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Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Jerome H. Reichman
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Extract

Few topics in international intellectual property law have been as controversial in recent years as the one we are about to examine. In the 1980s and early 1990s, a Diplomatic Conference attempted to revise the oldest international convention providing some protection for patented inventions outside of the domestic laws. Those efforts broke down, largely because developed and developing countries could not agree on the powers that governments should retain to issue compulsory licenses or on the grounds for which these powers could be exercised. The failure of this Conference, held under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), persuaded the technology-exporting countries to link future negotiations concerning international intellectual property protection to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, known as the Uruguay Round, which got underway in 1986. The end result was Annex IC of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of 1994, which incorporated a new, comprehensive and relatively elevated set of international minimum standards of patent protection into the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , Summer 2009 , pp. 247 - 263
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2009

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