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Biblical Law and the Economic Growth of Ancient Israel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2015

Todd G. Buchholz
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Abstract

This paper shows that the laws of ancient Israel found in the Old Testament significantly restricted economic transactions and limited the possibility of economic growth. The paper begins by examining the production function in light of Hebraic teaching, demonstrating that theological principles can be translated into economic regulations. The paper then describes the various laws regarding land, labor, capital, and technology and analyzes the probable economic effects of such laws during approximately the fourth century B.C.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Law and Religion , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , 1988 , pp. 389 - 427
Copyright
Copyright © Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University 1989

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References

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8. Schumpeter writes: “The sacred books of Israel, especially the legislative portions of them, reveal perfect grasp of the practical economic problems of the Hebrew state. But there is no trace of analytic effort.” Schumpeter, J., History of Economic Analysis 53 (1954)Google Scholar. Schumpeter says nothing else about Israel in his treatise. It seems he did not give the Biblical laws the analytic effort he accuses them of lacking. (Incidentally, economic analysis may even be useful when examining the behavior of animals. See, e.g., Kagel, , et al., Experimental Studies of Consumer Demand Behavior Using Laboratory Animals, 13 Econ. Inquiry 22 (1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar) In Part III I shall discuss why other aspects of Posner's thesis do not apply to ancient Israel.

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12. Id.

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16. The First Commonwealth extended from 1025-586 B.C. The monarchs Saul, Solomon, and David ruled from approximately 1025-925 B.C. The Israelites were exiled to Babylonia in 586 B.C. and returned to form the Second Commonwealth in 444 B.C. after Persia defeated Babylonia.

17. Baron, supra note 9, at 5.

18. Id, For evidence of ancient irrigation methods see, e.g., Arkell, , A Historical Background of Sudan Agriculture, in Agriculture in the Sudan 7–9 (1954)Google Scholar; Gulhati, & Smith, , Irrigated Agriculture: An Historical Review, in Irrigation of Agricultural Lands 3–5 (1967)Google Scholar.

19. The distance across modern Israel from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River is under fifty miles at many points. Yet the fifty miles may cover several distinct topographic and hydrographic regions.

20. Baron, supra note 9, at 5.

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23. 2 Kings 7:1. See also 1 Kings 20:34; Jeremiah 37:21; Robinson, supra note 21, at 312. The Bible discusses urban existence in Deuteronomy 19, 20 and grain markets and merchants in Amos 8:4-5; Proverbs 11:26. See also Silver, supra note 4, at 801. For quotations from the Bible, I am relying on the Jewish Publication Society's English translation: The Holy Scriptures According to the Masoretic Text (1955).

24. See Grant, supra note 11, at 90; Baron, supra note 9, at 7.

25. Baron, supra note 9, at 3.

26. See Gerschenkron, A., Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962)Google Scholar.

27. Baron, supra note 9, at 5-6. See also 1 Kings 10:12, 14-29; 1 Kings 9:26; 2 Chron. 9:13-27; Bell, J., A History of Economic Thought 18 (1953)Google Scholar. For protection and trade, Solomon built store cities such as Palmyra in the desert between Damascus and the Euphrates River. But after Solomon's death, Israel was partitioned between the north and the south and lost access to many routes. The Phoenicians and Canaanites took over as merchants.

28. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 312.

29. Baron, supra note 9, at 10. Bernhard anderson describes Babylon as a “scene of thriving agriculture and teeming industry” with a culture “superior to the modest way of life the Jews had known …” Anderson, B., Understanding the Old Testament 418–19 (1975)Google Scholar.

30. Baron, supra note 9, at 10.

31. The production function given is, of course, a simplification. Economists construct more sophisticated versions based on a country's (or firm's) factor endowment, relative costs of factors, and ease of substitution. See generally Solow, R., Growth theory (1970)Google Scholar; Hamberg, D., Models of Economic Growth (1971)Google Scholar; Neher, P., Economic Growth and Development (1971)Google Scholar.

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34. Exodus 3:14.

