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Secular Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Search for Truth in Contemporary America*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2015

Daniel O. Conkle
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I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places shall be made plain, and the crooked places shall be made straight and the glory of the Lord will be revealed and all flesh shall see it together.

Martin Luther King, Jr.

Echoing the prophet Isaiah, Dr. King dreamed of societal harmony and common understanding. Not only would “the glory of the Lord” be revealed, but “all flesh” would see the truth together. In today's America, this vision seems increasingly distant; some would say increasingly fantastic. From abortion to homosexuality to affirmative action, Americans are deeply divided on fundamental issues of morality and public policy. Combatants in an ongoing culture war, we disagree not only about specific issues, but also about the manner in which these issues should be considered, debated, and resolved. At bottom, we are divided because we disagree about the nature of moral and political truth and about how this truth should properly be determined. Far from seeing the truth together, we see separate truths that emerge from separate ways of thinking.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Law and Religion , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , 1995 , pp. 337 - 370
Copyright
Copyright © Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University 1995

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Footnotes

*

Copyright 1997 by Daniel O. Conkle.

This article had its origin on October 13, 1994, when I presented informal remarks at Hamline University's Seventh Annual Symposium on Law, Religion and Ethics. Alan Freeman and his spouse-collaborator, Elizabeth Mensch, had been scheduled to discuss the topic of “secular fundamentalism,” but Alan had been stricken by the illness that has since claimed his life, and he and Betty were unable to attend. I and several other panelists filled in as last-minute substitutes, addressing aspects of the same topic that Alan and Betty had intended to confront. We filled the time, but we could not begin to replace Alan and Betty, nor can anyone ever fill the void—both personal and scholarly—that has been created by Alan's untimely death.

Alan had more to accomplish, but he achieved so much in his life, both individually and in partnership with Betty. For this we should all be grateful. With sadness but with abiding respect and admiration, I dedicate this article to the memory of Alan, and I offer it in tribute to the scholarly work of Alan and Betty alike.

References

1. King, Martin Luther Jr., I Have a Dream (08 28, 1963)Google Scholar, reprinted in Washington, James Melvin, ed, A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., at 217, 219 (Harper, 1986)Google Scholar.

2. See Isaiah 40:4-5 (King James Version).

3. See, for example, Hunter, James Davison, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (Basic Books, 1991)Google Scholar.

4. Indeed, we cannot even agree on precisely what we mean by “truth.” See generally Perry, Michael J., Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics 56–62 (Oxford U Press, 1991)Google Scholar (discussing “correspondence” and more “internalist” understandings of truth). Without entering that debate, I proceed in this article on the assumption that truth—including moral and political truth—does or might exist in a relatively strong, relatively objective sense, and that the search for truth, so understood, is both worthwhile and important. This assumption does not presuppose the existence of a single, universal truth on every moral or political question, regardless of the cultural or historical context, but it certainly rejects the notion that truth is nothing more than “power” or “social construction.” At the very least, according to my assumption, some arguments on moral and political matters are better than others and, in that sense, are closer to the truth.

5. Relatedly, there are important epistemological questions concerning the nature and significance of religious truth, including religious truth as it relates to historical events. See, for example, Johnson, Luke Timothy, The Real Jesus: The Misguided Quest for the Historical Jesus and the Truth of the Traditional Gospels 133–66 (Harper, 1996)Google Scholar (arguing that the truth of Christianity, including the truth of the Resurrection, is not a matter of strictly historical inquiry); Lesnick, Howard, Religious Particularity, Religious Metaphor, and Religious Truth: Listening to Tom Shaffer, 10 J Law & Relig 317, 328–30 (1993–1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (suggesting that religion may be true in a deep but nonhistorical sense, even for those who are not conventional “believers”).

6. Conkle, Daniel O., Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J Law & Relig 1 (1993–1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As Professor David Hollenbach has explained, religion can play a public role not only by direct involvement in politics, but also by its influence in the broader realm of civil society and culture. See David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 San Diego L Rev 877 (1993)Google Scholar.

