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Group Interests and the State: an Explanation of Zimbabwe's Agricultural Policies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Tor Skålnes
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Extract

While most African states are struggling hard to correct the severe imbalances in their economies that have been created, in part, by declining agricultural exports and rising food imports, recent evidence from Zimbabwe suggests that growth is being fuelled by the strong performance of the agricultural sector. In September 1988, it was expected that the value of crop production for 1988–9 would rise by 40 per cent over the previous year, contributing strongly to a real increase in the gross domestic product (G.D.P) of 5–6 per cent.1 The great foreign-exchange earners, tobacco and cotton, broke previous output records and achieved very favourable prices on the world market as well, and the maize harvest also improved significantly.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , March 1989 , pp. 85 - 107
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

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References

Page 85 note 1 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report. Zimbabwe, Malawi (London, 1988), 4, p. 18.Google Scholar

Page 85 note 2 Bratton, Michael, ‘The Comrades and the Countryside: the politics of agricultural policy in Zimbabwe’, in World Politics (Princeton), 32, 2, 01 1987, p. 176.Google Scholar

Page 85 note 3 Modern Farming Publications, Commercial Agriculture in Zimbabwe. 1987–88 Annual (Harare, 1988), p. 33.Google Scholar

Page 86 note 1 The Economic Intelligence Unit, op. cit. p. 11.

Page 86 note 2 According to the World Bank, World Development Report, 1987 (Washington, D.C., 1987), during 1980–5 the annual G.D.P. growth rates for Zimbabwe's neighbours were as follows: Mozambique –9·6, Zambia 0·1, Lesotho 0·5, Tanzania 0·8, South Africa 0·8, Zaïre 1·0, Malawi 2·0, Botswana 12·1. While Zimbabwe's debt in 1985 consituted 32·1 per cent of its G.N.P., the figure for Zambia was 150·8, Malawi 75·7, Tanzania 48·6, and Lesotho 30·1.Google Scholar

Page 86 note 3 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action (Washington, D.C., 1981).Google Scholar

Page 87 note 1 For instance, Lofchie, Michael F. and Commins, Stephen K., ‘Food Deficits and Agricultural Policies in Tropical Africa’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 20, 1, 03 1982, pp. 1–25;Google ScholarBarker, Jonathan (ed.), The Politics of Agricultural in Tropical Africa (Berverly Hills, London, and New Delhi, 1984);Google ScholarSandbrook, Richard, with Barker, Judith, The Pollitics of Africa's Economic Stagnation (Cambridge, 1985);CrossRefGoogle Scholar a number of writers in Commins, Stephen K., Lofchie, Micheal F., and Payne, Rhys (eds.), Africa's Agrarian Crisis: the roots of famine (Boulder, 1986);Google Scholar and Ghai, Dharam and Smith, Lawrence, Agricultural Prices, Policy, and Equity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Boulder, 1987).Google Scholar

Page 87 note 2 Bates, Robert H., Markets and States in Tropical Africa: the political basis of africultural policies (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1981).Google Scholar

Page 87 note 3 ibid. p. 33.

Page 89 note 1 ibid. p. 56.

Page 90 note 1 For example, the N.L.M. in Ghana in the 1950s and the K.P.U. in Kenya in the 1960s were banned when they tried to mobilise the rural areas in defence of farmers' interests.

Page 90 note 2 Riddell, Roger C., ‘Industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Phase One. Country Case Study – Zimbabwe’, Overseas Development Institute, London, 01 1988, pp. 31–4.Google Scholar

Page 91 note 1 World Bank, Zimbabwe. An Industrial Sector Memorandum (Harare, 1987), p. xiii. The report goes on to state that ‘An analysis of the sources and uses of funds in 1980–85 shows that internally generated funds provided nearly three-quarters of new resources, with increase in long-term debt adding a modest one-tenth.’Google Scholar

Page 91 note 2 Bratton, loc. cit. pp. 182–3.

Page 91 note 3 Thomson, Anne M., ‘Zimbabwe’, in Harvey, Charles (ed.), Agricultural Pricing Policy in Africa (London, 1988), p. 203.Google Scholar

Page 91 note 4 A view supported by an official of the Commercial Farmers Union at a meeting with the author in Harare, September 1988.