35. Wright, G. & Fuller, R., The Book of the Acts of God 18 (1957)Google Scholar.

36. Heschel, A., God in Search of Man 200 (1955)Google Scholar.

37. Rad, G. Von, 1 Old Testament Theology 139 (1962)Google Scholar. See also Rad, Von, Genesis (1961)Google Scholar. Michael Novak states: “… Judaism and Christianity are religions of narrative and liberty. In every story of the Bible, attention is focused upon the moment of decision. In any given story, dramatic interest is aroused because the outcome remains in doubt until the closing lines.” Novak goes on, too eagerly I think, to conclude that more modern market competition is envisaged in the Bible. Novak, supra note 2, at 344-45.

38. Deuteronomy 32:7.

39. See Nisbet, R., History of the Idea of Progress 10-11, 48–49 (1980)Google Scholar. Cf. Bury, J., The Idea of Progress (1920)Google Scholar.

40. Buber, M., I and Thou (1970)Google Scholar. Although a leader of the Hasidic movement, Buber has influenced Protestant theologians more significantly than Jewish theologians.

41. Proverbs 17:5.

42. See, e.g., d'Entreves, A.P., Natural Law: An Historical Survey (1965)Google Scholar; Maritain, J., The Rights of Man (1944)Google Scholar; Sturm, , Lon Fuller's Multidimensional Natural Law theory, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 612 (1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sturm, , Naturalism, Historicism, and Christian Ethics, 44 J. of Religion 41–42 (1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fried, , Natural Law and the Concept of Justice, 74 Ethics 237 (1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Modern natural law approaches descend in many ways from Aristotle through the Scholastics. See, e.g., Fox, M., Studies in Maimonides and Aquinas, 75–106 (1975)Google Scholar. Modern natural rights theories usually stem from the natural law tradition, as Leo Strauss taught in Natural Right and History (1953). A useful exposition on Strauss is Kennington, , Strauss's Natural Right and History, 35 Review of Metaphysics 57 (1981)Google Scholar.

43. From the Talmud, Tikkune Zohar 122, T. 43, quoted in Newman, L., The Talmudic Anthology 60 (1954)Google Scholar.

44. See Siegel, , A Jewish View of Economic Justice, 1 This World 70, 71 (1982)Google Scholar.

45. Isaiah 5:15.

46. See Deuteronomy 16:18-20, Deuteronomy 17:8-9.

47. Deuteronomy 27:19. See also Leviticus 19:18.

48. Leviticus 25:14. According to the Talmud, “When a person is brought before the Heavenly Court, they first ask him, “Were you honest in business?” Shabbat, 33b.

49. Kaufman, Stephen A., The Structure of Deuteronomic Law, Maarav 105, 146 (1979)Google Scholar.

50. Deuteronomy 25:3. Imago Dei also sustains the Catholic human rights tradition. See, e.g., Maritain, supra note 42; Hollenbach, D., Claims in Conflict (1979)Google Scholar.

51. Sartre, J., No Exit, Sc. 5 (1945)Google Scholar.

52. Whittaker, E., A History of Economic Ideas 79 (1950)Google Scholar. Whittaker quotes from Genesis 3:17. Whittaker's is one of the few texts on economic thought that even mentions pre-Grecian economics. Some begin with the Greeks, as do Bell, supra note 27; Spiegel, H., The Development of Economic Thought (1952)Google Scholar; Lekachman, R., A History of Economic Ideas (1959)Google Scholar. Others skip all the way to the mercantilists, as does Blaug, M., Economic Theory in Retrospect (1962)Google Scholar or even further to the Enlightenment and Adam Smith, as do Taylor, O., A History of Economic Thought (1960)Google Scholar; Barber, W., A History of Economic Thought (1968)Google Scholar. Of course, mere mention does not imply careful and correct explanation. Perhaps Whittaker should have started with the Greeks.

53. Genesis 2:15. See also Seigel, supra note 44, at 70; Hirsch, R., The Way of the Upright 39 (1973)Google Scholar. Contemporary Catholic thought is similar here. Pope John Paul II writes: “Man is the image of God partly through the mandate received from his Creator to subdue, to dominate, the earth. In carrying out this mandate, man, every human being, reflects the very action of the creator of the universe …. And so these words, placed at the beginning of the Bible, never cease to be relevant.” Laborem Exercens 4. In Christian thought, sin does not make work necessary; sin makes work more difficult. Jesus, John, and Paul all worked and recommended work. See John 5:17; John 13,12:17; Acts 18:3; 1 Thess. 4:11; II Thess. 3:10 ff. See also Theology of Work, 14 New Catholic Encyclopedia 1015–16 (1967)Google Scholar.

