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JEWISH LAW AND MEDIEVAL LOGIC: WHY EATING HORSE MEAT IS A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2015

Bernhard Rohrbacher
Bernhard Rohrbacher*
Affiliation:
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1994; J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2001
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Abstract

This article presents a case study of the influence of Muslim and Christian logicians on medieval Jewish law. The case in question is why it is a punishable offense for Jews to eat mammals that do not have either sign of purity—that is, neither have split hooves nor chew their cud—and the article examines the answers given by three medieval Jewish sages: Rashi, Maimonides, and Naḥmanides. The Written Law of the Torah explicitly allows the consumption of mammals, such as cattle, with both signs of purity. It also explicitly prohibits the eating of mammals, such as camels or pigs, with one sign but not the other. It does not, however, appear to explicitly prohibit the consumption of mammals, such as horses, with neither sign. Using a fortiori logic, Rashi derives a punishable prohibition against eating horses from the prohibition against eating camels and pigs. Maimonides ascribes this prohibition to the Oral Law of the Talmud. Naḥmanides, by contrast, attributes it directly to the Written Law without relying on either a fortiori logic or the Oral Law. This article argues that this solution was available to Naḥmanides because he adopted inclusive disjunction from Christian logicians, but it was not available to Maimonides because he adopted exclusive disjunction from Muslim logicians. The choice between inclusive and exclusive disjunction is shown to continue to be of importance in modern American law.

Keywords

Jewish lawIslamic philosophyscholasticisma fortiori argumentdisjunction
Type
ARTICLES
Information
Journal of Law and Religion , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 295 - 319
Copyright
Copyright © Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University 2015 

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References

1 3 Rashi, Commentary on the Torah, to Leviticus 11:8 (Yisrael Isser Zvi Herczeg trans., Mesorah Publications, Ltd. 1999) (Hebrew text and formatting omitted). Throughout this article, square brackets in a quotation indicate an alteration by this author and acute brackets indicate an alteration by the editor of the source of the quotation.

2 1 Sefer HaMitzvos of the Rambam: A New Translation Following the Study Schedule 249–50 [Negative Commandment 172] (Berel Bell trans., Sichos in English 2013) [hereinafter Sefer HaMitzvos]; see also 2 Rambam, The Commandments 168 [Negative Commandment 172] (Charles B. Chavel trans., Soncino Press 1967).

3 5 Ramban, Commentary on the Torah, to Leviticus 11:3 (Nesanel Kasnett et al. trans., Mesorah Publications, Ltd. 2010) (Hebrew text and formatting omitted).

4 1 Sefer HaMitzvos, supra note 2, at 249–50 [Negative Commandment 172].

5 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 11:3 (Hebrew text and formatting omitted).

6 Id. (italics in original; other formatting and Hebrew text omitted).

7 See generally R.E. Jennings, The Genealogy of Disjunction (1994).

8 See, e.g., Pentateuch & Haftorahs: Hebrew Text, English Translation & Commentary 198–200, 397–99, 554–59, 937–41 (J. H. Hertz ed., 2nd ed. 1960).

9 See, e.g., Benjamin Eidin Scolnic, Modern Methods of Bible Study, in Etz Hayim Study Companion 34, 37–40 (Jacob Blumenthal & Janet L. Liss eds., 2005).

10 See, e.g., W. Gunther Plaut, General Introduction to the Torah, in The Torah: A Modern Commentary xviii, xxi–xxiv (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 4th ed. 1985).

11 See, e.g., Marc Zvi Brettler, How to Read the Bible 3–5, 34–35 (2005); Richard Elliott Friedman, Who Wrote the Bible? 87, 146–49, 210, 223–25 (Harper & Row Publishers 1989).

12 Talmud Bavli, Chagigah 10b (Hersh Goldwurm et al. eds., Mesorah Publications, Ltd. 1990–2004) (formatting omitted).

13 Maimonides' Introduction to the Talmud 88 (Zvi Lampel, trans., Judaica Press, Inc. 1998) [hereinafter Introduction to the Talmud] (italics in original, footnotes omitted). The Mishnah (see infra, this section) calls laws in the first category laws that “are like mountains suspended by a hair,” that is, with only indirect support in the Torah, and laws in the second category laws that “hover in the air,” that is, with no support at all in the Torah. Nevertheless, the Mishnah concludes that “they are [both among] the fundamentals of Torah [גּוּפֵי תוֹרָה gufe torah].” Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Chagigah 10a (formatting omitted).

