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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 February 2018
The subjective character of sense-consciousness.—To the physiologist of the present day it must be clearly manifest that, in respect to what is revealed to us by the senses, we have no immediate knowledge of anything but sensation. Even according to Sir Willam Hamilton, perception proper takes note of nothing but the sentient organism. “All perception is a sensitive cognition; it therefore apprehends the existence of no object out of its organism, or not in immediate correlation to its organism, for thus only can an object exist now and here to sense”∗ An effect is produced upon the peripheral extremity of a nerve of sense; this is conveyed to the appropriate centre, and there calls forth a sensation.
∗ ‘Hamilton's Reid,’ p, 879, par. 13.Google Scholar
∗ ‘Psychological Medicine,’ p. 143Google Scholar
∗ If this subject were more fully entered into, it would have to be shown that our outward sensations are apprehended as external in space to the whole field of internal sensation* that is, to the whole of the organism as the seat of emotion— pain or pleasure. Moreover, our outward sensations are distinguished from the other class by the entire absence of animate qualities. From these two causes, it is, they are cognized as not-self.Google Scholar
∗ ‘Hamilton's Reid,’ p. 861, noteGoogle Scholar
† The Senses and the Intellect,’ Book II, Chap, 1st, § 37.Google Scholar
∗ Pathology proves as clearly as physiology, that the brain alone can be the seat of normal and abnormal mental action; that the normal state of the mental process depends upon the integrity of this organ; and that both together are influenced by the state of the other organs in disease.—' Griesinger on Mental Diseases.' Translation by Dr. "Robertson and Dr, Rutherford, p. 3.Google Scholar
† ‘Hamilton's Reid,’ p. 861, note.Google Scholar
∗ Certain feelings, such as vertigo, headache, sense of tightness, are of course consciously located in the head, but sensation, thought, and emotion* are not localised in their respective organs.Google Scholar
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