Page 92 note 1 Mitchell, Bruce, ‘The State and the Workers' Movement in Zimbabwe’, in South African Labour Bulletin (Durban), 12, 6–7, 08–09 1987.Google Scholar

Page 92 note 2 Davies, Rob, ‘Market Liberalisation in Zimbabwe, 1980 to 1987: the case of subsidies’, Third Annual Conference on Food Security Research in Southern Africa,Harare,September 1987, p. 31.Google Scholar

Page 92 note 3 Bratton, loc. cit. p. 184.

Page 92 note 4 Mitchell, loc. cit. pp. 21–4.

Page 95 note 1 Hirschman, Albert, ‘The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants’, in Essays in Trespassing (Cambridge, 1981), p. 110.Google Scholar

Page 95 note 2 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Taxation under the Chairmanship of Dr. Raja J. Chelliah (Harare, 04 1986), pp. 59and 414, tables 4.9 and A.24.Google Scholar

Page 95 note 3 ibid. pp. 226–6.

Page 97 note 1 Probably to around 80 per cent. See Weiner, Daniel, ‘Land and Agricultural Developments’, in Stoneman, Colin (ed.), Zimbabwe's Prospects: issues of race, class, state and capital in Southern Africa (London, 1988), p. 74.Google Scholar

Page 98 note 1 According to the author's notes of a meeting in Harare with the C.F.U.'s cheif economist on 9 September 1988, ‘There has been a fast enough slide of the Zimbabwean dollar as far as the C.F.U. is concerned. If there was a larger devaluation, inputs would just become more expensive, and prices have risen fast in the last couple of years. The agricultural sector imports around Z$300 million for inputs.’ There was great dissatisfaction, however, with the way that imports were licensed and foreign exchange allocated, all part of the policy of keeping an overvalued currency.

Page 99 note 1 Economist Intelligence Unit, op. cit. p. 11.

Page 99 note 2 This Chamber of Mines view of the currency was expressed by Robinson, Messrs and Bain when interviewed by the author in Harare, 27 September 1988.Google Scholar

Page 99 note 3 However, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, op. cit. p. 2, a not insignificant 9·4 per cent of total imports came from the United States in 1986. Furthermore, as oil is quoted in U.S.$ and must be imported, a devaluation against that currency would increase the fuel bill. Manufacturers in other countries might be tempted to increase their prices when selling to Zimbabwe if competition from American firms were reduced.

Page 100 note 1 See Bates ‘Commonalities and Variations: the politics of agricultural policy’, in op. cit. pp. 119–32.

Page 100 note 2 Phimister, Ian, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 1980–1948: capital accumlation and class struggle (London and New York, 1988), pp. 171–6 and 227.Google Scholar

Page 101 note 1 Hunt, A. F., ‘European Agriculture’, in Leistner, G. M. E. (ed.), Rhodesia: economic structure and change (Pretoria, 1976), p. 80.Google Scholar

Page 101 note 2 ibid. pp. 86–7.

Page 102 note 1 Herbst, Jeffrey, ‘Policy Formulation and Implementation in Zimbabwe: understanding state autonomy and the locus of decision-making’, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, 1987, p. 173.Google Scholar

Page 102 note 2 Zimbabwean agricultural land is divided into six ecological zones, according to rainfall and soil fertility, each of which is called a ‘Natural Region’ (N.R.): I is suitable for specialised products such as fruits and vegetables, tea and coffee; II for intensive production of maize, tobacco, and sugar; III for semi-intensive maize, cotton, livestock, sorghum, and millet: IV for semi-extensive livestock, maize, sorghum, and millet; V for extensive livestock only; while VI is unsuitable for farming. The breakdown of these various regions into ratios of black and white ownership is given in Munslow, Barry, ‘Prospects for the Socialist Transition of Agriculture in Zimbabwe’, in World Development (Oxford), 13, 1985, p. 42; 75 per cent of all African land falls within N.R.s IV and V.Google Scholar

Page 105 note 1 The routes to Beira, Nacala, and Maputo have all been attacked by the guerrillas, and massive amounts of money are still spent on upgrading and defending militarily the Beira Corridor. A successful export drive is very dependent upon improved access to the sea through Mozambique, since the alternative routes would mean increased dependence upon South Africa.Google Scholar

Page 105 note 2 Herbst, op. cit. ch. 5.

Page 106 note 1 ibid. p. 168.