Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967

Humphrey J. Fisher

doi:10.1017/S0022278X00018863

Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008

Humphrey J. Fisher

Article contents

Extract
References

Get access

Rights & Permissions

Extract

On St Patrick's Day 1967 Sierra Leone went to the polls to elect a new parliament. Four days later, on 21 March, Brigadier David Lansana, head of the Sierra Leone army, seized power. After two more days, on 23 March, Lansana was repudiated by a group of senior army officers; this second coup was followed by the creation of a National Reformation Council, including five army officers and two senior police officials, which was to take control of the government. Almost the last multi-party democracy in independent black Africa had come to an end, cancelling the first peaceful change of government through the ballot-box. Lansana's action was in some respects less defensible than Ian Smith's U.D.I. in Rhodesia. Smith acted against the presumed wishes of a majority of Rhodesians; Lansana acted against the majority wish which had just been expressed. Smith did not, within minutes of taking power, send troops to fire on protesting crowds in the streets of the capital.

Type: Articles
Information: The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 1969 , pp. 611 - 636

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00018863 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1969

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

^{Page 612 note 1} See Lewis, W. Arthur, Politics in West Africa (London, 1965), p. 22Google Scholar. In the 1967 elections a number of independent candidates were disappointed competitors for S.L.P.P. nominations. This did not necessarily damage their relationship with the party: indeed, Sir Albert personally paid the £250 deposit for several such independents. But the action of four of the successful independents, in offering to support an A.P.C. government (see below, p. 625), shows that a prior commitment to one party did not prevent a subsequent switch to the other, thus fulfilling the purpose which Professor Lewis remarks.

^{Page 613 note 1} The Sierra Leonean (Freetown), 6 04 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 614 note 1} Daily Mail (Freetown), 23 11 1966.Google Scholar

^{Page 614 note 2} Shekpendeh (Freetown), 17 12 1966 and 11 02 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 615 note 1} Unity (Freetown), 10 02 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 615 note 2} West Africa (London), 15 04 1967, p. 482.Google Scholar

^{Page 615 note 3} Suret-Canale, J., ‘La Fin de la chefferie en Guinée’, in The Journal of African History (Cambridge), VII, 3, 1966.Google Scholar

^{Page 615 note 4} Think (Freetown), 12 02 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 616 note 1} The violence of the clash between Ghana and Guinea was well illustrated by the arrest in Accra on 29 October 1966 of Guinean diplomats on their way to an O.A.U. meeting; cf. Skurnik, W. A. E., ‘Ghana and Guinea, 1966—a case study in inter-African relations’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), V, 3, 1967Google Scholar. Sierra Leone was one of the countries described by the Guinean Government as having adopted a ‘helpful’ attitude in relation to this episode.

^{Page 616 note 2} Daily Mail, 2–5, 9, 12, 14, and 19 January 1967.

^{Page 617 note 1} E.g. Unity, 31 December 1966 and 7 January 1967; We Tone (Freetown), 31 12 1966 and 4 02 1967Google Scholar; Shekpendeh, 21 January 1967; and Think, 22 January 1967.

^{Page 617 note 2} We rone, 31 December 1966.

^{Page 617 note 3} Ibid. 30 April 1966.

^{Page 617 note 4} Shekpendeh, 7 January 1967; We Tone, 28 January 1967.

^{Page 617 note 5} We Tone, 31 December 1966.

^{Page 618 note 1} Ibid. 4 February 1967.

^{Page 618 note 2} Cf. p. 636, below.

^{Page 618 note 3} Daily Mail, 8 December 1966.

^{Page 618 note 4} We rone, 26 November 1966.

^{Page 618 note 5} Ibid. 29 October and 5 November 1966.

^{Page 618 note 6} Ibid. 29 October and 5, 19, and 26 November 1966; The Sierra Leonean, 17 November 1966.

^{Page 618 note 7} E.g. Shekpendeh, 17 December 1966; We Tone, 26 November 1966.

^{Page 619 note 1} West Africa, 8 and 15 April 1967.

^{Page 619 note 2} Daily Mail, 27 January 1967.

^{Page 619 note 3} Unity, 11 November 1966.

^{Page 619 note 4} Daily Mail, 7 November 1966.

^{Page 619 note 5} West Africa, 8 April 1967.

^{Page 619 note 6} A second stand-by arrangement on similar conditions, for the equivalent of $3·6 million, became effective on 17 January 1968.

^{Page 620 note 1} We rone, 4 February 1967.

^{Page 620 note 2} Unity, February 1967.

^{Page 620 note 3} We rone, 5 November 1966.

^{Page 620 note 4} Report of the Dove-Edwin Commission of Inquiry into the Conduct of the 1967 General Elections in Sierra Leone and the Government Statement thereon (Freetown, 1967), p. 7.Google Scholar

^{Page 621 note 1} Report of the Dove-Edwin Commission, para. 17.

^{Page 621 note 2} We rone, 26 November 1966.

^{Page 621 note 3} Public Order Act 1965, pt. IV, para. 24. Anyone who held a meeting against the wish of the paramount chief, or who failed to comply with any conditions which he imposed, was liable to a fine of up to Le.200 and 6 months in jail.

^{Page 621 note 4} The Sierra Leonean, 6 April 1967.

^{Page 622 note 1} The minister read from the Bible, including the description of Christ as the only begotten Son of the Father; approving were the amens of the congregation, just as for the Qur'ān reading, including the affirmation that God neither begets nor is begotten.

^{Page 622 note 2} Cf. Keith-Lucas, B., ‘Electoral Reform in Sierra Leone’, in Political Studies (Oxford), III, 1955, p. 98Google Scholar: ‘Politically, the dividing line between the parties is approximately the same as that between the Protectorate and the Colony.’