7. The role of religion in politics and law is constrained by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause's prohibition on religiously motivated policy making is properly limited to the pursuit of spiritual objectives, such as attempts to sponsor prayer or other devotional activities. The Establishment Clause should not be read to preclude a religiously motivated pursuit of non-spiritual, worldly objectives. On the distinction between spiritual and worldly objectives, see Conkle, , 10 J Law & Relig at 11–13Google Scholar (cited in note 6).

8. Id at 13-21.

9. Id at 14. As I explain in the article, fundamentalism actually is a matter of degree; thus, fundamentalist tendencies may be extreme or more moderate. See id at 14-15.

10. Id at 15-16.

11. Id at 16-17 n 55.

12. Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., The Worst Corruption, Wall St J A10 (11 22, 1995)Google Scholar.

13. Id.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. See Marsden, George M., Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism: 1870-1925 (Oxford U Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Sandeen, Ernest R., The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American Millenarianism 1800-1930 (U Chicago Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

17. More and more, conservative American Protestants are calling themselves “evangelicals.” See Niebuhr, Gustav, Public Supports Political Voice for Churches, NY Times A1 (06 25, 1996)Google Scholar (describing results of public opinion survey).

18. Schlesinger, Wall St J (cited in note 12). Referring to “the monster of Hitlerism and Stalinism,” Haris Silajdzic, the former Prime Minister of Bosnia, has contended that in light of this history of “secular fundamentalism,” Europeans are in no position to condemn religious fundamentalism as uniquely problematic. See Premier Warns of Secular Fundamentalism in Europe, British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (July 31, 1995) (available on LEXIS).

The French Revolution began with Mr. Jefferson's enthusiastic approval, but it lost his support when it became infected, as do so many of our causes, with excessive zeal—when the secular fundamentalists, Marat, Danton, and Robespierre, guillotined ordinary citizens and even penniless prostitutes on allegations that they had uttered the hateful words, “Vive le roi,” or “Long live the King.”

Carrington, Paul D., Remembering Jefferson, 2 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts J 455, 459 (1993)Google Scholar.

20. Id at 459.

21. Id at 460. See id (“That current academic dogma is secular in form” does not make it less problematic than religious zealotry.).

22. Myerson, Allen R., Help Wanted: Gyration Inspectors, NY Times Sec 4 at 2 (02 4, 1996)Google Scholar.

Secular true believers, much like their religious counterparts, possess a moral rectitude that is uncommon in an age of declining beliefs. Secularism's adherents hold an unshakable confidence not only in the superiority of their values, but to their right to assert them over others through the institutions of society.

Eberly, Don E., Restoring the Good Society: A New Vision for Politics and Culture 52 (Hourglass Books, 1994)Google Scholar.

24. Not surprisingly, this type of false association is likely to be invoked in political attacks on religious conservatives. For example, Americans United for Separation of Church and State recently sponsored a political advertisement containing the following text: “Maybe we should let radical religious fundamentalists run this country. (After all, it's worked so well in Iran.)” The advertisement ran in the Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph shortly before the November, 1996, election; Americans United was rebuffed in its attempts to place the advertisement in another newspaper and on billboards. See Lynn, Barry W., Billboard Battle: Who's Being Censored?, Church & State 21 (12 1996)Google Scholar.

25. The fact that a term has a negative connotation does not necessarily mean that it should be abandoned. Perhaps the negative connotation is in some way deserved. But this depends on the particular meaning that the term is designed to convey.

26. Conkle, , 10 J Law & Relig at 14–16, 23–24Google Scholar (cited in note 6).

27. For discussions and evaluations of the analogy between Biblical and constitutional interpretation, see, for example, Levinson, Sanford, Constitutional Faith (Princeton U Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Grey, Thomas C., The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan L Rev 1 (1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McConnell, Michael W., The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convietions into Law, 98 Yale L J 1501, 1509–14 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Perry, Michael J., The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S Cal L Rev 551 (1984)Google Scholar.

28. Horwitz, Morton J., The Meaning of the Bork Nomination in American Constitutional History, 50 U Pitt L Rev 655, 663 (1989)Google Scholar.

