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A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990 Coup in Nigeria

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Julius O. Ihonvbere
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Extract

The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this constitution.

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Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 29 , Issue 4 , December 1991 , pp. 601 - 626
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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References

1 See, for example, Falola, Toyin and Ihonvbere, Julius, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979–84 (London, 1985),Google Scholar and Graf, William D., The Nigerian State: political economy, state, class and political system in the post-colonial era (London, 1988).Google Scholar

2 For a discussion of coups and counter-coups in Nigeria, see Kirk-Green, A. H. M., Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: a documentary sourcebook, 1966–1970, Vols. I and II (Oxford, 1971);Google ScholarSt. Jorre, John de, The Nigerian Civil War (London, 1972);Google ScholarDudley, B. J., Instability and Political Order: politics and crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1973);Google ScholarAdegboyega, Adewale, Why We Struck: the story of the first Nigerian coup (Ibadan, 1981);Google Scholar and Gbulie, Ben, Nigeria's Five Majors: coup d'etat of 15th January 1966 first inside account (Onitsha), 1981).Google Scholar

3 There have been major religious riots in Kano (1980), Borno (1982), Gongola (1984), Gombe (1985), Ilorin (1986), Katsina, Bauchi, and Kano (1991).

4 Falola and Ihonvbere, op. cit. pp. 235–65,Google Scholar and Ihonvbere, Julius O., ‘Instability and Military Intervention in Politics in the Periphery’, in Sanda, A. O. and Ojo, Olusola (eds.), The Impact of Military Rule on Nigerian Administration (Ile-Ife, 1987), pp. 31–51.Google Scholar

5 Finer, S. E., The Man on Horseback: the role of the military in politics (London, 1962);Google ScholarHuntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA, 1967);Google ScholarDecalo, Samuel, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: studies in military style (New Haven and London, 1976);Google Scholar and Janowitz, Morris, Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Countries (Chicago, 1977).Google Scholar

6 For extensive discussions of the colonial experience, see Oni, Ola and Onimode, Bade, Economic Development of Nigeria: the socialist alternative (Ibadan, 1975);Google ScholarOnimode, Bade, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria: the dialectics of mass poverty (London, 1982);Google Scholar and Falola, Toyin (ed.), Britian and Nigeria: exploitation or development? (London, 1987).Google Scholar

7 See Ihonvbere, Julius O. and Falola, Toyin, ‘The Recycling of Oil Rents and Nigeria's Peripheral Role in World Capitalism’, in Ife Social Science Review (Ile-Ife), 6, 1, 1983,Google Scholar nd Ihonvbere, Julius O., Labour, State and Capital in Nigeria's Oil Industry, (San Francisco, 1992).Google Scholar

8 See Achebe, Chinua, The Trouble with Nigeria (Enugu, 1983);Google ScholarAke, Claude (ed.), Political Economy of Nigeria (London, 1985);Google ScholarEkekwe, Eme, Class and State in Nigeria (London and Lagos, 1988);Google Scholar and ‘Can IBB Tame the Army?’, in African Concord, 5, 11, 16 07 1990.Google Scholar

9 See Dudley, op. cit., and National Commission for Museums and Monuments, Nigeria: yesterday and today (Lagos, 1985). Nzeogwu had a very populist agenda, but the failure of the coup and his death during the civil war deprived scholars of further insights into his personality and ideas.Google Scholar

10 Graf, , op. cit. p. 43,Google Scholar and Toyo, Eskor, The Working Class and the Nigerian Crisis (Ibadan, 1967).Google Scholar

11 See Nwankwo, Arthur, Can Nigeria Survive? (Enugu, 1981);Google ScholarFalola, and Ihonvbere, , The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second RepublicGoogle Scholar; Adamolekun, Lapido, The Fall of the Second Republic (Ibadan, 1985);Google Scholar and Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert, ‘The Nigerian Plight: Shagari to Buhari’, in Third World Quarterly (London), 7, 3, 07 1988, pp. 610–25.Google Scholar

12 Marinho, F. R. A., Nigeria: a regenerative economy or vegetative existence? (Lagos, 1984), p. 3,Google Scholar and Falola, and Ihonvbere, , op. cit. pp. 83–145.Google Scholar

13 Omotunde, Dele, ‘Eight Broken Eggs’, in Newswatch (Lagos), 1 05 1990, p. 29.Google Scholar

14 See Ihonvbere, Julius O., ‘The 1983 Elections and the Buhari Coup in Nigeria: contradictions in a (semi-) peripheral political economy’, Centre for African Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 04 1985.Google Scholar

15 Ekpu, Ray, ‘With Feet of Clay’, in Newswatch, 7 May 1990, p. 4,Google Scholar and Soji Akirinade, ‘Coup that Crumbled’, in ibid. pp. 14–20.

