Africa's Nuclear Capability

Oye Ogunbadejo

doi:10.1017/S0022278X00056755

Africa's Nuclear Capability

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008

Oye Ogunbadejo

Article contents

Extract
References

Get access

Rights & Permissions

Extract

The impact of nuclear weapons on the present and future trends in international relations continues to attract wide scholarship. While the literature on the subject has been growing apace, nuclear technology is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and the dangers posed to the survival of mankind are becoming much more acute than hitherto. In broad terms, the fears expressed about these weapons tend to centre around the implications of three major issues: the emergence of greater first-strike inclinations in the two super-power nuclear forces; the possibility of a perceived strategic imbalance favouring either the United States or the Soviet Union; and the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Type: Articles
Information: The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 19 - 43

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00056755 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

^{page 19 note 1} For example, Gompert, David C. et al. , Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: alternatives for the future (New York, 1977);Google ScholarRussett, Bruce, The Prisoners of Insecurity: nuclear deterrence, the arms race, and arms control (San Francisco, 1983);Google ScholarMandelbaum, Michael, The Nuclear Future (Ithaca, 1983);Google ScholarStockholm International Peace Research Institute, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives (London, 1978);Google ScholarScoville, Herbert, MX: Prescription for Disaster (Cambridge, Mass., 1981);Google ScholarKatz, Arthur M., Life After Nuclear War (Cambridge, Mass., 1982);Google ScholarGreenwood, Ted et al. , Nuclear Proliferation: motivations, capabilitiès, and strategies for control (New York, 1977);Google ScholarDunn, Lewis A., Controlling the Bomb: nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, 1982);Google ScholarGurr, Ted Robert (ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict: theory and research (New York, 1980);Google Scholar and Quester, George (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation: breaking the chain (Madison, 1981).Google Scholar

^{page 19 note 2} See Din, Allan, ‘Stopping the Arms Race in Outer Space’, in Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), 20, 3, 1983, pp. 221–5;Google ScholarGray, Colin S., American Military Space Policy: information systems, weapon systems and arms control (Cambridge, Mass., 1983);Google Scholar Gompert et al., op. cit.; Colin S. Gray, ‘Soviet Military Programmes and the “New High Ground”’, in Survival (London), XXV, 5, 09–10 1983, pp. 193–204 and 204–15, respectively.Google Scholar

^{page 19 note 3} ‘Laser Weapon Test Foreseen’, in The New York Times, 17 October 1983.

^{page 20 note 1} Ibid.

^{page 20 note 2} Weltman, John J., ‘Nuclear Devolution and World Order’, in World Politics (Princeton), XXXII, 2, 01 1980, p. 192.Google Scholar

^{page 20 note 3} For an extended discussion of these three reasons, see Robert F. Goheen, ‘Problems of Proliferation: U.S. policy and the Third World’, in ibid. xxxv, 2, January 1983, pp. 194–215; and Rosen, Steven and Jones, Walter, The Logic of International Relations (Boston, 1982 edn.).Google Scholar

^{page 20 note 4} See ‘Who Has the Bomb?’, in a special issue of Newsweek (New York), 5 December 1983, entitled ‘Nuclear War: can we reduce the risk?’.

^{page 21 note 1} See Thompson, W. Scott, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966: diplomacy, ideology, and the new state (Princeton, 1969);CrossRef Google Scholar and Idang, Gordon J., Nigeria: internal politics and foreign policy, 1960–1966 (Ibadan, 1973).Google Scholar

^{page 21 note 2} Cf. Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Non-alignment in Africa's International Relations’, in The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 5, 2, 1981, pp. 16–45. For an interpretational analysis of the concept of non-alignment as both an ideology and a foreign policy issue,Google Scholar see Nweke, G. Aforka, Harmonization of African Foreign Policies, 1955–1975 (Boston, 1980).Google Scholar

^{page 22 note 1} It should be noted that the majority of the non-nuclear states originally welcomed N.NP.T. and the associated safeguards, ensuring that they would not develop nuclear weapons, in return for aid in producing energy, and promises by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union concerning ‘the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date’. Almost 15 years later, those promises still remain a pious hope, and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons has actually accelerated.

