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Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations, and the Congo Crisis of 1960–1: a Reinterpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

David N. Gibbs
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Extract

The Congo constituted the largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations, at least until recently, being only exceeded in scale by current actions in Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Somalia. It included, during 1960–4, not only civilian advisers who helped run the central règime in Lèopoldiville, but also an army which, at full strength, comprised 19,000 troops. They intervened extensively in the politics of the country, thereby not conforming to the popular image of a passive ‘peace-keeping’ force.

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Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 163 - 174
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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References

1 See, for example, Franck, Thomas M. and Carey, John, The Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo (Dobbs Ferry, 1963);Google ScholarLefever, Ernest W., Crisis in the Congo: a U.N. force in action (Washington, DC, 1965);Google ScholarGendebien, P. H., L'Intervention des Nations Unies au Congo, 1960–1964 (Paris, 1967);Google Scholar and United Nation, The Blue Helmets (New York, 1985), pt. 5.Google Scholar

2 Cf.Collins, Carole, ‘Fatally Flawed Mediation: Cordier and the Congo crisis of 1960’, in Africa Today (Denver), 39, 3, 1992, pp. 5–22.Google Scholar

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9 Whatever the merits of the argument that the colonies were more of a liability than an asset in most cases, the Congo had an exceptionally high economic value. For a generally critical view of the thesis of ‘economic imperialism’, see Fieldhouse, D.K., Economics and Empire 1830–1914, (Ithaca, 1973).Google Scholar

10 O'Brien, op. cit. p. 173.

11 ‘Belgian Giant Maps New Areas for Profit’, in Business Week (New York), 26 05 1962.Google Scholar

12 ‘The Congo is in Business’, in Fortune (New York), 11 1952.Google ScholarPubMed

13 See statements by a Belgian journalist in O'Brien, op. cit. pp. 84 and 239.

14 Quoted from U.N. document, ‘Report on Mercenaries and Other Forms of Foreign Intervention in Katanga’, dated (probably) 23 October 1961; DAG-1/2.2.1, Box 47, United Nations Archives, New York.Google Scholar

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16 Hemstone, Smith, Rebels, Mercenaries, and Dividends: the Katanga story (New York, 1962), p. 46. The author, then a journalist, is currently U.S. ambassador to Kenya.Google Scholar

17 O'Brien, op. cit. p. 164.

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19 Roger Trinquier's activities in both Indochina and Katanga are discussed by McCoy, Alfred Jr., The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York, 1972), ch. 4.Google Scholar

20 O'Brien, op. cit. p. 197.

21 Department of State, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’, 27 January 1961, p. 72; National Security File, Countries Series, Box 86, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.Google Scholar

22 The U.N. force adopted a ‘hands off’ attitude with regard to Katanga from July until mid- September 1960, when Rejeshwar Dayal, an Indian national, arrived in the Congo as Hammarskjöld's personal representative. This anti-Katanga stance continued until the termination of the secession in January 1963.Google Scholar

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26 Although Brussels gradually distanced itself from Tshombe's régime, according to Gérard-Libois, Jules, Katanga Secession (Madison, 1966), p. 158, Belgian policy changed especially quickly after a new left-leaning government was elected and assumed office in April 1961Google Scholar. However, Belgian mining interests continued to support Tshombe long after the termination of the Katanga secession. See Gibbs, op. cit. chs. 4–6.

The finding that it was the mining companies, not the Belgian Government, which played the dominant rôle in the Katanga secession contradicts the notion of the ‘autonomous’ state, insulated from business pressures, which has been popularised by, for example, Skocpol, Theda, ‘Bringing the State Back In: strategies of analysis in current research’, in Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 3–43.Google Scholar

27 On these events, see Dayal, Rejeshwar, Mission for Hammarskjöld (Delhi, 1976), ch. 16.Google Scholar

28 According to Wheatcroft, Geoffrey, ‘The Center Holds I’, in The New Republic (Washington, DC), 12–1909 1988.Google Scholar

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31 Translated and quoted by Representative Bruce, Donald, ‘Is Katanga on the Auction Bloc?’, in Congressional Record (Washington, DC), 12 09 1962, p. 19247.Google Scholar

