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Introduction Bioethics in Court

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Ben A. Rich
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Introduction
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Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , Summer 2005 , pp. 194 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2005

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References

Gorovitz, S., “Bioethics,” in Becker, L. C. and Becker, C. B., eds., Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992): 89–91.Google Scholar
The home page of the ASBH website states: “The ASBH is a professional society of more than 1,500 individuals, organizations, and institutions interested in bioethics and the humanities.” Membership is declared to be open to “healthcare professionals, teachers, consultants, and others who have an interest in the field of clinical and academic bioethics and the health related humanities.” The long list of affinity groups within ASBH includes such diverse interests as: Dental Ethics, Environmental Bioethics, Literature and Medicine, Race, Culture/Ethnicity, Rural Bioethics, and Visual Arts & Cultural Representations, <http://www.asbh.org> (Last visited March 18, 2005).+(Last+visited+March+18,+2005).>Google Scholar
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The Principle of Double Effect originated in medieval catholic theology. It is a method of moral analysis that has as its purpose the determination of whether an act that has both good and bad consequences can be ultimately considered morally acceptable or unacceptable. If all 4 of the following criteria are met, then according to the principle the act can be deemed to be morally acceptable. Those criteria are: 1) the act itself must be morally good or at least neutral; 2) the bad result may be foreseeable but not intended; 3) the good result must not be directly caused by the bad result; and 4) the good result must be proportionate to the bad result. In contradistinction to criterion number 2 of the Principle of Double Effect, which seeks to make a distinction with moral implications between foreseeing and intending, the law has traditionally taken the position that every person may be presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his or her actions. Thus, one who engages in an act which has a foreseeable consequence may be presumed to act with the intent of bringing about that consequence.Google Scholar
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