^{page 23 note 1} Cf. Kapur, Ashok, ‘The Nuclear Spread: a third world view’, in Third World Quarterly (London), 2, 1, 01 1980, pp. 59–75.Google Scholar

^{page 23 note 2} See, for example, Yanger, Joseph A., International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy (Washington, D.C., 1981), especially pp. 145–71.Google Scholar

^{page 24 note 1} Schelling, Thomas C., ‘Thinking About Nuclear Terrorism’, in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.), 6, 4, Spring 1982, p. 61.Google Scholar

^{page 24 note 2} Mazuri, Ali A., The African Condition: a political diagnosis (London, 1980), p. 122.Google Scholar

^{page 25 note 1} Ibid. p. 138.

^{page 25 note 2} Africa Now (London), August 1983.Google Scholar

^{page 26 note 1} ‘The Third World Goes Nuclear’, in South: the third world magazine (London), 12 1980.Google Scholar

^{page 26 note 2} African Business (London), 06 1983, p. 35.Google Scholar

^{page 26 note 1} Quoted by Mirabelli, Terence, ‘Nuclear Quest in Libya: Gadaffi's H-Bomb ambition’, in New African (London), 02 1980.Google Scholar

^{page 27 note 1} The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: the basicfacts (Ottawa, 1982), pp. 9 and 14.Google Scholar

^{page 27 note 2} Mirabelli, loc. cit.

^{page 27 note 3} In 1983, in the wake of strong anti-Libyanism in the United States, these students were expelled by the Reagan Administration.

^{page 28 note 1} For a detailed analysis of Libya's ambitions and foreign policies in the Sahel, see Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’, in International Security, 8, 1, Summer 1983, pp. 154–78.CrossRef Google Scholar

^{page 28 note 2} The Economist (London), 29 11 1980, p. 41.Google Scholar

^{page 28 note 3} ‘Niger's Uranium’, in ibid. 19 June 1982.

^{page 28 note 4} West Africa (London), 1982, p. 3002.Google Scholar

^{page 28 note 5} Saudi Arabia has been another major source of financial support for Pakistan's project. See ‘Nuclear Proliferation’, in The Economist, 22 08 1981.Google Scholar

^{page 29 note 1} Cf. Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Diego Garcia and Africa's Security’, in Third World Quarterly, 4, 1, 1982, pp. 104–20.CrossRef Google Scholar

^{page 29 note 2} For an analysis of the implications of Libya's nuclear quest for the Sahel states, see Ogunbadejo, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’.

^{page 30 note 1} See Husain, Azim, ‘The West, South Africa and Israel: a strategic triangle’, in Third World Quarterly, 4, 1, 01 1982, pp. 44–73.CrossRef Google Scholar

^{page 30 note 2} Červenka, Zdenek, ‘The Conspiracy of Silence’, in Africa (London), 125, 01 1982.Google Scholar

^{page 30 note 3} Betts, Richard K., ‘A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa’, in international Security, 3, 4, Spring 1979, p. 96.Google Scholar

^{page 31 note 1} For detailed information about the Republic's various delivery-systems and brands of aircraft fighters, see the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1983–1984 (London, 1983), especially pp. 73–4.Google Scholar

^{page 31 note 2} Africa, January 1982, p. 15.

^{page 31 note 3} Kidron, M. and Segal, Ronald, The State of the World Atlas (London, 1981), p. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 31 note 4} See, for example, ‘The Global Race for Nuclear Arms’, in Newsweek, 15 September 1980.

^{page 31 note 5} For confirmation of the 1979 nuclear test, see Husain, loc. cit., esp. pp. 58–9; Zdenek Červenka, ‘The West and the Apartheid Bomb’, in Africa, January 1982, pp. 18–19; and Robert D'A. Henderson, ‘Nigeria: future nuclear power?’ in Orbis (Philadelphia), 25, 2, Summer 1981, p. 411. n.

^{page 32 note 1} Husain, loc. cit. p. 60.Google Scholar

^{page 32 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 32 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 32 note 4} See, for example, Spence, J. E., ‘South Africa: the nuclear option’, in African Affairs (London), 80, 321, 10 1981, p. 441.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 1} See Kingsley, Michael, ‘Anti-Nuke Forces Pick Wrong Target: little countries’, not superpowers’, bombs are the real worry’, in Los Angeles Times, 18 November 1983, pt. II, p. 7; and ‘Nuclear Proliferation: death from a salesman’, in The Economist, 24 July 1982, p. 37.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 2} Çervenka, ‘The West and the Apartheid Bomb’, p. 18.

