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Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Wm. Cyrus Reed
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Extract

In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its armed wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA),1 entered Kigali after routing the former régime and putting an end to months of genocide in which upwards of 500,000 had lost their lives. By August, another one to two million had fled from Rwanda. All in all, nearly half of the population had been killed, displaced inside the country, or was in exile.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 479 - 501
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

1 Both are also known by their French names, the Front patriotique rwandais-Inkotanyi, and the Armée patriotique rwandais.

2 For analyses of the RPF, see Bennett, James, ‘Zur Geschichte und Politik der Rwandishen Patriotischen Front’, in Schurings, Hildegard (ed.), Ein Volk verlässt sein Land: Krieg und Völkermord in Ruanda (Cologne, 1994), pp. 168–79Google Scholar , and Prunier, Gérard, ‘Éléments pour une histoire du Front patriotique rwandais’, in Politique africaine (Paris), 51, 10 1993, pp. 121–38.Google Scholar

3 See Lemarchand, René, Rwanda and Burundi (London and New York, 1970), especially chs. 4, 5, and 6.Google Scholar

4 Watson, Catherine, Exile from Rwanda: background to an invasion (Washington, DC, 1991), p. 5.Google Scholar

5 Interview, Kigali, August 1994.

6 Kamukama, Dixon, Rwanda Conflict: its roots and regional implications (Kampala, 1993), p. 32.Google Scholar

7 République rwandaise, Présidence de la république, Commission spéciale sur les problèmes des émigrés rwandais, Le Rwanda et le problème de ses réfugiés: contexte historique, analyse, et voies de solution (Kigali, 05 1990).Google Scholar

8 Gasarasi, Charles P., ‘The Mass Naturalization and Further Integration of Rwandese Refugees in Tanzania: process, problems and prospects’, in Journal of Refugee Studies (Oxford), 3, 2, 1990, pp. 90–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Ibid. p. 88.

10 Ibid. p. 96.

11 Watson, Catherine, ‘War and Waiting’, in Africa Report (New York), 37, 6, 1992, p. 53.Google Scholar

12 Clay, Jason W., The Eviction of Banyaruanda: the story behind the refugee crisis in Southwest Uganda (Cambridge, MA, n.d.)Google Scholar , and Kamukama, op. cit. pp. 36–41.

13 The information that follows is based upon confidential interviews conducted in Kigali with former members of the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (Ranu) in August 1994 and July 1995.

14 Tito Rutaremara was then living in France, where lack of funding, travel documents, and the pending completion of his thesis explains why he did not return to Kenya until 1987.

15 Watson, op. cit. 1991, p. 13.

16 Ibid.

17 Following the invasion, Habyarimana quickly returned from New York, while Museveni remained abroad, in effect giving the RPA more latitude to act.

18 This figure is given by Gertzel, Cherry, ‘Uganda's Continuing Search for Peace’, in Current History (Philadelphia), 89, 547, 1990, p. 207Google Scholar , and by Reyntjens, Filip, ‘Rwanda: recent history’, in Africa South of the Sahara, 1994 (London, 1994), p. 698.Google Scholar Watson, loc. cit. 1992, p. 54, suggests that the original 4,000 soldiers were accompanied by 3,000 civilians when they crossed the border.

19 Interviews, Kigali, July 1995.

20 Muhanguzi, Justice, The War in Rwanda: the inside story (Mbarara, Uganda, 1992), p. 1.Google Scholar

21 See Reyntjens, Filip, L'Afrique des grands lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi, 1988–1994 (Paris, 1994), p. 91, fn. 7.Google Scholar ‘Inkotanyi’ was also the name of the elite fighters in the ancient Rwandan monarchy, though it is unclear that the RPA was aware of the historical reference.

22 Watson, loc. cit. 1992, p. 54.

23 For a discussion of the rôle of Uganda in the invasion, see Zarembo, Alan I., ‘Explaining the 1990 Invasion of Rwanda: domestic pressures or foreign policy interests?’, Senior Honors thesis, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 1992, especially pp. 20–6.Google Scholar

24 The troops from Zaïre were quickly withdrawn because of their lack of discipline and accusations that they spent more time looting shops and stealing from the people than fighting the RPF.

25 Muhanguzi, op. cit. p. 19.

26 ‘The Dar es Salaam Declaration on the Refugee Problem’, signed 19 February 1991, Annex III, in Kamukama, op. cit. pp. 77-–9. Rwanda was joined by Zaïre, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda. The Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees sent observers.

