The Beneficiaries of Transkeian ‘Independence’

Roger J. Southall

doi:10.1017/S0022278X00014452

The Beneficiaries of Transkeian ‘Independence’

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008

Roger J. Southall

Article contents

Extract
References

Get access

Rights & Permissions

Extract

In a recent article, Heribert Adam argued that the ‘prevalent view of South Africa combines conceptual errors with false methodological emphasis and, often, wishful thinking’, and that the ‘popular perspective represents a gross over-simplification of a far more complex situation.’1 The analysis to which he was objecting views South Africa as an outdated colonial society, in which white settlers enforce a racially defined domination upon an exploited mass of the black population, which is reduced to serving primarily as a source of cheap labour for white capital by an immense battery of totalitarian controls. Linked to this view - and now fuelled by the widespread riots during mid-1976 throughout African urban areas - is the assumption that substantive political change will necessarily come about by violent revolution, motivated by the growing determination of a burgeoning black population to force a redistribution of power and wealth. However, as Adam further pointed out, analysis of South Africa purely in terms of racial conflict leaves important questions unanswered, for there is need to explore how the differential distribution of wealth and resources - political and economic - originated, and how they are maintained.

Type: Articles
Information: The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , March 1977 , pp. 1 - 23

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00014452 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

^{Page 1 note 1} Adam, Heribert, ‘Conquest and Conflict in South Africa’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), XIII, 4, 12 1975, p. 621.Google Scholar

^{Page 1 note 2} Ibid. pp. 622 and 640.

^{Page 2 note 1} The 1936 Act was never intended at the time to serve as a basis for the fragmentation of the country into a number of separate states, but the Government has been resolute in taking it as the territorial basis for ‘lseparate development’. However, lands delineated as Native Reserves but never allocated under the 1936 proposals are now being distributed; and because the majority of Homelands consist of many land fragments, the Government is engaging in a process of ‘consolidation’, reducing the number of pieces of each Homeland, and removing blacks from the white areas. For the ‘final’ consolidation plans, see the Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 28 07 1975Google Scholar; and for a survey of the resettlement of the population, see Rogers, Barbara, Divide and Rule: South Africa's Bantustans (London, 1976).Google Scholar

^{Page 2 note 2} For a sophisticated sociological rationalisation of ‘separate development’, see Rhoodie, N.J. and Venter, H. J., Apartheid: a socio-historical exposition of the origin and development of the apartheid idea (Amsterdam, 1960).Google Scholar

^{Page 2 note 3} Lipton, Merle, ‘Independent Bantustans’, in International Affairs (London), 48, 1, 01 1972, pp. 1–19.Google Scholar

^{Page 3 note 1} Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly (Umtata), 25–27 03 1974.Google Scholar

^{Page 4 note 1} Hanimond-Tooke, W. D., Command or Consensus: the development of Transkeian local government (Cape Town, 1975).Google Scholar

^{Page 5 note 1} The fullest guide to this period is by Carter, Gwendolen M., Karis, Thomas, and Stultz, Newell M., South Africa's Transkei: the politics of domestic colonialism (London, 1967), chs. 7 and 8.Google Scholar

^{Page 5 note 2} In 1963, only 30 per Cent of the electorate were said to be literate. The reported statement by the Secretary of the Interior that ‘the introduction of a symbol system would be a retrogressive step in a country where illiteracy is on the way out’ - The Daily News (Durban), is 12 1969Google Scholar - should therefore be taken with rather more than a pinch of salt.

^{Page 6 note 1} Mbeki, Govan, South Africa: the peasants' revolt (Harmondsworth, 1964).Google Scholar Cf. also Copelyn, J. A., ‘The Mpondo Revolt, 1960’, M.A. Honours thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1974.Google Scholar

^{Page 6 note 2} Rand Daily Mail, 26 July 1976 and 11 August 1976.

^{Page 6 note 3} Carter, Karis, and Stultz did secure access to election returns in urban centres in 1963, and found that voting preferences differed markedly from rural areas - op. cit. pp. 143–5. Merging the urban into the rural figures in later elections has enabled the South African authorities to obscure this feature which emphasises the failure of Eantustan institutions to represent the interests of Africans in white areas.

^{Page 6 note 4} Kotzé, H. J., ‘Transkeian General Election’, in Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa (Pretoria), 9, 1973, pp. 349–52.Google Scholar

^{Page 7 note 1} Sources: 1963 and 1968: P. Cramer, D. Louw, and G. Norman, ‘Aspects of Transkeian Political History’, in Moss, Glen, ‘South Africa's Transkei', Students’ Representative Council, University of the Witwatersrand, 1974, mimeographed; 1973Google Scholar: Daily Dispatch (East London), 5 11 1973Google Scholar, and Eastern Province Herald (Port Elizabeth), 20 11 1973; 1976Google Scholar: Rand Daily Mail,, 6 October 1976, and Daily Dispatch, 16 October 1976.