29. Id (footnote omitted). Compare McConnell,98 Yale L J at 1512 (cited in note 27) (“Constitutional interpretation, performed in the manner of Orthodox Jews and Christian fundamentalists, would seek specific answers to specific questions from a particular time in the past (presumably the founding), and would enforce those answers in today's world, notwithstanding considerable pressure arising from changes in context and circumstance.”). See also Wood, Gordon S., The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, New York Review of Books 33, 39 (02 18, 1988)Google Scholar.

30. Horwitz, , 50 U Pitt L Rev at 663Google Scholar (cited in note 28). For further elaboration, see Horwitz, Morton J., The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv L Rev 30 (1993)Google Scholar.

31. Secular fundamentalists, at least if they are judges, actually might have a more complex understanding of the text they are interpreting. In particular, judges might adopt a fundamentalist interpretive stance without rejecting the possibility that the text, in its fullest understanding, contains broader or evolving truths. In interpreting the Constitution, for example, judges might believe that the judiciary should do no more than enforce the Constitution's fundamentalist meaning, but they might also believe that nonjudicial decision makers, interpreting the Constitution for themselves, might properly honor other, non-fundamentalist constitutional values.

32. According to Professor Michael J. Sandel, this ideal of neutrality is one of three connected ideas that form the essence of contemporary liberal theory, the others being the priority of individual rights and the notion that individuals are “freely choosing, unencumbered selves.” Together they create what Sandel describes as “the procedural republic” of modern America. Sandel, Michael J., Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 28 (Belknap Press of Harvard U Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

33. Id at 18. Some contend that political liberalism, and the privileging of secular over religious beliefs in the resolution of political issues, is constitutionally required by the Establishment Clause. For a prominent article advancing this position, see Sullivan, Kathleen M., Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As noted previously, I reject this interpretation of the Establishment Clause, which, in my view, would improperly constrain the religiously motivated pursuit of non-spiritual, worldly objectives. See above, note 7.

This is not to deny that a religiously motivated law, like any other law, might violate constitutional principles—or principles of liberal democracy—that are unrelated to the law's religious motivation. See generally Garvey, John H., A Comment on Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 Mich L Rev 1288 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arguing that liberal democracy values certain goods, including certain individual freedoms, and that religiously motivated lawmaking should not conflict with those goods); Garvey, John H., What Are Freedoms For? (Harvard U Press, 1996)Google Scholar (elaborating Garvey's theory of freedoms).

34. Professor Mark Tushnet, for example, has argued that it is permissible for lawmakers to rely on religious justifications, but only if the laws they adopt are independently justifiable on secular grounds. Tushnet, Mark, The Limits of the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic, in Wood, James E. Jr., and Davis, Derek, eds, The Role of Religion in the Making of Public Policy 191–220 (Baylor U Press, 1991)Google Scholar. Professor Michael J. Perry adopts a somewhat similar position in his most recent book, although he would not require secular grounding for the claim that all human beings are sacred. Perry, Michael J., Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives (Oxford U Press, 1997)Google Scholar.

35. Indeed, liberal theorists may define “reason” to include virtually all kinds of thinking except religion. According to Professor Suzanna Sherry, for example, “reason” includes thinking based on “experience, observation, logic, learned patterns, and tradition”—unless, that is, any of these sources of judgment depend upon “[a]ppeals to a perception of reality shared only by the faithful.” Sherry, Suzanna, The Sleep of Reason, 84 Georgetown L J 453, 455–56 (1996)Google Scholar.

36. Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (Columbia U Press, 1993)Google Scholar. Rawls limits his claim to “fundamental” political questions involving “constitutional essentials” and “questions of basic justice,” id at 214, although he adds that even with respect to other issues, “it is usually highly desirable to settle political questions by invoking the values of public reason,” id at 215.

37. See id at 13, 175.

38. Id at 243. Although he privileges public reason in this sense, Rawls contends that citizens who affirm his understanding of liberalism do so “on moral grounds.” Id at 147.

All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it provides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those grounds does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature of their affirmation.

