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Ghana, The Congo, and The United Nations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Jitendra Mohan
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The recurrent crisis in the (ex-Belgian) Congo, which first exploded soon after the country's independence on 30 June 1960, was the main event in the history both of the United Nations (U.N.) and of Africa during the 1960s. Its first phase (with which this paper largely deals) opened with the mutiny of the Force publique on 5 July, the intervention of Belgian troops on 10 July, and the proclamation of Katanga's independence on 11 July; it came to an end with the suppression of Katanga's secession, tentatively in December 1961 and conclusively in January 1963. The Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (O.N.U.C.) was authorised by the Security Council on 14 July, on the independent initiative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, and in response to the Congo Government's appeals to the U.N. for technical and military assistance. The operation was the biggest and costliest by far in the life of the U.N.; 1 and its course was marked by political as well as financial ruin, from which the U.N. has never quite recovered. Evidence for this was furnished early. By the time the operation formally came to an end on 30 June 1964, the Congo was already in the thick of the second phase of the crisis; this phase, which began with the outbreak of rebellion in Kwilu in January 1964, was brought to an end of sorts by the Belgian-American military intervention in Stanleyville in November 1964, which produced few signs of activity by the U.N.

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The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , October 1969 , pp. 369 - 406
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1969

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References

Page 369 note 1 The so-called U.N. action in Korea, although far grander in scale, was essentially a war operation by western powers, conducted in the name of the U.N. but in fact under the command and control of the United States. In the light of the subsequent development of the U.N., it is hardly a relevant precedent.

Page 370 note 1 For an illuminating analysis of the Congo crisis in relation to the movement of African unity, see Wallerstein, Immanuel, Africa: the politics of unity (New York, 1967),Google Scholar ch. 4.

Page 371 note 1 I have analysed some aspects of Ghana's emerging foreign policy in ‘Ghana Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1957–60’, in The Economic Bulletin of Ghana (Legon), X, 4, 1966;Google Scholar and I have surveyed the general course of Ghanaian politics, with an accent on internal developments, in ‘Nkrumah and Nkrumaism’, in The Socialist Register 1967 (London, 1967).Google Scholar

Page 372 note 1 Nkrumah, Kwame, Challenge of the Congo (London, 1967), p. 16.Google Scholar

Page 372 note 2 See Hoskyns, Catherine, The Congo since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (London, 1965), pp. 62 and 77.Google Scholar I have drawn heavily throughout on this excellent account.

Page 373 note 1 See Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom: a statement of African ideology (New York, 1961), p. 179.Google Scholar

Page 373 note 2 Nkrumah, , Challenge of the Congo, p. 17.Google Scholar

Page 374 note 1 Nkrumah's address to the National Assembly, Ghana, , Parliamentary Debates (Accra), 8 08 1960, col. 644.Google Scholar

Page 374 note 2 African Unity: a speech by Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah… on opening Africa Unity House in London, 18th March, 1961 (n.d.), p. 3. Cf. Kasavubu's message to the President of the U.N. General Assembly of 23 October 1960: ‘we are first and foremost Congolese and only secondarily Africans’ (U.N. document A/4560).

Page 374 note 3 Nkrumah, , Challenge of the Congo, p. 14.Google Scholar

Page 374 note 4 Correspondence exchanged between Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah… and the Leaders of the Republic of the Congo on The Congo Situation (Accra, n.d.), p. 4.Google Scholar This document is hereinafter referred to as ‘W.P. No. 6/60’.

Page 375 note 1 See Hoskyns, op. cit. pp. 158—9; also Parliamentary Debates (Accra), 29 07 1960, cols. 339–40,Google Scholar for a statement by the Minister of Defence on Ghana troops in the Congo. See also two articles, ‘Review of Ghana's Role in the Congo’ and ‘Ghana's Help to the Congo Reviewed’, in The Evening News (Accra), 12 and 1 12 1960,Google Scholar for particulars of Ghana's considerable help in the medical and technical fields.