^{Page 7 note 2} Kotzé, D. A., African Politics in South Africa, 1964–1974: parties and issue (London, 1975), p. 208.Google Scholar

^{Page 8 note 1} Sources: P. A. Kotzé, op. cit. Table 9. IV, and Daily Dispatth, 21 and 23 October 1976. It should be noted that these figures relate to the election of only 40 and 59 seats in 1973 and 1976, 5 and 16 members being returned unopposed in these respective contests.

^{Page 8 note 2} Rand Daily Mail, January 1976.

^{Page 8 note 3} No consolidated statement of Ncokazi's position has been published, but see the following sources for second-hand reports: Rand Daily Mail, 6 January and 21 July 1976; Weekend World (Johannesburg), 25 01 1976Google Scholar; Natal Daily News, 6 February 1976.

^{Page 8 note 4} Rand Daily Mail, 20 March 1976.

^{Page 9 note 1} The Rand Daily Mail, 6 January 1976, reported that Ncokazi threatened to boycott the 1976 election unless Matanzima agreed to hold a referendum on the independence issue. However, although the Chief Minister refused to test public opinion in this way, the Democratic Party still participated in the election.

^{Page 9 note 2} The dispute relates to their respective claims to the paramountcy among the Thembu, and has been translated by Dalindyebo into support for the Democratic Party and opposition to the policies of Matanzima.

^{Page 9 note 3} The Natal Mercury (Durban), 26 04 1975.Google Scholar

^{Page 9 note 4} Rand Daily Mail, 7 September 1976. Mopei subsequently announced that the ultimate goal of the QwaQwa Government was to form a union with Lesotho which would include South Sotho living in the Transkei and the eastern parts of the Free State. The Friend (Bloemfontein), 14 09 1975.Google Scholar

^{Page 9 note 5} Rand Daily Mail (Extra), 7 September and 12 November 1975.

^{Page 9 note 6} Rand Daily Mail, 30 December 1975, ‘Year of Shattered Homeland Unity’.

^{Page 9 note 7} The Times (London), 13 03 1974.Google Scholar

^{Page 10 note 1} Sunday Tribune (Johannesburg), 30 05 1976.Google Scholar

^{Page 11 note 1} The Transkei is predominantly an exporter of labour to the South African economy; in 1975, 256,971 inhabitants were registered as working in the Republic, compared with 74,580 inside the Homeland itself. Transkei Annual, 1976 (Clairwood), pp. 61–3.Google Scholar

^{Page 11 note 2} The Government pays male labourers RI.20 a day, while women receive less, and in 1975 it rejected a motion to introduce a minimum daily wage of R2. Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, 11 March 1975.

^{Page 11 note 3} A study of the occupations of members of the 1968 and 1973 Assemblies indicates that the majority were farmers, chief, and headmen. However, there are indications that the representation of groups such as clerks, teachers, school inspectors, traders and rural businessmen is increasing. See Breytenbach, W. J., ‘The Political System of the Republic of Transkei— an Overview’, in Politikon (Pretoria), III, 2, 1976, pp. 36–5.Google Scholar

^{Page 11 note 4} Bureau for Economic Research on Bantu Development, Transkei Economic Review, 1975 (Pretoria), Table 6.4, p. 40.Google Scholar

^{Page 12 note 1} Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, 2 April 1974 and 5 March 1975. Ministers receive salaries of over R12,000, and the Chief (now Prime) Minister over R14,000.

^{Page 12 note 2} Although there were only 64 nominated members in the 1973 Assembly, there were 74 members whose names were pre-fixed with the word ‘Chief’.

^{Page 12 note 3} Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, 3 April 1974.

^{Page 12 note 4} Ibid. 5 March 1975, Budget speech by Matanzima.

^{Page 12 note 5} Ibid. 6 May 1974.

^{Page 12 note 6} Hammond-Tooke, op. cit. p. 207.

^{Page 13 note 1} There were 91 registered chief in April 1974. Since then the Transkei ‘Hansard’ for 1974 and 1975 (but not 1976) reveals the creation of 4 chiefs in Nyanda Region, 18 in Quakeni Region, and 8 in Gcaleka Region.

^{Page 13 note 2} Hammond-Tooke, op. cit. p. 211.

^{Page 13 note 3} According to the Trarokei Annual, 1976, p. 31Google Scholar, there were 6,667 civil servants at the end of 1975.

^{Page 13 note 4} Becker, W., ‘Employment Opportunity for Graduates offered by the Transkei’, in Becker, (ed.), The Economic Development of the Transkei (Lovedale, C.P., 1970).Google Scholar

^{Page 14 note 1} Information based on conversations with officials in the Transkei Public Service Commission, August 1976.