14 See Introduction to the Talmud, supra note 13, at 88–92.

15 See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: A New Translation with Commentaries & Notes (Eliyahu Touger ed., Moznaim Publishing Corp. 1988–2010).

16 See Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Makkos 23b.

17 See, e.g., Exodus 20:12 (כֵַּבּד אֶת־אָבִךָ וְאֶת־אִמֶּךָ kabed et-avikha ṿe'et-imekha, “Honor your father and your mother.”). Throughout this article, the most recent English translation of the Jewish Publication Society is used unless noted otherwise; chapter and verse numbers are omitted within quotes. See JPS Hebrew-English Tanakh: The Traditional Hebrew Text and the New JPS Translation (2nd ed. 1999).

18 See, e.g., Exodus 20:13 (לוֹ תִֶרָצח lo tirtsaḥ, “You shall not murder”).

19 See, e.g., infra, note 39.

20 Throughout this article, “death penalty” refers both to stoning, burning, strangulation, and decapitation as administered by a human court (מִיתוֹת ֵבּית דִּין mitot bet din) and to premature death as imposed by the Heavenly Court (כֵָּרת karet). The—otherwise important—differences between these two general categories of the death penalty in Jewish law and the four subcategories of the first of these two categories are irrelevant here.

21 See, e.g., Exodus 21:12 (“He who fatally strikes a man shall be put to death.”).

22 See, e.g., Introduction to the Talmud, supra note 13, at 38.

23 See, e.g., The Complete ArtScroll Siddur: Weekday/Sabbath/Festival 48–53 (Rabbi Nosson Scherman trans., 2nd ed. 1987) [hereinafter ArtScroll Siddur].

24 See, e.g., Siddur Sim Shalom for Shabbat and Festivals 70 (Leonard S. Chahan ed., 1998).

25 See Joseph Rauch, The Hamburg Prayerbook, in Central Conference of American Rabbis: Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention 253, 265 & n.21 (Isaac E. Marcuson ed., 1918).

26 1 Sifra: An Analytical Translation 57 [Baraita de Rabbi Ishmael, Parashah 1] (Jacob Neusner trans., 1988) [hereinafter Sifra] (formatting omitted).

27 Black's Law Dictionary 61 (6th ed. 1990).

28 Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).

29 ArtScroll Siddur, supra note 23, at 49.

30 Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Makkos 5b (formatting omitted).

31 Id.

32 Id. at 5b n.30. For example, the following is a possible refutation of Justice Brennan's a fortiori argument in Carey v. Population Services International (see supra, text accompanying note 28): A state may not prohibit the availability of abortion to minors, because at this point abortion is the only alternative to giving birth and its availability is not a significant encouragement for minors to be sexually active. This does not preclude a state from prohibiting the availability of contraceptives to minors, because at that point contraceptives are not the only alternative to giving birth and their availability is a significant encouragement for minors to be sexually active. Needless to say, this possible refutation, like Justice Brennan's a fortiori argument, rests on a host of underlying assumptions, none of which are hereby endorsed or rejected by this author.

33 The second of the hermeneutical principles listed in the “Baraita of Rabbi Ishmael,” according to which “the Torah is interpreted … by means of a[] [verbal] analogy,” is less central to understanding this article. See infra text accompanying notes 52–53, 63.

34 The connective particle ו is pronounced as וּ u (this verse) or וְ ṿe (preceding verse), depending on the first sound of the word to which it is prefixed. Among other meanings, it can have a disjunctive meaning (this verse) or a conjunctive meaning (preceding verse).

35 That is, the hyrax, a rodent-like mammal resembling a small groundhog. See Natan Slifkin, The Camel, the Hare, and the Hyrax: The Law of Animals with One Kosher Sign in Light of Modern Zoology 88–95 (Zoo Torah & Gefen Books, 2nd ed. 2011).

