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Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the Medico-Ethical Limits of Self-Modification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Annemarie Bridy
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Extract

Controversy swept the U.K. in January of 2000 over public disclosure of the fact that a Scottish surgeon named Robert Smith had amputated the limbs of two able-bodied individuals who reportedly suffered from a condition known as apotemnophilia. The patients, both of whom had sought and consented to the surgery, claimed they had desperately desired for years to live as amputees and had been unable, despite considerable efforts, to reconcile themselves psychologically to living with the bodies with which they were born. Both surgeries were successful, and both patients, who had undergone psychiatric evaluation prior to the amputations, subsequently reported having no regrets. In the wake of a wave of sensationalistic stories in the media, the hospital at which the surgeries had been performed, the Falkirk and District Royal Infirmary, banned any future surgeries of the kind. Outraged local politicians promptly announced their intention to pass laws banning the procedure outright. One member of Scottish Parliament declared the surgery obscene and asserted that the whole thing is repugnant and legislation needs to be brought in now to outlaw this.

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , Spring 2004 , pp. 148 - 158
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2004

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