Page 376 note 1 [United States Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs] Cleveland, Harlan, ‘The UN in the Congo: three questions’ [02 1963],Google Scholar in Kitchen, Helen (ed.), Footnotes to the Congo Story (New York, 1967), p. 71.Google Scholar

Page 377 note 1 Much, though, would be heard later from American sources to the effect that a U.N. intervention in the Congo was the only alternative to a ‘big-power intervention’ or ‘Soviet—American confrontation’ in the heart of Africa. This may be compared with the case of the present civil war in Nigeria, in which both marked Soviet activity and marked U.N. inactivity have evoked in Washington neither major protests at ‘Soviet penetration’ of Nigeria or West Africa, nor ominous warnings of a ‘Soviet—American confrontation’; nor have there even been calls for U.N. intervention.

Page 377 note 2 The Elements in Our Congo Policy (Washington, 1965), pp. 2–3, 19–20, and 8–9.Google Scholar While attesting to Adoula's ‘moderate’ character, in the same address Ball referred to Gizenga as ‘the Communist-chosen instrument’ and ‘the agent of Communist designs’ in the Congo (pp. 11 and 15).

Page 378 note 1 Ibid. pp. 18–19. For a first detailed classification of the new states into ‘radicals’' ‘moderates’, and ‘conservatives’, see Good, Robert C., ‘The Congo Crisis: a study of post- colonial politics’, in Martin, Laurence W. (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment: the new states in world affairs (New York, 1962).Google Scholar Good was later Director of African Research in the State Department under Hilsman, Roger, who in his book To Move a Nation: the politics of foreign policy in the administration of John F. Kennedy (New York, 1967), pp. 240–3,Google Scholar implicitly follows Good's classification.

Page 378 note 2 Lefever, Ernest W., Crisis in the Congo: a United Nations force in action (Washington, 1965), p. 76;Google Scholar altogether an eye-opening book.

Page 380 note 1 Nkrumah's, press statement of 6 August, cited in his address to the National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, 8 08 1960, cols. 641–2.Google Scholar

Page 380 note 2 See Hoskyns, op. cit. pp. 170–2.

Page 380 note 3 Ghana Government Note to the U.N. Secretary-General of 10 August 1960, W.P. No. 6/60, pp. 9–10.

Page 381 note 1 See Hoskyns, Catherine, ‘The Part Played by the Independent African States in the Congo Crisis July 1960-December 1961’, in Austin, Dennis and Weiler, Hans N. (eds.), Inter-State Relations in Africa (Freiburg i. Br., 1965), p. 38.Google Scholar See also Quaison-Sackey, Alex, Africa Unbound: reflections of an African statesman (New York, 1963), pp. 86–7.Google Scholar Djin was prepared to go to Elisabethville and plead with Tshombe himself to end Katanga's secession, but was not allowed to do so by Lurnumba.

Page 381 note 2 See Hoskyns, , The Congo since Independence, p. 190.Google Scholar

Page 381 note 3 Ghana Minister of Foreign Affairs, Note to the President of the U.N. Security Council of 1 August 1960, U.N. document S/4415.

Page 382 note 1 Nkrumah's press statement of 6 August 1960. There was in fact an abortive attempt to secede Katanga from the Congo just two days before the country's independence; and there had long been a ‘secessionist movement’ among Katangan whites which had latterly been ‘Africanised’.

Page 382 note 2 Nkrumah's, address to the National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, 17 08 1960, col. 816.Google Scholar

Page 382 note 3 W.P. No. 6/60, p. 5.

Page 383 note 1 Nkrumah's letter of instructions of 17 August 1960 to Djin, Ghana's ambassador in Léopoldville, W. P. No. 6/60, p. 12; also Nkrumah's letters to Lumumba dated 19 and 22 August and 12 September 1960, ibid.

Page 383 note 2 Ibid.; also Nkrumah's letter to Lumumba dated ‘September, 1960’, ibid. p. 21.