Id at 147-48. For Rawls' most recent explication of his views, see Rawls, John, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U Chi L Rev 765 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39. Campos, Paul F., Secular Fundamentalism, 94 Coluna L Rev 1814 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Compare Rainey, R. Randall, S.J., , Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27 Loyola LA L Rev 147, 189–90 (1993)Google Scholar (suggesting that “the systematic exclusion or marginalization of ‘religious people’ from public policy discourse and the rule of law” amounts to “‘liberal fundamentalism,’” a “form of secular fundamentalism”).

40. Campos, , 94 Colum L Rev at 1820–21Google Scholar (cited in note 39).

41. Id at 1826.

42. Id at 1822.

43. At least one political candidate has used the phrase “secular fundamentalism” in this way. See Marelius, John, Huffington Issues Spiritual Call to Arms, San Diego Union-Tribune 8 (10 12, 1994)Google Scholar (quoting United States Senate candidate Michael Huffington as decrying the “secular fundamentalists” who believe that “God should … be kept in the closet and under wraps” and that religion should not be brought to bear on public issues).

44. On the privatization of religion and the secularization of public debate, see, for example, Carter, Stephen L., The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion (Basic Books, 1993)Google Scholar; Gedicks, Frederick Mark, Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol'y 419, 421–27 (1990)Google Scholar; Gedicks, Frederick Mark, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 Va L Rev 671(1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McConnell, Michael W., “God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!”: Freedom of Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L Rev 163Google Scholar; Smith, Steven D., The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U Pa L Rev 149, 169–78 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a rich analysis of these developments as they relate to the issue of abortion, see Mensch, Elizabeth & Freeman, Alan, The Politics of Virtue: Is Abortion Debatable? (Duke U Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

45. Comprehensive secular fundamentalists invariably embrace political liberalism for the resolution of public questions. Conversely, those who are secular fundamentalists in the sense of embracing political liberalism need not be comprehensive secular fundamentalists, i.e., they need not reject religion as a source of truth or meaning in the private domain.

46. Niebuhr, Reinhold, 2 The Nature and Destiny of Man: Human Destiny 238 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964) (originally published 1943)Google Scholar; see Berg, Thomas C., Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73 NC L Rev 1567, 1603–06 (1995)Google Scholar.

47. See Conkle, , 10 J Law & Relig at 14–16, 23–24Google Scholar (cited in note 6). No less than other citizens, religious fundamentalists are entitled to the full protection of our constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and freedom of expression. Thus, in suggesting that religious fundamentalism can be problematic in the realm of politics, I certainly am not suggesting that it should in any way be legally restricted or legally disadvantaged.

48. See Sherry, , 84 Georgetown L J at 464–84Google Scholar (cited in note 35).

49. Id at 478-79.

50. Id at 476. But compare id at 454 (contrasting “largely rational” religion with “religiosity of the traditional, pre-Enlightenment, antirational kind”).

51. In my previous article, I distinguished between two types of non-fundamentalist religious believers—religious “modernists,” who stand at the opposite extreme from religious fundamentalists, and religious “reconcilers,” who stand more in the middle. See Conkle, , 10 J Law & Relig at 17–21Google Scholar (cited in note 6). In the present discussion, I am treating these two types together.

52. Contrast Sherry, , 84 Georgetown L J at 462Google Scholar (cited in note 35) (“The methods of science and rational argument are of no avail in evaluating religious beliefs ….”).

Writing from a very different perspective, Professor Stanley Fish challenges the coherency and persuasiveness of liberal arguments tike that of Sherry. See Fish, Stanley, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 Colum L Rev 2255 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But Fish, like Sherry, appears to believe that religious thinking is truly “religious” only when it amounts to religious fundamentalism: “[T]hose religions that put ‘openness of mind’ at the center of their faith—or rather at the center of their rejection of faith—… are indistinguishable from other enlightenment projects and are hardly religions at all.” Id at 2281.

53. For a wonderful description of the “continuous” epistemology of a religious believer of this type, see Alexander, Larry, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 San Diego L Rev 763, 767–70 (1993)Google Scholar.

54. For a discussion of the sin of intellectual pride, i.e., pride of knowledge, see Niebuhr, Reinhold, 1 The Nature and Destiny of Man: Human Nature 194–98 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964)Google Scholar (originally published 1941).