16 See Ihonvbere, Julius O. and Ekekwe, Eme N., ‘Dependent Capitalism, Structural Adjustment and Democratic Possibilities in Nigeria's Third Republic’, in Afrika Spectrum (Hamburg) 3, 1988,Google Scholar and Lardner, Tunji Jr., ‘The Babangida Blues’, in Africa Report (New York), 35, 3, 07–08 1990, pp. 50–2.Google Scholar

17 No scholarly work on the conspiracy currently exists. But see ‘The Coup that Failed: the storming of Dodan Barracks’, in Newswatch, 7 05 1990;Google Scholar‘Sunday Coup: the unanswered questions’, in The African Guardian (Lagos), 14 05 1990;Google Scholar‘Orka's Coup: the people's verdict’, in African Concord, 5, 4, 28 05 1990;Google Scholar ‘Coup: the big trial’, in The African Guardian, 4 June 1990; ‘Glimpses from Orka's Trial’, in ibid. 11 June 1990; and ‘Can IBB Tame the Army?’, in loc. cit.

18 See ‘Nigeria: riches and rags’, in Newswatch, 5 10 1987;Google Scholar‘X-Ray: the mood of the nation’, in The African Guardian, 13 06 1988;Google Scholar and ‘IBB in the People's Court’, in ibid. 29 August 1988.

19 Major-General Babangida, Ibrahim, in Newswatch, 9 September 1985, p. 19.Google Scholar

20 See Ihonvbere, Julius O. and Iwarimie-Jaja, Darlington, ‘Political Economy of Mental Health in Nigeria: a case study of Port Harcourt’, in Man and Life (Calcutta), 01–06 1991.Google Scholar

21 ‘Nigeria: the new rich, the rising cocaine profile, the booming corruption’, and Uzoatu, Uzor Maxim, ‘Reaping the Negative Way’, in This Week (Lagos), 2 04 1990;Google Scholar also ‘The Drug Trade’, in Africa Confidential, 13 July 1990, p. 5.Google Scholar

22 See ‘Nigeria: four years on a knife edge’, in African Concord, 2 September 1988, and ‘X-Ray: the mood of the nation’, loc. cit.Google Scholar

23 See Committee for Unity and Progress, ‘Battle for Minimum Wage: N125 is death wage’, Lagos, n.d.Google Scholar

24 See ‘IBB's Surprise Move: the sacking of the AFRC’, in Newswatch, 20 02 1989. The President is frequently referred to as IBB.Google Scholar

25 As compensation for the active rôle played in thwarting Orka's attempted coup, Major-General Sanni Abacha was made Minister of Defence. Ike Nwachukwu, who had chaired the Tribunal which tried and found the plotters guilty, was re-appointed Minister of External Affairs, a position from which he had earlier been removed.

26 Aluko, Sam, cited in ‘The Scramble for Alternatives’, in Newswatch, 24 06 1989, p. 14.Google Scholar

27 It is widely believed that Babangida's preference is for the N.R.C., which is pledged to continue the current régime's painful adjustment programme, whereas the S.D.P. has been vested with unrealistic socialist measures. Hence the statement by the chairman of that party in August 1990 that the S.D.P.'s manifesto will be changed because it was ‘drafted by technocrats…who have never tested the political waters in the real world outside…the language, the presentation, and even the extent to which they address our own perception of the real national issues are somewhat really at variance with what we would like to see in the manifesto’-‘Chairman on Aftermath of Elections, Manifesto’, in U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D.C.), 16 08 1990, p. 55.Google Scholar

28 The removal of subsidies from petroleum in 1986 and 1989 led to the destruction of public property and mass riots that were violently suppressed. The construction of toll gates on federal highways during 1987–8 also raised the cost of transportation. For public officials with government cars, the increases made little difference. For workers and the poor, it made life more difficult.

29 See ‘A Season of Fury: angry Nigerians rise against economic hardship’, in The African Guardian, 12 June 1989.Google Scholar

30 See ‘How Costly is Democracy?’, in Newswatch, 28 May 1990;Google ScholarAgbese, Pita, ‘The Impending Demise of Nigeria's Forthcoming Third Republic’, in Africa Today (Denver), 37, 3, 1990, pp. 23–44;Google Scholarand Ihonvbere, Julius O., ‘Economic Crisis and the Cost of Redemocratization in Contemporary Nigeria’, forthcoming.Google Scholar

31 The African Guardian, 13 06 1988.Google Scholar

32 ‘The Scramble for Alternatives’, in Newswatch, 24 July 1989.Google Scholar

33 Nigerian Labour Congress, May Day Address (Lagos), 1 05 1987, p. 3.Google Scholar

34 See National Concord, 12 December 1987, for Olusegun Obasanjo's speech at the launching of the book by Garba, Joe, entitled Diplomatic Soldering, at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos.Google Scholar