36 Leviticus 11:2–8.

37 The Israelites seem to have acquired horses only after they settled in Canaan. The Torah mentions horses only as possessions of the Egyptians, Exodus 14:28, “which at the time dominated the horse trade,” Meir Shalev, Beginnings: Reflections on the Bible's Intriguing Firsts 52 (Stuart Schoffman trans., Harmony Books 2011), or as possessions of future foreign enemies, Deuteronomy 20:1, and future Israelite kings, Deuteronomy 17:16, but never as possessions of the Israelites at that time, that is, before they settled in Canaan. By contrast, donkeys, which are also members of the horse family (equidae) and, like horses, lack both signs of purity, are mentioned in the Torah as possessions of Abraham, Genesis 22:3; Joseph's brothers, Genesis 42:13, 42:17; Moses, Exodus 4:20; and Dathan and Abiran, Numbers 16:15. Donkeys are also mentioned—unlike horses—in both versions of the Ten Commandments, Exodus 20:14; Deuteronomy 5:18, and in a host of other laws, Exodus 13:13, 21:33, 22:3, 22:8, 22:9, 23:4, 23:5, 23:12, 34:20; Deuteronomy 5:14, 22:3, 22:4, 22:10. Additionally, already in the wilderness of Sinai, the Israelites must have encountered several wild species of non-equine mammals then prevalent there with no sign of purity, and they certainly encountered them later after they settled in Canaan. According to David, it apparently was not unusual there that “a lion or bear came and carried off an animal from the flock.” 1 Samuel 17:34. On such occasion, David “would go after [the lion or bear] and fight it[,] [a]nd if it attacked [him], [he] would seize it by the head and strike it down and kill it.” 1 Samuel 17:35. The dead beast now being available for consumption, the status of such animals with no sign of purity as allowed or prohibited must have been in issue even then.

38 Deuteronomy 14:4–8.

39 As the Torah specifies no other form of punishment in connection with this prohibition, the default punishment of flogging is imposed for its transgression. See supra, text accompanying note 19; infra, text accompanying notes 49–50.

40 Leviticus 11:2.

41 2 Sifra, supra note 26, at 155 [Parashat Shemini, Pereq 3] (formatting omitted).

42 Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Pesachim 41b (formatting omitted).

43 See supra text accompanying notes 16–21.

44 1 Sefer HaMitzvos, supra note 2, at 249 [Negative Commandment 172].

45 2 Sifra, supra note 26, at 155 [Parashat Shemini, Pereq 3] (formatting omitted).

46 Rashi, supra note 1, to Leviticus 11:8 (Hebrew text and formatting omitted). Here and in subsequent quotes from this work, the translation is italicized and the translator's explanatory interpolations are set in plain face.

47 See supra text accompanying note 30.

48 See supra text accompanying note 45.

49 A different edition of this work adds here: “<though it is an accepted principle that transgression of a law derived from a kal va-chomer is not punishable>.” 1 Rambam, The Commandments,see supra note 2, at 168 [Negative Commandment 172].

50 In other words, the minimal amount of prohibited food that, when consumed, subjects a Jew to punishment.

51 1 Sefer HaMitzvos, supra note 2, at 249–50 [Negative Commandment 172] (footnotes omitted, italics supplied).

52 See supra text accompanying note 26.

53 The Talmud: The Steinsaltz Edition—A Reference Guide 150 (Israel V. Berman trans., Random House 1989) [hereinafter Talmud Reference Guide].

54 See Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Yevamos 3a.

55 Leviticus 18:10.

56 Leviticus 18:17.

57 See supra, text accompanying note 49.

58 The “main body of the Torah” (גּוּפֵי תוֹרָה gufe torah) includes not only statements of the Written Law, but also statements of the Oral Law that can be “extracted” from the Written Law “through analytical means,” such as a ḳal ṿaḥomer or a gezerah shaṿah. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying note 60.

59 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

60 1 Sefer HaMitzvos, supra note 2, at 217–18 [Negative Commandment 336] (footnotes omitted).

61 Introduction to the Talmud,supra note 13, at 88 (italics omitted).

62 1 Sefer HaMitzvos, supra note 2, at 249 [Negative Commandment 172].

63 Talmud Reference Guide, supra note 53, at 150.

64 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 11:3 (Hebrew text and footnotes omitted). Here and in subsequent quotes form this work, the translation is italicized and the translator's explanatory interpolations are set in plain face, except that transliterated words remain italicized in interpolations. Original emphasis in the translation is indicated through bold face.

65 Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Sanhedrin 76a n.25.

66 See Leviticus 18:9 (“The nakedness of your sister—your father's daughter or your mother's [daughter], whether born into the household or outside—do not uncover their nakedness.”).

67 See Leviticus 18:11 (“The nakedness of your father's wife's daughter, who [w]as born into your father's household—she is your sister; do not uncover her nakedness.”).

68 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 11:3 (Hebrew text and footnotes omitted).