55. Pannenberg, Wolfhart, How to Think About Secularism, First Things 27, 31(06/ July 1996)Google Scholar.

56. Id.

57. Id at 31-32.

58. See above, note 47 and accompanying text.

59. Vetterli, Richard and Bryner, Gary C., Religion, Public Virtue, and the Founding of the American Republic, in York, Neil L., ed, Toward A More Perfect Union: Six Essays on the Constitution 91, 100 (Brigham Young U, 1988)Google Scholar.

60. James Madison, for example, “arrived at a consistent, lifelong defense of Christianity on the basis both of reason and intuition, shifting gradually like many contemporaries from the first to the second.” May, Henry F., The Enlightenment in America 96 (Oxford U Press, 1976)Google Scholar. As such, Madison's beliefs fell at “the center of the American religious spectrum.” Id; see also id at xiv.

61. Professor Suzanna Sherry contends otherwise, but her argument is unpersuasive. Sherry initially claims that “virtually all of the Framers—and indeed the entire founding generation—shared a common background in the epistemology of the Enlightenment,” an epistemology “based on reason and empiricism, specifically rejecting faith and revelation.” Sherry, , 84 Georgetown L J at 466Google Scholar (cited in note 35). She then concedes, however, that her claim is “clouded” by the fact that “[t]he question of whether to privilege faith or reason would not have occurred to the founders for the simple reason that they did not see them as in conflict. They believed that religious belief could be (and indeed should be) supported by principles of reason.” Id at 468. Sherry concludes that “the founding generation subscribed to the epistemology of reason,” id, but the better conclusion, even by Sherry's own account, is the one that I advance in the text. In particular, the evidence suggests that the founding generation's understanding of the Enlightenment did not deny a role for religion, i.e., as long as the religion did not conflict with the teachings of reason.

Relying on their own historical claims, Professors Isaac Kramnick and R. Lawrence Moore have argued that the Framers created “a godless Constitution and a godless politics,” and that this understanding should continue to control today. See Kramnick, Isaac & Moore, R. Lawrence, The Godless Constitution: The Case Against Religious Correctness 22 (W.W. Norton & Co, 1996)Google Scholar. As Professor Scott C. Idleman has powerfully demonstrated, however, the authors' thesis is seriously flawed and cannot be accepted. See Idle-man, Scott C., Liberty in the Balance: Religion, Politics, and American Constitutionalism, 71 Notre Dame L Rev 991 (1996)Google Scholar.

62. Smith, , 140 U Pa L Rev at 162Google Scholar (cited in note 44); see id at 153-66; see generally Symposium, Religious Dimensions of American Constitutionalism, 39 Emory L J 1 (1990)Google Scholar.

63. For a discussion of Madison's arguments, see Smith, , 140 U Pa L Rev at 161Google Scholar (cited in note 44).

64. Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, Va Code Ann § 57-1 (Michie 1996) (enacted Jan 16, 1786); see Smith, , 140 U Pa L Rev at 162Google Scholar (cited in note 44).

65. At the very least, this historical and continuing pattern of religious involvement suggests that “those who seek to secularize entirely the political and legal processes ought to face a presumption not in their favor.” Idleman, Scott C., The Sacred, the Profane, and the Instrumental: Valuing Religion in the Culture of Disbelief, 142 U Pa L Rev 1313, 1339 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66. Kelley, Dean M., The Rationale for the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic, in Wood, and Davis, , eds, The Role of Religion in the Making of Public Policy at 159, 168Google Scholar (cited in note 34).

67. Id at 188. See also Perry, , Love and Power at 77–82Google Scholar (cited in note 4) (discussing the “essentially political” nature of religion, including especially Western religion).

68. Berg, , 73 NC L Rev at 1607Google Scholar (cited in note 46).

69. Id.

70. See id. For a summary of statistics concerning the religiosity of Americans, see Conkle, , 10 J Law & Relig at 3–4Google Scholar (cited in note 6).

71. Vetterli, and Bryner, , Religion, Public Virtue, and the Founding of the American Republic at 92Google Scholar (cited in note 59).

