Mello, M. M. Brennan, T. A.,
“Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform,” University of Texas Law Review 80 (
2002):
1595–
1637. There is weak and conflicting evidence that automobile tort liability may make driving safer, but none for medical care. See discussion in
Bovbjerg, R. R. Sloan, F. A., “No Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence,”
University of Cincinnati Law Review 67 (1998): 53–123. The most elaborate attempt to demonstrate deterrence in medical care came in a thorough study of New York hospital experience. The initial researchers concluded that higher liability exposure was associated with lower rates of adverse outcomes, but their results failed to attain statistical significance in any of the many specifications of their statistical models, and so appeared in a book chapter rather than in the peer reviewed literature,
Weiler, P. C. et al.,
A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univiversity Press, 1993): Chapter 6. After a subsequent series of re-analyses, a subset of investigators also did not seek publication, until telling the story in
supra note 12, Mello and Brennan. It is notable that the similar empirical studies of hospital records found similar injury rates across four states, each with a rather different tort-law regime, and that hospitals seem to have differed substantially within a state, even though the fundamental substantive tort law as well as tort reform legislation applies statewide. See
Mills, et al.;
Brennan, et al.;
Thomas, et al., all
supra note 10.
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