27 Because political leaders of the RPF were active in the RPA and vice versa, distinguishing the two became increasingly difficult. Here, RPF refers to the activities of the RPA as well.

28 Among the more prominent prisoners who joined the RPF when freed were Commandants Ruseruka, Muvunanyambo, and Thibandeeba, and Major Theomista Linzide.

29 Government of Rwanda, ‘Information on the Involvement of Uganda in the Aggression Against Rwanda’, undated, n.p. This document accused Uganda of helping to plan the invasion, train and arm the combatants, and of providing backup reinforcements by increasing the country's military presence along the Rwandan border prior to each RPF incursion.

30 Africa Research Bulletin: political, social, and cultural series (Oxford), 01 1992, p. 10406.Google Scholar

31 Rwanda and Uganda signed a security pact in August 1992, in which both agreed to co-operate in maintaining security along their common border. Ibid. August 1992, p. 10673.

32 Africa Confidential (London), 33, 20, 9 10 1992, p. 7.Google Scholar

33 Watson, loc. cit. 1992, p. 55.

34 Africa Research Bulletin, June 1992, p. 10621.

35 Watson, Ibid.

36 Africa Confidential, 33, 20, 9 October 1992, p. 7.

37 This offensive was supported by France, which sent troops to the north to protect ‘French and other foreign nationals’, according to a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry. Africa Research Bulletin, June 1992, p. 10628.

38 Ibid. May 1992, p. 10589.

39 ‘Accord de cessez-le-feu de N'Sele entre le Gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandais, tel qu'amende à Gbadolite le 16 September 1991 et à Arusha le 12 juillet 1992’, in Journal officiel de la République rwandaise (Kigali), 32, 16, 08 1993, pp. 1271–8.Google Scholar All of the agreements between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda became known as the Arusha Accords, and were published in the August 1993 edition of the Journal Officiel.

40 ‘Protocole d'accord entre le Gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandaise relatif à l'état de droit’, in ibid. pp. 1279–85.

41 ‘Protocole d'accord entre le Gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandais sur le partage du pouvoir dans le cadre d'un Gouvernement de transition à base élargie’, Articles 1–46, signed in Arusha, 30 October 1992, in ibid. pp. 1286–1309. The Protocol also outlined the broad policies which the Transitional Government was to pursue, as well as the creation of specialised commissions and the rights of the judiciary.

42 Africa Research Bulletin, March 1993, p. 10938.

43 ‘Protocole d'accord entre le Gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandais sur l'intégration des forces armées de deux parties’, signed in Arusha, 3 August 1993, in Journal Officiel, pp. 1341–1440.

44 This and the following paragraphs are based upon interviews with members of the RPF's Political Bureau, Kigali, July 1995.

45 For a detailed examination of the genocide itself, see Rights, Africa, Rwanda: death, despair, and defiance (London, 1995).Google Scholar Also, Destexhe, Alain, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (London, 1995)Google Scholar , and Prunier, Gerard, The Rwanda Crisis: a history of genocide (London, 1995).Google Scholar

46 For a review of the international response to events in Rwanda, see the five-volume study published by the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, , entitled The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: lessons from Rwanda, edited by Millwood, David (Copenhagen, 1996).Google Scholar

47 See Reed, Wm. Cyrus, ‘The Rwandan Patriotic Front: the development of politics and the politics of development in Rwanda’, in Issue (Atlanta), 23, 2, 1995, pp. 48–53.Google Scholar

48 Republic of Rwanda, Round Table Conference: mid-term review, 6–7 July 1995 (Kigali, 1995), pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

49 Interviews, Fonction publique, Kigali, July 1995.

50 The RPA has assumed the rôle of a national army, and has reportedly accepted 4,000 exmembers of FAR. But the overwhelming bulk of both the command and the rank-and-file remain affiliated with the RPF. Moreover, because virtually all members of the RPF had military experience, many of those taking senior posts in the civil service are former members of the RPA.

51 ‘UN Report Prompts Agency to Stop Urging Rwandan Refugees to Go Home’, in The New York Times, 28 09 1995, p. A4.Google Scholar

52 McGreal, Chris, ‘Rwanda Sacks its Hutu Prime Minister’, in The Guardian Weekly (London), 3 09 1995.Google Scholar

53 Of the one to two million refugees outside of the country, even the RPF estimates the number of guilty to be less than 50,000. Others put the figure much lower.

54 For a more detailed discussion of the challenges faced by the RPF, see Reed, loc. cit.