35 Fafowora, Dapo, cited in ‘Five Years of President Babangida's Rule: a tortuous journey’, in West Africa (London), 27 08–2 09 1990, p. 2351.Google Scholar

36 Barclays Bank, ABECOR Country Report. Nigeria (London), 07 1990, p. 1.Google Scholar

37 West Africa, 27 August–2 September 1990, p. 2350Google Scholar

38 The broadcast statement was reproduced in some newspapers and magazines in spite of threats and pleadings from the President's Press Secretary, Chief Duro Onabule, who felt that Orka's insults and personal attacks ought not to be publicised. Drafted in secret and/or in a hurry at the ratio station, coup announcements are usually full of grammatical errors, and I have not attempted to conceal those made by Orka.

39 Lardner, , loc. cit. p. 50.Google Scholar

40 Lardner, , loc. cit. p. 50.Google Scholar

41 See ‘Corruption a Nigerian?’, in African Concord, 26 March 1990,Google Scholar and ‘An Era of Scandals’, in ibid. 11 Februaryr 1991; also Agbese, Pita and Ihonvbere, Julius O., The State and the Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (Boulder, 1992), ch. 6,Google Scholar‘Adjustment, Corruption and Politics’. It should be noted that a propaganda leaflet entitled ‘Government by the Thief under IBB’ had been distributed in Lagos and Port Harcourt during the June 1989 anti-S.A.P. riots.Google Scholar

42 The formula of O–I–O means no breakfast, have lunch, and no dinner; while O–O–O means no feeding throughout the day-a common way of describing what happens in Nigerian universities.Google Scholar

43 Lardner, , loc. cit. p. 51.Google Scholar

44 Jason, Pini, ‘Babangida's Choice’, in New African (London), 08 1990, p. 40.Google Scholar

45 Bourke, Gerald, ‘Nigeria: playing politics’, in Africa Report 34, 5, 09–10 1989, p. 44.Google Scholar

46 Musa, Balarabe, quoted in Newswatch, 7 May 1990, p. 10.Google Scholar

47 ‘Nigeria: a giant blunders’, in African Concord, 27 August 1990, p. 31.Google Scholar

48 This figure does not include several loans contracted since October 1990. See United Bank for Africa, Monthly Business and Economic Digest (Lagos), 13, 6, 06 1990,Google Scholar and Central Bank of Nigeria, Monthly Reports (Lagos), various issues.

49 The International Labour Office reached the conclusion in 1981 that most Nigerians, especially those in the rural areas but also in the urban slums, were worse off than they had been at political independence. The report argued that huge expenditures in the name of development had made little or no impact on the provision of ‘basic needs’ and the living conditions of the majority. See I.L.O., First Things First: meeting the basic needs of the people of Nigeria (Addis Ababa, 1981).

50 It must be noted that one of the alleged plotters not yet arrested, Major Umukoro, has a Ph.D. in criminology.

51 See ‘NANS vs Government: the cat and mouse game’, in The African Guardian, 14 May 1990.Google Scholar

52 Lardner, , loc. cit. p. 50.Google Scholar

53 Igiebor, Nosa, ‘Splash and Dash’, in Tell (Lagos), 9 09 1991, pp. 14–17;Google Scholar Dare Babarinsa, ‘Is the Transition Train on Course?’, in ibid. pp. 18–19; Onome Osife-Whiskey, ‘New States, New Challenges’, in ibid. pp. 20–2; and Peter Ishaka, ‘Freedom for David-West’, in ibid. pp. 26–7.

54 Okoh, Odeh, ‘We the People’, in African Concord, 28 May 1990, p. 25.Google Scholar

55 ‘Nigeria: more questions than answers’, in Africa Confidential, 31, 10, 10 05 1990, p. 3.Google Scholar

56 ‘Military Rule Will Ruin Us’, a propaganda leaflet distributed in Lagos and Port Harcourt during the June 1989 anti-S.A.P. riots.

57 Lardner, , loc. cit. p. 28.Google Scholar

58 Jonathan, Onu Job, ‘We the People’, in African Concord, 28 May 1990, p. 28.Google Scholar

59 According to ‘Nigeria Hires a Public Relations Firm in U.S.’, in Good Home News (Dallas), 1, 6, 06 1990, p. 6, an American firm has been polishing the image of the President and his régime at a reported annual fee of $1 million that ‘does not include extraordinary but necessary expenses, such as travel, overseas telephone calls and extensive photocopying’.Google Scholar

60 Bourke, , loc, cit. p. 44.Google Scholar