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Physician Value Neutrality: A Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Francis J. Beckwith  and
John F. Peppin
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Extract

Although the notion of physician value neutrality (PVN) in medicine may be traced back to the writings of Sir William Osler, it is relatively new to medicine and medical ethics. We argue in this paper that how physician value neutrality (PVN) has been cashed out is often obscure and its defense not persuasive. In addition, we argue that the social/political implementation of neutrality, Political Liberalism (PL), fails, and thus, PVN's case is weakened, for PVN's justification relies largely on the reasoning undergirding PL. For these reasons, we conclude that PVN has no philosophical or ethical warrant and thus should be abandoned. We suggest that the physician present to her patients some type of statement or creed that would give them an idea of where she stands on important axiological issues and how these stands are cashed out clinically.

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , Spring 2000 , pp. 67 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2000

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