Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2021
The idea that disability insurers would benefit if the use of predictive genetic testing expands may seem little short of obvious. If individuals with higher than species-typical genetic propensities for illness or disease are identified, and barred or discouraged from participating in disability insurance programs, is it not obvious that the amount that disability insurers pay out will decrease? Is there any reason to doubt that insurers thus would gain advantage by promoting genetic testing? Writers on this subject typically have taken on faith that advantage goes to whoever knows most about the genetic characteristics of the individual seeking insurance. They therefore have assumed, without proving, that insurers’ interests lie with proliferating genetic information about insurance seekers.
Consequently, from a perspective that gives priority to commercial interests, denying insurers the freedom to obtain genetic information about insurance seekers or holders appears obviously damaging and even unfair. On the other hand, from a perspective that gives priority to the interests of citizens who may use insurance, the greater use of and access to predictive genetic testing sets off ethical alarms.