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Dementia, Healthcare Decision Making, and Disability Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Megan S. Wright
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Abstract

Persons with dementia often prefer to participate in decisions about their health care, but may be prevented from doing so because healthcare decision-making law facilitates use of advance directives or surrogate decision makers for persons with decisional impairments such as dementia. Federal and state disability law provide alternative decision-making models that do not prevent persons with mild to moderate dementia from making their own healthcare decisions at the time the decision needs to be made. In order to better promote autonomy and wellbeing, persons with dementia should be accommodated and supported so they can make their own healthcare decisions.

Type
Symposium Articles
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 47 , Issue S4: Current Topics in Health Law: Papers from the 2019 ASLME Health Law Professors Conference , Winter 2019 , pp. 25 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2019

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