72. Id (footnote omitted); see id at 91-117; see also Vetterli, Richard & Bryner, Gary C., In Search of the Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government (Rowman & Littlefield, 1987)Google Scholar.

73. Coleman, John A., An American Strategic Theology 187 (Paulist Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

74. Id at 193.

75. Coleman, John A., A Possible Role for Biblical Religion in Public Life, 40 Theological Studies 701, 702 (1979)Google Scholar.

76. Hall, Timothy L., Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 Tulane L Rev 87, 110 (1992)Google Scholar.

77. Id at 111.

78. See above, text accompanying note 53.

79. Perry, , Religion in Politics at 46Google Scholar (cited in note 34). Perry adds the following, parenthetical comment: “Nor, at its worst, is religious discourse more monologic—more closeminded and dogmatic—than is, at its worst, secular discourse.” Id at 46-47.

Focusing on fundamentalist religion and citing psychological and sociological factors, Professor William P. Marshall has argued that religious involvement in politics creates a special risk of intolerance. Marshall, William P., The Other Side of Religion, 44 Hastings L J 843 (1993)Google Scholar. Whatever the strength of Marshall's claim, however, it certainly cannot be extended to non-fundamentalist religion.

80. Pannenberg, First Things at 27 (cited in note 55).

81. Berger, Peter L., A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural 6 (Anchor Books, 1990)Google Scholar.

82. Id at 7.

83. See Gedicks, , 4 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol'y at 432–39Google Scholar (cited in note 44). But compare Blumoff, Theodore Y., The New Religionists' Newest Social Gospel: On the Rhetoric and Reality of Religions' “Marginalization” in Public Life, 51 U Miami L Rev 1 (1996)Google Scholar (arguing that the privatization of religion does not imply its marginalization, and that, indeed, there is an over-abundance of public religiosity in the United States, which actually disserves the cause of true religion).

84. See above, Part I. D.

85. Blackburn, Simon, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 255 (Oxford U Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

86. Danto, Arthur C., Naturalism, in Edwards, Paul, ed, 5 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 448, 449 (Macmillan Pub Co & Free Press, 1972)Google Scholar.

87. Goleman, Daniel, Forget Money; Nothing Can Buy Happiness, Some Researchers Say, NY Times B5 (07 16, 1996)Google Scholar. According to Dr. David T. Lykken, any deviations from this genetic predisposition depend primarily upon “the sorrows and pleasures of the last hours, days or weeks.” Id (quoting Dr. Lykken). But “[h]owever tragic or comic life's ups and downs, people appear to return inexorably to whatever happiness level is pre-set in their constitution.” Id.

According to this theory, to actively seek happiness, i.e., a personal “sense of well-being,” is an uphill struggle at best. See id (quoting Dr. Lykken), But according to Dr. Lykken, the cause is not entirely hopeless. He offers this advice:

Be an experiential epicure. A steady diet of simple pleasures will keep you above your set point. Find the small things that you know give you alittle high—a good meal, working in the garden, time with friends—and sprinkle your life with them. In the long run, that will leave you happier than some grand achievement that gives you a big lift for awhile.

Id (quoting Dr. Lykken). It is difficult to imagine a thinner understanding of human fulfillment and human autonomy.

88. Danto, , 5 Encyclopedia of Philosophy at 449Google Scholar (cited in note 86). See generally Johnson, Phillip E., Reason in the Balance: The Case Against Naturalism in Science, Law & Education (InterVarsity Press, 1995)Google Scholar.

89. Perry, , Love and Power at 69Google Scholar (cited in note 4).

90. Id at 70.

91. It may be that many who regard themselves as “secularists” would accept the second response. If so, they may be more “religious” than they think.

