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Language and Reality at the End of Life

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2021

Raphael Cohen-Almagor
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Extract

To find adequate answers to a changing reality heavily influenced by advances in technology, medical professionals have developed and adopted an array of terms that have brought new concepts into the profession. “Dignity,” “vegetative state,” “futility,” “double effect,” and “brain death” have become indispensable words in the medical setting. In the following discussion, the attention is on terminology. If we believe in phenomenology, the assumption is that we should closely reflect on the words we use in all spheres of life, especially in those that concern life and death. This article calls for a sincere discussion about these terms and concepts. The thesis put forward is that the language in the medical setting serves primarily the physicians, at times at the expense of the patients’ best interests. This language and the concepts it describes have generated an unhealthy atmosphere for patients, which might lead to undesirable actions at the end of patients’ lives.

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Article
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Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , Fall 2000 , pp. 267 - 278
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2000

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