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Mozambique: a Delicate Peace

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Chris Alden  and
Mark Simpson
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Extract

The pace of conflict-resolution in the Third World has been nothing short of astounding since 1990. A whole array of low-intensity wars have been terminated. Some, such as in Nicaragua and El Salvador, had occupied pride of place in the reinvigorated test of wills between Moscow and Washington during the 1980s. Others, as in Kampuchea, were fuelled by the parallel rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, which both fed off and had an impact on the key dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. A few, such as the ‘bush war’ in Namibia and the fighting in the Western Sahara, never became serious testing-grounds for the superpowers.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 109 - 130
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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References

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