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35 Although The Washington Post, 31 December 1991, ran a good article by Russell Warren Howe, entitled ‘Union Minière: an enigma of Congo crisis’, the allegations against the U.N. were not reported at all by The New York Times.Google Scholar

36 Gavshon, Arthur, The Last Days of Dag Hammarskjöld (London, 1963), p. 125. His assertions were mainly the outcome of interviews with Swedish officials, not necessarily the best or most objective sources of information about the Secretary-General.Google Scholar

37 For example, Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (New York, 1967), p. 262, claimed that the charges of financial ties were ‘quickly and easily refuted’, although offering no specifics.Google Scholar See also, Urquhart, Brian, Hammarskjöld (New York, 1972), p. 575.Google Scholar

38 Copies of the original documents can be found in the Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis.Google Scholar

39 Ibid. Researchers interested in the Secretary-General's collection of personal papers in Stockholm are advised to consult Trachtenberg, Larry, ‘A Bibliographic Essay on Dag Hammarskjöld’, in Jordan, Robert S. (ed.), Dag Hammarskjöld Revisited (Durham, 1983).Google Scholar

40 Dun and Bradstreet report, dated 5 November 1959; Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indianapolis.Google Scholar According to Le Monde (Paris), 24–2507 1960, Detwiler was also directly affiliated with the Lamco group itself.Google Scholar

41 Börje Hjortzberg-Nordlund, ‘Mining Situation in the Republic of the Congo’, 30 September 1960; DAG-13/1.6.1.0, Box 72, U.N. Archives, New York.Google Scholar

42 Lamco's and Liberian Iron Ore's Securities and Exchange Commission Prospectus, 15 November 1961, p. 45, in Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indianapolis. See also Lisagor, Nancy and Lipsius, Frank, A Law Unto Itself: the untold story of the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell (New York, 1988).Google Scholar

43 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation on ‘History and Status of Liberian-American Mining Company (LAMCO)’, 28 March 1958, released under mandatory review by the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.Google Scholar

44 See Ball, George, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York, 1982).Google Scholar

45 According to Sorenson, Theodore C., Kennedy (New York, 1965), pp. 630–1, Fowler Hamilton ‘was nearly nominated’ as C.I.A. director, but was then assigned at the last moment to foreign aid.Google Scholar

46 I.A.A.C.'s Annual Report, 1960, and Lamco's and Liberian Ore's…Prospectus, 1961; Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indianapolis.Google Scholar

47 See Weissman, Stephen R., American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964 (Ithaca and London, 1974);Google ScholarKalb, Madeleine, The Congo Cables (New York, 1982);Google ScholarMahoney, Richard D., JFK: ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983); and Gibbs, op. cit.Google Scholar

48 This assortment of American companies is discussed at length in Gibbs, ibid. ch. 4.

49 The U.S. ambassador to Belgium noted ‘the emotional (sometimes near hysterical) atmosphere of Brussels’ due to international involvement in the Congo crisis. Cable from Douglas MacArthur II to State Department, dated 4 January 1962; National Security File, Countries Series, Box 20/30, John F.Kennedy Library, Boston.Google Scholar

50 Gavshon, op. cit. p. 126.

51 Kalb, op. cit.

52 Weissman, op. cit., which remains, in my opinion, one of the best accounts of the Congo crisis.

53 See, especially, Krasner, Stephen, Defending the National Interest (Princeton, 1978). The neorealists emphasise the importance of state interests in international relations, an approach not well supported by the facts of the Congo crisis, since so much of the conflict involved private companies.Google Scholar

54 Hammarskjöld's plane was shot down by the U.S.S.R., according to Shevchenko, Arkady, Breaking with Moscow (New York, 1985), pp. 102–3. However, this Soviet defector's report is of very dubious reliability, as pointed out by Edward J. Epstein, ‘The Spy Who Came in to Be Sold’, in The New Republic, 15–22 July 1985, who found extensive factual errors and other serious flaws in Shevchenko's account.Google Scholar

55 The importance of commercial rivalries is the main theme of my recent book on the Congo, Gibbs, op. cit., which appeared in 1991, before the recent revelations about Hammarskjöld's death.Google Scholar