Page 385 note 1 Perhaps the most succinct statement of this point is Nyerere's June 1966 memorandum on foreign policy: Nyerere, Julius K., Principles and Development (Dar es Salaam, 1967).Google Scholar

Page 385 note 2 See Nkrumah's letter to the U.N. Secretary-General of 16 December 1963, cited in his Challenge of the Congo, p. 238.

Page 387 note 1 Nkrumah's telegram to Lumumba of 6 September 1960, W.P. No. 6/60, p. 15.

Page 388 note 1 Ghana Government statement of 16 September 1960, Ghana Today (London), 28 09 1960.Google Scholar

Page 388 note 2 Nkrumah, , Challenge, pp. 39 and 48.Google Scholar

Page 388 note 3 W.P. No. 6/60, p. 16.

Page 389 note 1 For Alexander's proposals and Nkrumah's endorsement, see U.N. document S/5 (19 August 1960). For General Alexander's version of the Congo story, see his African Tightrope (London, 1965), passim.Google Scholar

Page 389 note 2 See The Evening News, 07 1960.Google Scholar

Page 389 note 3 Cited in Nkrumah, , Challenge, pp. 39–41 and 47–54.Google Scholar

Page 391 note 1 See Merriam, Alan P., Congo: background of conflict (Evanston, 1961), p. 267.Google Scholar

Page 392 note 1 Nkrumah's, address to the U.N. General Assembly on 23 08 1960,Google Scholar cited in I Speak of Freedom, p. 268. For Djin's report on the reconciliation attempts, see Nkrumah, , Challenge, pp. 58–61;Google Scholar see also Hoskyns, , The Congo since Independence, pp. 219–22.Google Scholar

Page 392 note 2 See Nkrumah's letter to Welbeck of 21 January 1960, in Challenge, pp. 86–7. For the Congolese note declaring Djin et al. personae non gratae and for the Ghanaian reply of 10 10, see W.P. No. 6/60, pp. 25–6.Google Scholar

Page 393 note 1 See Quaison-Sackey, op. cit. pp. 90–1.

Page 394 note 1 The Ghanaian Times (Accra), 28 11 1960.Google Scholar

Page 394 note 2 Ibid. December 1960.

Page 394 note 3 Challenge, p. 202. Lumumba was then already dead, but at the time of Nkrumah's letter to Kennedy this was not yet public knowledge.

Page 395 note 1 Ghana Today, 21 12 1960.Google Scholar

Page 395 note 2 See The Congo Situation (Accra, n.d.), containing the texts of Nkrumah's letter to Hammarskjöld of 7 December and of his radio broadcast of 15 December 1960.

Page 396 note 1 See Hoskyns, op. cit. pp. 213, 217, and 244.

Page 396 note 2 Nkrumah's address to the General Assembly on 7 March 1961, Osagyefo at the United Nations: solution for the Congo (Accra, n.d.), p. 10.Google Scholar

Page 398 note 1 Nkrumah's message to Sékou Touré of 14 December 1960, in Challenge, p. 110.

Page 398 note 2 The limitations of the radical states were very real indeed. Thus by the end of July 1960 nearly half and by far the best part of the Ghana Army was fully engaged in the Congo. Between the financial years 1959–60 and 1960–1 Ghana's defence budget was nearly doubled, to some £iom.; in 1961–2 it was increased to some £14m. Source: Economic Survey 1962 (Accra, 1963), p. 106.Google Scholar Elaborate plans were afoot to expand and reorganise the Ghana Army, in spite of a sceptical and reluctant General Alexander; in 1961 the Soviet Union was tapped as a fresh source of military equipment and training. Inevitably, there was a tendency for ambitions to run well ahead of resources. But, whatever their final outcome, these long- term plans could not be turned to any immediate advantage in a real situation like that in the Congo. What was true of Ghana was true also, mutatis mutandis, of other radical African states. The U.A.R., the one possible exception, already had too many irons in the fire, committing its resources to the full.

Page 398 note 3 Challenge, p. 111.

