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Individuality and Human Beginnings: A Reply to David DeGrazia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Alfonso Gómez-Lobo
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Extract

In a recent article published in the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, David DeGrazia criticized the two pivotal assumptions that underlie President Bush’s policy on funding stem cell research. Those assumptions are (1) that we originate as single-cell zygotes at the time of conception and (2) that we have full moral status as soon as we originate.

In this paper, I would like to concentrate on the first of those assumptions and show in light of recent findings in embryological development that DeGrazia’s criticisms have to be rejected. I shall save my discussion of DeGrazia’s critique of the second assumption for a later article that can take into account DeGrazia’s further elaboration of his position.

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Independent
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , Fall 2007 , pp. 457 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2007

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References

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