Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
The absence of an efficient framework of economic institutions is frequently regarded as a major hindrance to the effective carrying out of economic policies, particularly in development planning2. However, rather little attention has been paid to the possibilities and problems of multi-purpose economic institutions, designed for the joint promotion of several government policies at the same time. This gap is particularly noticeable and particularly crucial in regard to Africa. To date, there have been several African examples of multi-purpose institutions, although these have not necessarily been intended as such originally. Set up to fulfil one or two main purposes, they have come to serve a multitude of aims as the need arose, and in doing so have demonstrated a considerable degree of institutional flexibility. Their example might well be deliberately followed in future.
page 163 note 1 Black, Eugene, The Diplomacy of Economic Development (Harvard, 1960).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 163 note 2 See for example, Lewis, W. A., ‘On Assessing a Development Plan’ in The Economic Bulletin (Accra), 06–07 1959,Google Scholar and Meier, G. M. and Baldwin, R. E., Economic Development (New York, 1957).Google Scholar
page 164 note 1 Cf. Baumol, W. J., Economic Dynamics (New York, 1951).Google Scholar
page 164 note 2 E.g. Chenery, H. B., ‘The Role of Industrialization in Development Programs’, in American Economic Review (Evanston), 05 1955.Google Scholar
page 164 note 3 E.g. Lewis, W.A., The Theory of Economic Growth (London, 1955).Google Scholar
page 164 note 4 Cf. Bauer, P. T. and Yamey, B. S., Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (London, 1957),Google Scholar with Baran, P., ‘On the Political Economy of Backwardness’, in The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies (Manchester), 01 1952.Google Scholar
page 164 note 5 E.g. the national studies by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or Lewis, Theory of Economic Growth.
page 164 note 6 E.g. Tinbergen, J., The Design of Development (Baltimore, 1958).Google Scholar
page 165 note 1 E.g. Bauer, P. T. and Paish's, F. W. articles in The Economic Journal (London), 12 1952, and 12 1954, and B. Niculescu's comment in December 1954.Google Scholar
page 166 note 1 Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African Cocoa (London, 1938), Cmd. 5845.Google Scholar
page 166 note 2 For a more detailed study, see Green, R. H., ‘Ghana Cocoa Marketing Policy, 1938–1960’, in the Conference Proceedings of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (Ibadan, 1961).Google Scholar
page 167 note 1 See Bauer, P. T., West African Trade (Cambridge, 1954), especially ch. 19 on wartime arrangements in the export trade, and in general on the history and operations of the marketing boards.Google Scholar
page 167 note 2 This was more serious in the case of oilseeds, but was substantial for cocoa as well. In all fairness it must be admitted that losses were considered to be at least as likely as profits because the shipping problem was overstressed.
page 167 note 3 See, for example, Nkrumah, Kwame, Towards Colonial Freedom (London, 1962), a reprint of his 1947 pamphlet.Google Scholar
page 168 note 1 Ghanaian doubts about even this structure are illustrated by de Graft-Johnson, J. C., African Experiment (London, 1958).Google Scholar
page 169 note 1 Gold Coast Parliamentary Debates (Accra, 1954), vol. II, pp. 242–3 and 390–1.Google Scholar
page 169 note 2 The rates ranged from 10 per cent with f.o.b. prices of under £120, to 40 per cent at £300, with the marginal rate hitting 100 per cent at £260.
page 170 note 1 The issues of stabilisation and 100 per cent pay-out should be separated. One can pay out 100 per cent with no effort at even intra-seasonal price fluctuation damping, or set a permanent grower price estimated to produce a less-than-100 per cent pay-out. Logically, decisions on controlling price changes and retaining a portion of cocoa receipts for non-individual grower use are quite separate.
page 172 note 1 The details of the swollen shoot campaign are open to severe criticism; however, determined and successful action was undertaken. Hesitation between alternative courses, in search of an ideal, might have allowed the industry to vanish while its future strength was still being debated.
page 172 note 2 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Co. Ltd. (Accra, 1956) outlines C.P.C. history in some detail, but takes a rather unrealistic view of Government and ruling-party relationships to statutory bodies anywhere.Google Scholar
page 173 note 1 This may be due to a reduction in opportunities to express criticism, especially after the collapse of the National Liberation Movement.
page 173 note 2 Cf. articles by Peter Ady in West Africa, 11, 18, and 25 June 1960.
page 173 note 3 Green, op. cit. p. 154.
page 173 note 4 The upper limit of planting is partly physical, so losses cannot necessarily be made up during price booms in an uncontrolled market situation.
page 175 note 1 See Bray, F. R., Cocoa Development in Ahafo (Achimota, 1959);Google ScholarHill, Polly, ‘The Cocoa Price’, in The Economic Bulletin (Accra), 04 1957,Google Scholarand ‘The Migration of Southern Ghanaian Cocoa Farmers’, in Bulletin of the Ghana Geographical Association (Accra), 07 1960;Google Scholar and Gordon, J., ‘The Cocoa Industry and Economic Development’, in The Economic Bulletin, 03 1960.Google Scholar
page 175 note 2 Cf. Green, R. H., ‘The Ghana Cocoa Industry’, in The Economic Bulletin, 05 1961.Google Scholar
page 176 note 1 O.E.E.C., Cocoa (Paris, 1951).Google Scholar
page 176 note 2 A number of working papers on this subject have been produced by the Economic Commission for Africa; e.g. E/CN.14/64 of December 1960. Cf. also Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East (New York), 12 1961, on the background for Asian economic co-ordination.Google Scholar
page 180 note 1 Cf. Hicks, J. R., Essays in World Economics (Oxford, 1959), appendix.Google Scholar
page 180 note 2 This is not to imply that growth cannot be generated by such sectors—the Ghanaian experience of 1947–59 demonstrates to the contrary—but that it is uncertain. The falling off of cocoa prices after 1959 made Ghana’s growth rate much more difficult to sustain.
page 181 note 1 The question here is not one of private versus public ownership. A government-owned industry must show a surplus (or profit) if it is to expand without additional inflows of funds.
page 181 note 2 See World Bank, The Economic Development of Tanganyika (Baltimore, 1959);Google ScholarGorst, S., Co-operative Organisation in Tropical Countries (Oxford, 1959);Google Scholar F.A.O., Co-operative Thrift, Credit and Marketing in Economically Under-developed Countries (Rome, 1953).Google Scholar
page 182 note 1 J. R. Hicks, op. cit.; Hicks, U. K., Development from Below (Cambridge, 1961);Google ScholarOrewa, G. O., Taxation in Western Nigeria (Oxford, for N.I.S.E.R., 1962).Google Scholar