92. As Professor Steven D. Smith has noted, the role of dialogue in the search for truth can be overstated. See Smith, Steven D., Moral Realism, Pluralistic Community, and the Judicial Imposition of Principle: A Comment on Perry, 88 Nw U L Rev 183, 186 (1993)Google Scholar (“Moral reality … may be best understood not through dialogue or theoretical discourse, but rather by other means or faculties such as intuition, inspiration, tradition, or revelation.”); Smith, Steven D., Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S Cal L Rev 649, 690 (1987)Google Scholar (“The suggestion that dialogue is the exclusive method of ascertaining truth does violence to the very meaning of dialogue. By its nature, dialogue is inherently parasitic upon methods other than dialogue for discovering truth.”).

93. See, for example, Audi, Robert, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 Phil & Pub Aff 259 (1989)Google Scholar; Foley, Edward B., Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 Colum L Rev 954 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marshall, , 44 Hastings L J 843Google Scholar (cited in note 79).

Professor Kent Greenawalt has advanced a series of sophisticated and nuanced argumerits that point generally in this direction, but with significant exceptions and caveats. See, for example, Greenawalt, Kent, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford U Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Greenawalt, Kent, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford U Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

94. Sherry, , 84 Georgetown L J at 471Google Scholar (cited in note 35).

95. Compare Conkle, Daniel O., Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw U L Rev 1113, 1164–69 (1988)Google Scholar (arguing that a failure to respect religious and irreligious beliefs can cause grave injury, not only to the individuals whose fundamental beliefs are being disparaged, but also to the larger community of which those individuals are a part).

96. Carter, , The Culture of Disbelief at 230–31Google Scholar (cited in note 44) (emphasis in original). Compare Levinson, Sanford, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 Harv L Rev 2061, 2077 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“Why doesn't liberal democracy give everyone an equal right, without engaging in any version of epistemic abstinence, to make his or her arguments, subject, obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to reject the arguments should they be unpersuasive …?”).

97. Blumoff, Theodore Y., The Holocaust and Public Discourse, 11 J Law & Relig 591, 610 (1994–1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98. Id.

99. Marty, Martin E., Dear Charles Colson …, Christian Century 799 (08 14-21, 1996)Google Scholar.

As Professor Douglas Sturm has argued, the serious pursuit of interreligious dialogue—a dialogue that “celebrates difference” even as it affirms “connectedness”—may represent a productive response to “the political question,” i.e., the question of “How shall we live our lives together?” Sturm, Douglas, Crossing the Boundaries: On the Idea of Interreligious Dialogue and the Political Question, 30 J Ecumenical Studies 1, 2, 3 (1993)Google Scholar. Compare Maitz, Alesia, Commentary on the Harris Superquarry Inquiry, 11 J Law & Relig 793, 831 (1994–1995)Google Scholar (“[E]cumenical approaches are one of the most important tools we have to integrate values into political discourse.”).

100. See Saphire, Richard B., Religious People and Public Life: Some Reflections on Greenawalt, 23 N Ky L Rev 655, 680 (1996)Google Scholar (asking devout religious believers to recast their arguments in nonreligious terms can be like asking them “to recast their arguments in ancient Greek”).

101. Blumoff, , 11 J Law & Relig at 611Google Scholar (cited in note 97). Compare Glendon, Mary Ann, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 181–82 (Free Press, 1991)Google Scholar (discussing the possibility of “translating” particular religious discourses without a loss of religious distinctiveness).

102. Berg, , 73 NC L Rev at 1622Google Scholar (cited in note 46).

103. Id. Berg's points are directed to the public sphere, but they are equally valid for discourse and debate in the private realm.

104. Coleman, , An American Strategic Theology at 195Google Scholar (cited in note 73).

105. Coleman, , 40 Theological Studies at 706Google Scholar (cited in note 75).

106. Id at 705.

107. Perry, , Religion in Politics at 81Google Scholar (cited in note 34). “Gandhi was not a Christian,” Perry continues, “but he recognized the Gospel vision as profound and compelling.” Id.

108. Perry, , Love and Power at 45Google Scholar (cited in note 4) (quoting The Williamsburg Charter: A National Celebration and Reaffirmation of the First Amendment Religious Liberty Clauses 19 (1988)Google Scholar).

