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Business associations and growth coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2002

Deborah Bräutigam
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, International Development Program School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC 20016. She acknowledges with thanks a resident fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, a Fulbright Senior Research Fellowship for the Mauritius fieldwork, and funding from the EAGER Project, United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development.
Lise Rakner
Affiliation:
Senior Research Fellow, Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen, N-5892, Norway. She acknowledges funding from the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Lusaka and the Norwegian Research Council.
Scott Taylor
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. The views expressed here are the authors' alone. Helpful comments from Linda Cotton, Arthur Goldsmith, David Hirschmann, Malcolm McPherson, and two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged, as are discussions with Peter Lewis, Ben Ross Schneider and Ernest Wilson III.

Abstract

Why are ‘growth coalitions’ involving business interest groups and governments so rare in Africa? How has democratisation affected the possibilities for growth coalitions? In three cases with varying degrees of democracy – Mauritius, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – we find that hypotheses about growth coalitions that place importance on the organisation of the business sector are generally borne out. Yet even when the business community is organised in an ‘ideal’ manner, growth coalitions still depend on factors within the state: leadership, ideas, and capacity. Democratisation has a mixed effect. We find that in the case of Zambia, business–state relations did not improve despite a pro-democracy stance by business and the pro-business agenda of the democratic government coming to power in 1991. In Zimbabwe, the erosion of democracy reduced business access to state elites, breaking up a growth coalition that initially showed considerable promise. In Mauritius, the strengthening of democracy has paralleled the deepening of the growth coalition, and both have been reinforced by a strong economy. Our study shows that growth coalitions are possible in Africa; the key lies in determining the conditions under which such coalitions can be sustained in Africa's fragile polities.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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