69 In fact, the Gemara there associates this dissenting opinion with Rabbi Yehudah, and it elsewhere states that “[a]n anonymous Sifra,” such as the one at issue here, also “generally reflects the view of R[abbi] Yehudah.” Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Sanhedrin 86a (formatting omitted).

70 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 11:3 (Hebrew text and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original is in bold).

71 See also supra text following note 31.

72 It is noteworthy, however, that Rashi appears to follow the dissenting opinion regarding this principle. This is evident, for example, in his exegetical use of a ḳal ṿaḥomer to derive the divine imposition of the special punishment of skin disease for speaking disparagingly of another. He comments on Miriam's (and Aaron's) “rebellion” against Moses, for which she was punished with skin disease: “Now if Miriam, who did not intend to speak of [Moses's] disparagement, was thus punished, how much more so [will] one who speaks of the disparagement of his fellow [be thus punished].” Rashi, supra note 1, to Numbers 12:1 (Hebrew text and footnotes omitted).

73 See also supra text following note 31.

74 Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Makkos 17b (formatting omitted).

75 See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying notes 77 and 78.

76 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 11:3 (Hebrew text omitted) (emphasis in original is in bold).

77 Leviticus 11:4 (translation by the author; italics supplied). The New JPS Translation has “although it chews the cud, it has no true hoofs.” JPS Hebrew-English Tanakh, supra note 17, Leviticus 11:4. The translation chosen here is closer to the Hebrew original, in that it coordinates rather than contrasts the italicized and the non-italicized parts.

78 Leviticus 11:7 (translation by the author; italics supplied). The New JPS Translation has “although it has true hoofs … it does not chew the cud.” JPS Hebrew-English Tanakh, supra note 17, Leviticus 11:7. The translation chosen here is again closer to the Hebrew original, for the reason stated in the immediately preceding note.

79 Leviticus 11:4 (italics supplied).

80 2 Midrash Rabbah, to Genesis 32:4 (H. Freedman trans., Judaica Press 3rd ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted).

81 Leviticus 11:4 (italics supplied).

82 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 11:3 (Hebrew text omitted) (emphasis in original is in bold).

83 Another question is why Naḥmanides appears to have failed to consider a similar solution in the case of the prohibition against incest with a full sister. In other words, why does Naḥmanides appear to agree that this prohibition is not included via inclusive disjunction in Leviticus 18:9 (“The nakedness of your sister—your fathers daughter or your mother's [daughter], whether born into the household or outside—do not uncover their nakedness”), but must instead be derived from Leviticus 18:11 (“The nakedness of your father's wife's daughter, who [w]as born into your father's household—she is your sister; do not uncover her nakedness.”)? See supra text accompanying note 68. One answer is that Naḥmanides does not agree with this approach, but merely cites it as part and parcel of the “classic example” used in the Talmud for the principle that “A punishable prohibition cannot be established through a logical deduction.” See id.; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text. There are at least three indications that this is so. First, Naḥmanides writes that, according to the Sages of the Talmud, the prohibition against incest with a full sister cannot be derived from the prohibition against incest with either half sister, “even though it could be derived [therefrom] by logical inference through a kal vachomer, and moreover <a full sister> has within herself the designation of both of <these half sisters>.” 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 11:3 (Hebrew text and footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied in bold). The (emphasized) language in the second clause clearly does not explain the (non-emphasized) language in the first clause, as it would if it were introduced by the causal conjunction כִּי (ki “because”) rather than the coordinating conjunction וְ (ṿe “and”). As written, this language instead hints at the derivation of the prohibition that this author would expect Naḥmanides to adopt, according to which the prohibition against incest with a full sister is included in Leviticus 11:9 via inclusive disjunction. If this is correct, then Naḥmanides's derivation of this prohibition is another example in which he employs inclusive disjunction, whereas Rashi and Maimonides employ exclusive disjunction. Second, it is curious that, at the end of his summary of the classic example for the principle that “A punishable prohibition cannot be established through a logical deduction,” Naḥmanides does not cite to Makot 5b, where this example is discussed at great length, but rather cites to Yevamot 22b, where it is discussed only in the briefest of terms (“And the Rabbis, what do they do with this [phrase] she is your sister [in Leviticus 18:11]? They need it to obligate <a brother> for cohabiting with his sister who is the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother … to tell you that we do not establish a [punishable] prohibition from a logical inference.” Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Yevamos 22b) (italics in original; formatting omitted). See supra text accompanying note 68. By citing to a less obvious source, Naḥmanides distances himself from its reasoning. Third, when Naḥmanides directly discusses in the proper place the prohibition against incest with a sister, he does not even mention the claim in the Talmud that the prohibition against incest with a full sister is not included in the prohibition against a half sister in Leviticus 18:9 but must be derived from additional language in Leviticus 18:11. See 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 18:9. This again suggests that he does not endorse this claim. Another answer to the question posed at the beginning of this footnote is that Naḥmanides's approach to the prohibition against consumption of mammals with no sign of purity simply cannot be replicated in the case of the prohibition against incest with a full sister. The reason for this is that, whereas the impurity of a mammal with no sign of purity is not an altogether different type of impurity from that of a mammal with only one sign of purity, “a full sister is an altogether different type of relation than a half sister,” and as a result, “the punishment assigned for a half sister indicates nothing about the punishment for a full sister” nor does the prohibition against a half sister indicate anything about the prohibition of a full sister. See Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Sanhedrin 76a n.25 (italics supplied). This author prefers the first answer, although he knows of at least one prima facie convincing—but in fact refutable—argument to prefer the second, which, however, goes far beyond the scope of this article. See 5 Ramban, supra note 3, to Leviticus 18:9.