Page 399 note 1 Alex Quaison-Sackey, Ghana's representative on the Conciliation Commission, refused, however, to sign its final report; for his reasons, see U.N. documents A/4711 and Addenda I and 2, Annex xx.

Page 399 note 2 For Nkrumah's proposals to Hammarskjöld and the Casablanca foreign ministers' proposals, see Challenge, pp. 134–8. For Nkrumah's address to the General Assembly, see Osagyefo at the United Nations. See also Nkrumah's note to Adlai Stevenson some days later, as an informal gloss on his own General Assembly address; Challenge, pp. 146–51. Guinea attended the Accra meeting, but did not endorse the final declaration.

Page 400 note 1 According to Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (London, 1965), p. 503Google Scholar: ‘During the summer of 1962 British, Belgian and American officials worked together on a new unification plan [for the Congo] which U Thant put into final form and sponsored in September.’ The plan ‘was based on proposals submitted by the United States to the Secretary-General on August 9’ and ‘slightly modified’ by him. It ‘reflected a growing convergence of American and Belgian views on the desirability of salvaging Tshombe for a positive role in a unified Congo’—thus Lefever, op. cit. pp. 102–3, who also states that the Soviet Union ‘was in favour of the Plan without any reservation whatsoever’. See also Gerard-Libois, Jules, Katanga Secession (Madison, 1966), pp. 254–5.Google Scholar

Page 401 note 1 A scrutiny of three ‘inside’ accounts of the Kennedy administration—two from inside the White House, one from inside the State Department—fails to disclose any hard evidence for the claim that the Soviets were about to make a big ‘kill’ in Central Africa. What it does disclose is that it was the State Department's mounting anxiety as to the chances of survival of the ‘moderates’ in Léopoldville which moved it to argue with vehemence for firm action against Tshombe. In view of the opposition from interested quarters to the proposed course of action, however, the State Department found it expedient to base its ‘public’ case, in Congressional and press ‘backgroundings’, on ‘the imminent threat of a Soviet take-over’ in the Congo. See Schlesinger, op. cit. pp. 503–4; Sorensen, Theodore C., Kennedy (London, 1966), pp. 704–5;Google Scholar and Hilsman, op. cit. pp. 264–8.

Page 402 note 1 The present Mobutu régime in the Congo is in many respects the direct successor to the Adoula régime.

Page 403 note 1 For the ups and downs of Gizenga's own party as a microcosm (as it were) of Congolese politics, see Weiss, Herbert F., Political Protest in the Congo: the Parti Solidaire Africain during the independence struggle (Princeton, 1967).Google Scholar The state of Congolese nationalist forces may be illustrated with one example. Leading factions within the Conseil national de libération—which had been established in October 1963 by ex-Lumumbists and ex-Gizengists to pave the way for ‘revolution’ in the Congo—were severally in negotiation with Tshombe early in 1964, presumably to enlist him on the side of ‘revolution’. Tshombe did return to the Congo a few months later, but for purposes other than ‘revolutionary’.

Page 406 note 1 See Nkrumah's correspondence on this subject in January 1963 with the U.N. Secretary- General and Prime Minister Adoula, in Challenge, pp. 214–23. The Congolese Foreign Minister, Bomboko, dismissed the Ghanaian initiative as a ‘flagrant interference in the internal affairs’ of his country. In March Ghana dropped its demand for Tshombe's arrest as its contribution towards smoothing the way to the founding conference of the O.A.U. in May 1963.

Page 406 note 2 See Challenge, ch. 21. The Ghanaian proposal was opposed by the Congo Government. Nkrumah in a message on 2 October 1963 advised the Ghana Foreign Minister then in New York to ‘insist that this question [of an all-African force] is particularly an African problem and not one for the Congolese people alone because none of us can escape the consequences of a stongly-entrenched neo-colonialist force in the Congo’. Ibid. pp. 231–2.

Page 406 note 3 Ghana Today, 26 April 1961. In the past, on issues such as Korea and Hungary which, like Cuba, bore directly on the interests of the super-powers, Ghana had been scrupulously ‘correct’, i.e. neutral.