^{Page 623 note 1} Scott, D. J. R., ‘The Sierra Leone Election, May 1967’, in Mackenzie, W. J. M. and Robinson, Kenneth (eds.), Five Elections in Africa: a group of electoral studies (Oxford, 1960), p. 191.Google Scholar

^{Page 623 note 2} Scott, op. cit. p. 193.

^{Page 623 note 3} The too ready assumption that tribalism is the root of all evil has led to some absurdities and inaccuracies. Afrique contemporaine (Paris), 31, 05–06 1967, pp. 19–20Google Scholar, calls Sir Henry Lightfoot-Boston a Temne instead of a Creole, and says 10 of the 12 paramount chiefs elected to parliament in March 1967 were Mende. In fact, only seven chiefs were from the south, and some of these were of other tribes—Sherbro, Vai, or Gallinas.

^{Page 623 note 4} Cf. Scott, op. cit. p. 173.

^{Page 623 note 5} According to the Report of the Dove-Edwin Commission, para. 134: ‘The whole of the Government's arrangements for the 1967 elections was rigged and corrupt. At all levels, before, during and after the elections this corruption was evident. They were determined to use all means fair or foul to win and remain in office and if all failed to get Brigadier Lansana to take over.' The publication of the Report, prefaced by a five-page ‘Government Statement’, was delayed for over two months until 29 November. While criticising some parts of it, the N.R.C. accepted the conclusion that the elections had been ‘rigged and corrupt’.

^{Page 624 note 1} The addition of four new seats to the 62 in the previous parliament had been authorised on 3 February, just before the dissolution, by the Electoral Provisions (Amendment) Act 1967. No general redistribution was attempted at this time, and there were still extreme differences between the numbers of voters in the different constituencies. The votes actually cast on 17 March ranged from less than 2,000 in four constituencies in Sherbro or close to Freetown, to around 20,000 or more in four other constituencies. This disparity does not appear to have been markedly to the advantage of either party; in each of these quartets, two seats went to the S.L.P.P. and two to the A.P.C. The constitution, para. 38(4), requires the periodic review of constituency divisions.

^{Page 624 note 2} Scott, op. cit. pp. 201–2.

^{Page 624 note 3} We rone, 26 November 1966.

^{Page 625 note 1} Report of the Dove-Edwin Commission, para. 122.

^{Page 625 note 2} Ibid. annex E.

^{Page 625 note 3} These figures appear also in West Africa, 8 April 1967, p. 477.

^{Page 625 note 4} The constitution in force in 1967 appeared formally as the Sierra Leone (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961, Statutory Instruments No. 741.

^{Page 626 note 1} Keith-Lucas, op. cit. p. 104.

^{Page 626 note 2} Report of the Electoral Reform Commission (Freetown, 1954), para. 49–52 and 58.Google Scholar

^{Page 626 note 3} ‘Statement of the Government of Sierra Leone on the Report of the Electoral Reform Commission (Freetown, 1955), Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1955, para. 12.Google Scholar

^{Page 626 note 4} Report of the Sierra Leone Constitutional Conference, 1960 (Freetown, 1960), para. 20 (k).Google Scholar

^{Page 626 note 5} E.g. the Constitution, para. 30, and the Electoral Provisions Act 1962, Pt. V.

^{Page 626 note 6} Wade, H. W. R. and Cryer, H. L. (eds.), Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law, 1967 (London, 1968).Google Scholar

^{Page 627 note 1} Report of the Dove-Edwin Commission, pp. 16 and 19. Wade and Cryer refute as ‘baseless’ Lansana's accusation that the Governor-General had acted unconstitutionally; op. cit. p. 78.

^{Page 627 note 2} Letter of 4 February 1967 from the Attorney General to the Governor-General.

^{Page 627 note 3} Letter of 22 February 1967 from the Governor-General's Secretary.

^{Page 628 note 1} The phrases omitted at 10.15 were insignificant, except that the last three sentences were replaced by this: ‘Please let us all avoid it, by remaining calm and waiting for the results of the election. Thank you very much.’

^{Page 630 note 1} The end of this broadcast is missing from my recording; normally all announcements were repeated many times, and such gaps could be repaired, but this one was not, perhaps because Lansana's power was already waning.

^{Page 631 note 1} Dalby, D., ‘The Military Take-over in Sierra Leone’, in The World Today (London), 08, 1967, p. 358Google Scholar, says that of the variety of patriotic motives advanced by Blake's military junta the desire to suppress tribalism is the least plausible, tribalism never having presented a very great problem in Sierra Leone. It is more than likely that the intervention of the army, like the electoral malpractices which preceded it, stimulated tribal suspicions.

^{Page 631 note 2} Genda was replaced by Juxon-Smith as chairman before he had time to return to Sierra Leone from the United States. Major Turay was not on the list first announced.

^{Page 632 note 1} The reference is to Bangura and his imprisoned colleagues of the February coup, who provided some light relief. According to one story, the N.R.C. sent representatives to release them from prison, but the officers refused liberation until they were formally and fully exonerated. While the argument proceeded, many other prisoners escaped. Later the same day I met heavily armed troops on patrol, and thought that mutiny had broken out—but they were only looking for the escapees.

^{Page 634 note 1} I have the transcript, in nearly complete form, together with various other scripts not reproduced in this article, and would be glad to make them available to any interested student.

^{Page 636 note 1} On 22 March 1967 Cohn Legum, broadcasting on Lansana's coup, commented that the army might in such political crises play a useful role.

^{Page 636 note 2} Lewis, op. cit. p. 88.

Article contents

Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967

Extract

Access options

References

Save article to Kindle

Save article to Dropbox

Save article to Google Drive

Reply to: Submit a response

Your details

You have entered the maximum number of contributors

Conflicting interests