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Community Culture and Tradition: Maintaining Male Dominance in Conservative Institutions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 April 2015
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“The freer women are to share their gifts with society and to assume leadership in society, the better are the prospects for the entire human community to progress in wisdom, justice and dignified living …” So argued Mary Ann Glendon, the Vatican delegate to the Fourth World Conference on Women in September, 1995. While Glendon's point is well taken, in many societies, including the Catholic Church which Glendon represented at the Conference, women often do not have the opportunity to choose their roles and share their gifts and talents with society in the manner they deem most appropriate. In patriarchal societies women's roles and contributions are often reduced to the periphery. This is the case in traditional societies where the community is viewed as the bearer of rights, and the roles assigned women are designed to ensure that they conform to the needs of the community, rather than the needs of individual women. Women are often socialized into accepting the roles mapped out for them by the community, and attempts to challenge them often lead only to ostracization by the community.
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1. The Conference was held in Beijing, China from September 4 - 15, 1995 (hereinafter Beijing Conference). Glendon made these remarks in her address to the Conference. See Glendon, Mary Ann, Vatican Delegation in Beijing, 25 Origins 203 (09 14, 1995)Google Scholar.
2. In her address to delegates at the Conference, Glendon acknowledged that the Catholic Church had been guilty of the practice of marginalizing the contributions of women. Id at 203.
3. The Vatican's emphasis on the family and the importance of the role played by women in the family was made evident in Glendon's address. Glendon noted that: “To affirm the dignity and rights of all women, whose quest for personal fulfilment and the construction of a stable society is inseparably linked to their commitments to God, family, neighbor and especially to their children.” Id at 204.
4. It appears to be very difficult for the Catholic Church to engage in dialogue with its own members about controversial issues. In Lincoln, Nebraska, many Catholics who belong to organizations that question the Church's teachings on specific issues like the ordination of women, artificial birth control, or abortion were excommunicated in May, 1996 by Bishop Fabian Bruskowitz for belonging to organizations that in Bishop Brus-kowitz' eyes are incompatible with the Church's teachings. Calls for reconciliation and the recent (August 1996) formation of a project called Catholic Common Ground by Cardinal Bernadin of Chicago, Illinois have been treated cautiously because it is unclear to what extent dialogue can be established when many subjects will be considered “off-limits” because there is official Church teaching on those subjects.
5. Pope John Paul II took preliminary steps in 1995 to ensure that women made more of a contribution to the liturgical life of the Church in various areas. This will be discussed more fully below. Similarly, several African leaders are taking steps to conform with the provisions of CEDAW in order to address the conditions of women.
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27. This paradox is clearly illustrated by a group of ANC women calling itself the Mothers and Daughters of the Nation which was formed to ensure that women's rights were heeded by the ANC at their National Convention. One supporter of women's rights who did not wish to associate herself with the group because of their name commented that the Mothers and Daughters of the Nation never stand alone as just women, but must always see themselves in relation to something else; they always have to be someone's mother, wife or daughter.
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37. With the limited education that most girls receive, the only jobs available to them are as domestic workers.
38. This is illustrated by the fact that maintenance for African children has become a subject of legislation; in many African countries the law now requires African men to pay child support. Previously this was not an issue as the structure of the extended African family, and the dictates of customary law meant that children were usually cared for by the families of their father.
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43. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Preamble, Art 18, 21 ILM 58 (1982).
44. GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 52, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), Arts 14(1), 2(1), 999 UNTS 171.
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69. For example, the African [Banjul] Charter (cited in note 43) is devoted to upholding African civilization and heritage and the African perspective of human rights, yet it too provides for freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex. It is not altogether clear from this document which right is to be accorded preference.
70. This right was clearly established by Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (cited in note 46). It has been expanded on by Article 3 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (cited in note 47) which provides for the equal access of men and women to economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of gender is recognized in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (cited in note 44) and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), GA Res 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp (No 46) at 193, UN Doc A/34/46.
71. CEDAW, Art 5(a) (cited in note 70).
72. The Committee was established pursuant to Article 17 of the Convention. It is comprised of 23 experts from various geographical areas who are elected by the states parties to the Convention. CEDAW, Art 17 (cited in note 70). See the report of the Committee found in CEDAW/C/SR113 25 Feb, 1988.
73. African [Banjul] Charter, Art 18(3) (cited in note 43).
74. Id at Art 17.
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