84 See Jennings, supra note 7, at 43–83.

85 See, e.g., Robert J. Yanal, Basic Logic 109 (1988) (stating that “[t]he standard logical definition of ‘or’ (in ‘P or Q’) is ‘Either P or Q or both’”).

86 Maimonides' Treatise on Logic: The Original Arabic and Three Hebrew Translations 45 (Isaac Efros trans., American Academy for Jewish Research 1938).

87 Id. at 55.

88 Avicenna's Treatise on Logic 24–25 (Fardhang Zabeh ed., Martinus Nijhoff 1971) (footnote omitted).

89 Id. at 24–25 n.14 (quoting Nicholas Rescher, Studies in the History of Arabic Logic 77 (1963)).

90 Id. at 26.

91 Id. at 35 (italics supplied; footnote omitted).

92 Id. at 35 n.19.

93 Maimonides' Treatise on Logic, supra note 86, at 58.

94 Al-Fārābī's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics 77–78 (Nicholas Rescher trans. 1963) (note and indications of original line breaks omitted).

95 Id. at 78 (indications of original line breaks omitted). Thus, while there are no other alternatives to the world being eternal or the world being created, or water being hot, cold, or lukewarm, there are other alternatives to Zaid being in Iraq or being in Syria, as he could be in Persia, for example.

96 Here and below, Al-Farabi employs the term “excluded” in the sense in which Avicenna employs the phrase “taken as a premise.” See supra text accompanying note 91.

97 See supra note 95.

98 Al- Fārābī's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics,supra note 94, at 78–80 (indications of original line breaks omitted).

99 Benson Mates, Stoic Logic 118 (University of California Press, 2nd ed. 1961) (quoting Galen, Institutio Logica (Karl Kalbfleisch ed., Teubner 1896)). See also Jennings, supra note 7, at 254–55 (quoting the statement that “the disjunctives have one member only true” from Galen's Institutio Logica and quoting similar statements from other Greco-Roman works, namely, Marcus Tullius Cicero's Topica, Aulus Gellius's Noctes Atticae, Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and Diogenes Laertius's Vitae Philosophorum).

100 Cristopher J. Martin, Logical Consequence, in The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy 289, 298 (John Marenbon ed., 2012) (citing Peter Abelard, Dialectica 491 (Lambertus M. de Rijk ed., 1970)). Boethius (ca. 480–525 CE) was a Greco-Roman philosopher active around the fall of the Western Roman Empire.

101 Terence Parsons, The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12th through 14th Centuries, in 2 Handbook of the History of Logic: Medieval and Renaissance Logic 157, 171 (Dov M. Gabbay & John Woods eds., 2008).

102 William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic 34 (Norman Kretzmann trans., University of Minnesota Press 1966) (italics supplied); see also Parsons, supra note 101, at 171 n.16.

103 Jeffrey E. Brower & Kevin Guilfoy, Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, at xviii (Jeffrey E. Brower & Kevin Guilfoy eds. 2004).