^{page 33 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 33 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 33 note 5} ‘Israel Has Nuclear Stockpile’, in Sunday Star (Toronto), 16 05 1982, p. A14.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 6} Africa Now, June 1983.

^{page 34 note 1} For instance, at the Greek international arms fair, which took place in Athens in October 1982, Armscor, South Africa's state-owned weapons company, offered ‘battle tested’ lines in most items, from high-speed armoured troop carriers to frequency-hopping field radios that defy interception. So confident was the Republic about the marketability of all its weapons that it has boldly projected annual sales of as much as $500 million within the next decade. See ‘South Africa: making weapons for export’, in Newsweek, 29 November 1982.

^{page 35 note 1} Betts, loc. cit. p. 92.

^{page 35 note 2} Spence, loc. cit. p. 442.

^{page 35 note 3} Çervenka, ‘The West and the Apartheid Bomb’.

^{page 35 note 4} ‘The Report of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa’, Toronto, 1982, p. 3.

^{page 35 note 5} Schelling, loc. cit. p. 70.

^{page 36 note 1} Cf. for example, Time (New York), 14 11 1983, p. 56;Google ScholarThe Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 4 11 1981, pp. 1, 15, and 32; and the leader, ‘Redecorating Apartheid’, in The New York Times, 17 October 1983, p. 16.Google Scholar

^{page 36 note 2} de St. Jorre, John, ‘A Vote to Modernize Apartheid's Edifice’, in The New York Times, 7 November 1983.Google Scholar

^{page 36 note 1} The Guardian (London), 8 08 1983.Google Scholar

^{page 36 note 4} Červenka, Zdenek, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (New York, 1977), p. 155.Google Scholar

^{page 37 note 1} This four-day conference on ‘The Rôle and Potential of Nuclear Energy in Nigeria’, was attended by a number of scientists from North America, Europe, and Africa.

^{page 38 note 1} National Concord (Lagos), 5 08 1983.Google Scholar

^{page 38 note 2} Mazrui, op. cit. p. 135.

^{page 38 note 3} Ibid. p. 134.

^{page 38 note 4} See The Military Balance, 1983–84; and Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Nuclear Capability and Nigeria's Foreign Policy’, in Legum, Colin (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, 1983–84 (London, 1984).Google Scholar

^{page 39 note 1} See, for example, Africa, 138, February 1983.

^{page 40 note 1} Ibid.

^{page 40 note 2} ‘Bongo's Nuclear Ultimatum to France’, in Ibid.

^{page 40 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 40 note 4} Cf. Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G., ‘Why Africa's Weak States Persist: the empirical and the juridical in statehood’, in World Politics, xxxv, 1, 10 1982, pp. 1–24.CrossRef Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 5} For example, Mazrui proposed that Zaïre should ‘go nuclear’ in his 1979 B. B. C. Reith Lectures; The African Condition, ch. 6.

^{page 40 note 6} See, among others, Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G., Personal Rule in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982),Google Scholar and ‘Why Africa's Weak States Persist’ also Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Conflict in Africa: a case study of the Shaba crisis, 1977’, in World Affairs (Washington), 141, 3, Winter 1979, pp. 219–34.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 1} Mazrui, Ali A., ‘Africa's Nuclear Future’, in Survival, XXII, 2, 03–04 1980, p. 78.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 2} Kingsley, loc. cit.

^{page 42 note 1} Russett, op. cit. p. 179.

^{page 43 note 1} According to Henry Kissinger's address to the Atlantic Alliance, given in Brussels, 13 January 1984, ‘Some 20,000 strategic warheads are in the arsenals of both sides. Even were the Soviets to accept our proposal to cut this total by half, the remaining warheads would be more than sufficient for catastrophe.’ See The Times (London), 18 01 1984, p. 10.Google ScholarCf. also Harsch, Joseph C., ‘To Reduce the Danger’, in The Christian Science Monitor, 13 December 1983, and The Military Balance, 1983–84. In addition, it has been estimated that Britain has 192 warheads at sea in Polaris submarines; that France has 80 at sea, and 18 on land; and that China has 14 on land.Google Scholar

Article contents

Africa's Nuclear Capability

Extract

Access options

References

Save article to Kindle

Save article to Dropbox

Save article to Google Drive

Reply to: Submit a response

Your details

You have entered the maximum number of contributors

Conflicting interests