^{Page 14 note 2} Daily Dispatch, 21 February 1975.

^{Page 14 note 3} The Natal Witness (Pietermaritzburg), 4 07 1975.Google Scholar

^{Page 14 note 4} Rand Daily Mail (Extra), 13 September 1975.

^{Page 14 note 5} This assertion is based upon conversations with individuals in the Transkei; given the B.P.C. and S.A.S.O. orientation of Ncokazi, and the distrust which politicians evince of teachers in the Assembly, it will probably stand further scrutiny.

^{Page 15 note 1} Nine mission hospitals with large establishments were taken over by the Government in 1974. Annual Report of the Tranthei Public Service Commission, 1975.

^{Page 15 note 2} The official Opposition is now the Transkei People's Freedom Party, formed by Cromwell Diko, who crossed the floor with three other members of the T.N.I.P. after the 1976 election. Daily Dispatch, 27 October 1976. The former leader of the Opposition, Knowledge Guzana, weakened his position in the N.D.P. when he failed to retain his seat in the same election.

^{Page 15 note 3} Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, 10 April 1975. For an analysis of Bantustan armies as 'a first line of defence [for South Africa] againstguerrillaincursions from thenorth’, see Laurence, Patrick, The Transkei: South Africa's politics of partition (Johannesburg, 1976), ch. 10.Google Scholar

^{Page 15 note 4} Hart, Gillian, African Entrepreneurship, Occasional Paper No. 16, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, 1972, pp. 94–6.Google Scholar

^{Page 16 note 1} Debaks of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, 5 May to 19 June 1964.

^{Page 16 note 2} Rand Daily Mail, 24 May 1974.

^{Page 16 note 3} Xhosa Development Corporation, Tenth Annual Report, 1975, p. 25.

^{Page 17 note 1} Ibid. p. 27.

^{Page 17 note 2} Interview with the Chief Minister, 24 February 1976; Minutes of the African Chamber of Commerce.

^{Page 17 note 3} Ibid. 1972–6.

^{Page 18 note 1} The Minister of Bantu Administration, M. Botha, is reported as saying that the Development Corporation intends to spend R83 million over the period 1976—9 to create 22,000 jobs. To the Point (Johannesburg), 17 10 1975.Google Scholar

^{Page 18 note 2} Horrell, Muriel, The African Homelands of South Africa (Johannesburg, 1973), pp. 120–2.Google Scholar

^{Page 18 note 3} South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1974 (Johannesburg, 1975), p. 215.Google Scholar

^{Page 19 note 1} ‘Transkei: the Birth of a Nation’, in To the Point, 17 October 1975.

^{Page 19 note 2} ‘Concessions Offered to Industrialists at Growth Points’, Decent ralisation— Growth Points, 1975 (Johannesburg), ch. 2.Google Scholar

^{Page 19 note 3} Eastern Province Herald, 2 June 1976.

^{Page 19 note 4} Statement by Matanzima to businessmen and industrialists in Johannesburg, reported in the Natal Mercury, 23 April 1975.

^{Page 20 note 1} Daily Dispatch, 6 August 1976.

^{Page 20 note 2} Unfortunately, the Annual Reports of the X.D.C. do not give comprehensive lists of investments by private industry. The data above have therefore been compiled from the following newspapers: Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 6 05 and 23 06 1974Google Scholar; Weekend Post (Johannesburg), 25 06 1975Google Scholar; Daily Dispatch, 12 September and, November 1975. South African Financial Gazette (Johannesburg), 21 11 1975Google Scholar; and The Daily News, 17 July 1975.

^{Page 20 note 3} Weekend Post, 25 July 1975.

^{Page 20 note 4} The Star (Johannesburg), 14 02 1975Google Scholar, and Sunday Times, 6 November 1975.

^{Page 20 note 5} Sunday Times, 6 June 1976.

^{Page 21 note 1} See the enthusiastic exegesis about investment prospects by Blausten, Richard, ‘Foreign Investment in the Black Homelands of South Africa’, in African Affairs (London), 75, 299, 04 1976, pp. 208–23.Google Scholar

^{Page 22 note 1} Limitations of space have prevented an analysis here of the rôle which the Transkei plays in subsidising the white economy of South Africa, whilst simultaneously being the recipient of budgetary and development subsidies from the Pretoria Government. I have attempted to deal with these aspects in ‘Independence for the Transkei: mystification and diversion in the model Bantustan’, in Seiler, John (ed.), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, forthcoming.Google Scholar

Article contents

The Beneficiaries of Transkeian ‘Independence’

Extract

Access options

References

Save article to Kindle

Save article to Dropbox

Save article to Google Drive

Reply to: Submit a response

Your details

You have entered the maximum number of contributors

Conflicting interests