104 “The possibility of [Maimonides] having known Latin is more or less excluded by a fanciful etymology that his Commentary on the Mishnah offers for the rabbinic Hebrew term … aspaclaria.” Herbert A. Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works 80–81 (2005). Aspaclaria (אְַסַפְּקלְַריָא) refers to the more or less distorting lens or mirror through which human beings can perceive the divine presence. See Talmud Bavli, supra note 12, Sanhedrin 97b n.41 and accompanying text. “[Maimonides] explains [this term] as a compound of two Hebrew words, whereas in actuality it is a transparent borrowing from the common Latin word specularia, window pane.” Davidson, supra, at 81.

105 That is, “[t]he languages that [Maimonides] was able to read.” Davidson, supra note 104, at 80.

106 Nina Caputo suggests that this account, “which is no longer extant,” would have been written “most likely” in Catalan, but appears to leave open the possibility that it was written in Latin. See Nina Caputo, Nahmanides in Medieval Catalonia: History, Community, and Messianism 162, 167 (2007). Haim Maccoby is even more equivocal when he states that this account, if indeed it ever existed, “must have been either in Latin or Spanish (Catalan).” Haim Maccoby, Judaism on Trial: Jewish-Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages 98 (1993). In any event, if Naḥmanides was able to write in Catalan or Spanish, then it stands to reason that he also was able to read Latin, given the similarities between these languages.

107 Daniel J. Lasker, Jewish Knowledge of Christianity in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in Studies in Medieval Intellectual and Social History: Festschrift in Honor of Robert Chazan 97, 103–04 (David Engel et al. eds., 2012).

108 Charles B. Chavel, Ramban: His Life and Teachings 17 (1960).

109 More broadly, “there were individuals, a subset of the intellectual class such as astronomers, physicians, and philosophers, who did read Latin works” in Christian Iberia. Benjamin R. Gampel, Letter to a Wayward Teacher: The Transformations of Sephardic Culture in Christian Iberia, in 2 Cultures of the Jews: Diversities of Diaspora 86, 120 (David Biale ed., 2002). As an astronomer, physician, and philosopher, Naḥmanides fits that bill perfectly.

110 One anonymous reviewer wonders whether “the meaning of a ‘logical disjunction’ [is] really a question of [formal] logic … or … a question of [linguistic] interpretation.” However, modern semantics, that is, the study of meaning in language, is largely a “logical theory of natural language.” Johan van Benthem & Alice ter Meulen, Preface to Handbook of Logic and Language, at xiii (Johan van Benthem & Alice ter Meulen eds., Elsevier 2nd ed. 2011); see generally Handbook of Logic and Language, supra, for the interface between logic and language. Other factors, such as pragmatics, that is, the study of context in language, play a role in linguistic interpretation. See, e.g., supra examples in text accompanying note 84. Nor is there a one-to-one correspondence between logical operators and linguistic expressions in English or any other language. See Jennings, supra note 7, at 43–83. There is, however, no dichotomy between formal logic and linguistic interpretation. On the contrary, there is a very substantial overlap between these two areas. This article is one investigation into that overlap.

111 264 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

112 Id. at 1329–30 (italics in original).

113 Id. at 1330 (italics in original).

114 Id. at 1329 (italics supplied).

115 Id. at 1332.

116 Id. at 1330.

117 Id. at 1331.

118 Id. at 1334 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).

119 Id. (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).

120 Prior commentators on this case have ignored this point. See David W. Maher, Claiming in the Alternative: Beware of the Minefield!, 85 Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society 999 (2003); David Maher & Jennifer Hammond, The Ambiguity of Or, 84 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 245 (2002).

121 886 So. 2d 38, 39 (Ala. 2003) (italics supplied).

122 Id. at 41–43.

123 Id. at 43.

124 Id. at 45 (Lyons, J., dissenting) (italics supplied).

125 Id. (Lyons, J., dissenting).

126 Kenneth A. Adams & Alan S. Kaye, Revisiting the Ambiguity of “And” and “Or” in Legal Drafting, 80 St. John's Law Review 1167, 1191–92 (2006).

127 72 P.3d 343 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).

128 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–203(B) (2015) (italics supplied).

129 Johnson, 72 P.3d at 348.

130 Model Penal Code § 2.03 explanatory note (2001) (italics supplied).

131 Johnson, 72 P.3 at 348.

132 That is, if the statute read, “The actual result differs from that intended or contemplated only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or only in the respect that the injury or harm intended or contemplated would have been more serious or extensive than that caused.”

133 Daniel H. Frank & Oliver Leaman, Preface to The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, at xv (Daniel H. Frank & Oliver Leaman eds., 2003).