Sheffield), 51, 07 1991, pp. 27–49.Google Scholar

10 The ownership of the Halco Mining consortium was divided as follows: Alcan Aluminium Ltd, 27%; Aluminium Co. of America, 27%; Harvey Aluminium Inc., 20%; Pechiney Ugine, 10%; Vereinigte Aluminium Werke AG, 10%; and Montecatini Edison, 6%.

11 See Campbell, Bonnie, Les Enjeux de la bauxite: la Guinée face aux multinationales de l'aluminium (Montreal and Geneva, 1983), ch. 4.Google Scholar

12 Frialco's shares were mainly held by Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, United States (48·5%) and Pechiney Ugine, France (26·5%), with the rest being distributed between British Aluminium Company (10%), Aluminium Industrie AG, Switzerland (10%), and Vereinigte Aluminium Werke AG, Germany (5%).

13 The private partners in Friguia, after various renegotiations, were: Noranda, Canada (19·6 %); Pechiney, France (18·6 %); British Alcan, United Kingdom (5.1 %); Alusuisse, Switzerland (5·1 %); and VAW, Germany (2·6 %).

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27 Republic of Guinea. Country Economic Memorandum, Vol. 2, p. 36.Google Scholar

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34 SBK's exports increased from 1·2 to 2·4 million tonnes, and CBG's from 11·1 to 11·3 million tonnes. This accounts for the jump in mining sector growth from –1·5 per cent in 1992 to 9·5 per cent in 1993, as shown in Table 1.

35 It should be recalled that the sites of Tougué and Dabola have been the object of considerable interest in the past, as illustrated by the various exploratory agreements signed over the years: with Alusuisse in February 1971, Energyprojekt in April 1971, and with both in April 1974, while subsequent negotiations have involved Algeria. For more details, see Campbell, Les Enjeux de la bauxite, pp. 106–7.

36 The Boké site had an output of 11·5 million tonnes in 1990 and 1991, and output stabilised at around 11 million tonnes until 1995. Estimated reserves are 4,000 million tonnes. Country Profile, 1994–1995, p. 21, and Country Report, 2nd quarter, 1995, p. 14.

37 Country Profile, p. 20.

38 Guinea: mining sector review, p. 15.

39 Republic of Guinea. Country Economic Memorandum, Vol. 2, p. 38.

40 For a more detailed discussion, see Campbell, ‘Negotiating the Bauxite/Aluminium Sector Under Narrowing Constraints’, pp. 46–8.

41 Ibid. p. 47.

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52 Interviews by Jennifer Clapp at various agricultural projects in Guinea, 1989–90.

53 Galandrin, Jean, ‘Situation de la caféculture guinéenne et perspectives’, in Government of Guinea’, Journées nationales sur la filière café (Conakry), 1989).Google Scholar

54 The initial rise in ‘official’ prices did not have such a positive effect as expected because many farmers were already receiving higher prices on ‘parallel’ markets which were close to world levels.

55 Actes et recommendations de la deuxième conférence du développement rural, 1989.

56 International Coffee Organisation data.

57 FAO Trade Yearbook (Rome, 1994).Google Scholar

58 Clapp, Jennifer A., ‘Interpreting Agricultural Performance in Guinea under Structural Adjustment’, in Canadian Journal of African Studies (Toronto), 27, 3, 1993, pp. 182–3.Google Scholar

59 See Arulpragasam and Sahn, op. cit. p. 135.

60 Interviews by Jennifer Clapp with farmers in the Forest Zone, 1989–90.

61 For a detailed description of the rice importing and exporting process, see Arulpragasam and Sahn, op. cit. p. 113.

62 The various steps involved in the export of coffee are outlined in Clapp, Jennifer A., ‘African Agricultural Transformation and the World Bank: the case of Guinea’, Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics, 1992, ch. 4.Google Scholar

63 On this crisis, see Thenevin, Pierre, ‘Proposition d'amélioration du fonctionnement de la filiére rizicole en Guinée’, Ministry of Agriculture, Conakry, 1989.Google Scholar

64 Clapp, ‘Interpreting Agricultural Performance in Guinea under Structural Adjustment’, p.187.

65 Ministry of Planning and Finance, Emploi rural (Conakry, 1992), pp. 8 and 21.Google Scholar See also, US AID, Republic of Guinea: agriculture sector assessment (Conakry, 1990), p. 50.Google Scholar

66 Ministry of Planning and Finance, Macro-économie et dimensions sociales de l' adjustement (Conakry, 1992), p.12.Google Scholar

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69 Trends in Developing Economies, p. 201.

70 Country Profile, 1994–5, p. 20.

71 Ibid. p. 26.

72 See Clapp, Jennifer A., ‘Explaining Policy Reform Implementation in Guinea: the role of both internal and external factors’, in Journal of International Development (Chichester), 6, 3, 1994, pp. 15–16.Google Scholar

73 Ibid. pp. 10–11.

74 World Bank, ‘Aide Mémoire: CAS-II’, Conakry, 12 1992.Google Scholar

75 See UNDP, Human Development Report (New York), 1992, 1993, 1994 editions. Guinea had been sixth from the bottom of the UNDP's index in 1991.Google Scholar

76 Clapp, ‘Explaning Policy Reform Implementation in Guinea’, pp. 16–17.

77 ‘Aide Mémoire: CAS II’, p. 1.

78 ‘Guineé: les élections contre la démocratie’, in Jenune Afrique (Paris), 1722, 6–13 01 1994, pp. 16–17.Google Scholar

79 Africa Research Bulletin: political series (London), 1994, pp. 11, 479 and 11,588.Google Scholar

80 World Bank, ‘Guinée: aide mémoire’, Conakry, 1993, p. 1.Google Scholar