109. In my previous article, I urged religious thinkers to be “reconcilers,” thinkers willing to confront and consider secular as well as religious sources of truth in an attempt to “reconcile” these sources by bringing them into harmony or agreement. Conkle, , 10 J Law & Relig at 19–21Google Scholar (cited in note 6). Those whose starting point is secular could likewise be reconcilers in this sense. To be a reconciler, however, one first must be multi-lingual: one cannot meaningfully consider a potential source of moral truth without understanding and communicating in the moral language of that source.

110. But compare Sherry, , 84 Georgetown L J at 477Google Scholar (cited in note 35) (“[T]here is no way to resolve disputes between epistemologies except by recourse to power.”).

111. Id at 474.

112. Id at 474-75 (footnotes omitted).

113. See generally Alexander, , 30 San Diego L Rev 763Google Scholar (cited in note 53) (arguing for the unity of religious and nonreligious epistemology).

At least on one theoretical understanding, the First Amendment, taken as a whole, may support my general conception of the search for truth. Thus, according to Professor William P. Marshall, the search for truth is a value that helps justify not only freedom of expression, but also the Religion Clauses. Marshall, William P., Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DePaulL Rev 243 (1994)Google Scholar. “[B]y affirming the value of religious ideas in the pursuit of truth,” writes Marshall, “the search for truth value recognizes that freedom of religion and freedom of speech are complementary parts of the same enterprise.” Id at 267. For an elaboration of Marshall's views, see Marshall, William P., In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 Ga L Rev 1 (1995)Google Scholar.

114. This humility and tolerance would require that full consideration be given to the experiences, values, and insights of religious minorities, whose historical and contemporary experiences may lead them to be concerned, if not frightened, about an enhanced religious role in contemporary America. For powerful testimony on this concern from a Jewish perspective, see Blumoff, 11 J Law & Relig (cited in note 97).

115. See Berg, , 73 NC L Rev at 1624 (cited in note 46)Google Scholar.

116. Davis, Harry R. and Good, Robert C., eds, Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political Philosophy and Its Application to Our Age as Expressed in His Writings 207 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960)Google Scholar.

117. Id.

118. Berg, , 73 NC L Rev at 1624Google Scholar (cited in note 46). “Religious humility,” according to Niebuhr, “is in perfect accord with the presuppositions of a democratic society.” Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defence 135 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944)Google Scholar.

As Professor Jaroslav Pelikan has noted, President Abraham Lincoln exemplified the type of humility that Niebuhr later described. Pelikan, Jaroslav, Believers-in-Chief, New Republic 30, 32 (09 4, 1995)Google Scholar. Thus, Lincoln showed “a sense of reverence in the presence of a divine mystery that did not yield its ultimate secrets either to rationalism or to orthodoxy and therefore called for humility and awe on the part of all mortals.” Id.

119. See above, notes 1-2 and accompanying text.

120. And even if my proposed search for truth were in fact pursued within the United States, this might not be adequate for the increasingly global era in which we live. According to Professor Harold J. Berman, international conditions require “a transnational, cross-cultural, inter-religious” search for truth. Berman, Harold J., Law and Logos, 44 DePaul L Rev 143, 164 (1994)Google Scholar. Such a search, writes Professor Berman, would draw upon

the resources not only of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—the traditional theistic religions—but also of various forms of Buddhism, Taoism, and other non-theistic religions, as well as on various forms of humanism that are not called religions but share with them a passionate commitment to a higher spiritual truth.

Id at 157.

If my dream for the United States is unrealistic, all the more so is Berman's for the world. But Berman has hope even for his vision, hope he traces to the Biblical account of Pentecost:

Implicit in the story of the Tower or Babel is the story of Pentecost…. It tells us that at a place where a multitude of people of different nationalities had gathered to worship, certain of them received from the Holy Spirit the power to speak in “other languages,” so that all the peoples of the earth could hear “the mighty works of God,” “each in his own native tongue.” Thus the story of Pentecost gives hope that human pride can be overcome, and that by translation from one language to another all peoples of the world may, by the power of a higher spiritual truth, share each other's experiences vicariously and become, as they were originally intended to be, united.

Id at 165 (citing and quoting Acts 2:1-13).

121. King, , I Have a Dream at 219 (cited in note 1).Google Scholar