54. Psalms 128:2.

55. Deuteronomy 11:7. According to the Talmud, if a man is idle, he is not blessed. Midrash Tehillim 23:1.

56. Hirsch, supra note 53, at 39. Despite vitriolic anti-semitism and a misreading of the Bible, Marx saw the same virtues in work, when work was not capitalist wage-labor. See Marx, K., Das Kapital 144–45 (Gateway, ed. 1849)Google Scholar; Buchholz, T., New Ideas from Dead Economists (1989), ch.6Google Scholar, For Marx's anti-semitism see his essay, On the Jewish Question (1843) and Himmelfarb's intriguing The Real Marx, 79 Commentary 37 (04 1985)Google Scholar.

57. Genesis 29:15-20; Genesis 30:32. See also Bell, supra note 27, at 18.

58. Exodus 2:9. See also Bell, supra note 27, at 18.

59. See Grant, supra note 11, at 89.

60. See Leviticus 19:13; Deuteronomy 24:14-15; Jeremiah 22:13. The Code of Hammurabi specified wage rates for various services, e.g., a field-laborer was to be paid 8 gur of corn per annum, a herdsman 6 gur. See Edwards, C., The Hammurabi Code and the Sinaitic Legislation 67–73 (1904)Google Scholar.

61. Leviticus 19:13. See also Deuteronomy 24:14-15; Isaiah 16:14; Encyclopedia Judaica, supra note 22, at 615.

62. See Deuteronomy 23:25-26. See also Hirsch, supra note 53, at 56.

63. Proudhon, quoted in The Pentateuch and Haftorahs 929 (1971)Google Scholar. In modern times courts have sometimes found that legal restrictions on labor interfered with fundamental freedom of contract, as in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where a state set a maximum number of the hours an individual could work per week. It took years before the Court would approve such paternalist measures. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

64. Fogel, R. & Engerman, S., Time on the Cross (1974)Google Scholar. The Appendix provides a good bibliography of the literature then available on slavery. Fogel & Engerman's controversial findings have been challenged. See David, & Temin, , Slavery: The Progressive Institution, 34 J. Econ. Hist. 739 (1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wright, , The Efficiency of Slavery: Another Interpretation, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 219 (1979)Google Scholar; Fogel, & Engerman, , Explaining the Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum South, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 275 (1977)Google Scholar; David, & Temin, , Explaining the Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum South: Comment, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 213 (1979)Google Scholar; Fogel, & Engerman, , Explaining the Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum South: Reply, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 672 (1980)Google Scholar. See also Barzel, , An Economic Analysis of Slavery, 20 J. Law & Econ. 87 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. To see the effects of emancipation of slaves on a small agricultural economy, see Moohr, , The Economic Impact of Slave Emancipation in British Guiana, 1832–1852, 25 Econ. Hist. Rev. 588 (1972)Google Scholar.

65. Note that Aristotle, for all his concern about justice, approved of slavery. Aristotle saw a natural division between masters and slaves. Some people, he thought, are naturally “fit” to be slaves. In fact, to enslave was to do justice, since the slave deserved to be subordinated by virtue of his nature. See 1 Politics, chs. 3-6.

66. See Ginzberg, , Studies in the Economics of the Bible, 22 Jewish Q. Rev. 343, 347 (1931–1932)Google Scholar. The Koran highly recommends manumission.

67. See Leviticus 25; The Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 535.

68. See Hirsch, supra note 53, at 24; Baron, supra note 9, at 7.

69. Talmud, Kiddushin, 22b.

70. See Grant, supra note 11, at 91; Baron, supra note 98, at 7.

71. Grant, supra note 11, at 91.

72. Baron, supra note 9, at 7. This was especially true of smaller landowners, since slavery was more efficient when economies of scale were reached on larger plots. Restrictions on cumulation of property limited the number of large scale agricultural producers. See Baron, supra, at 27-29.

73. See Leviticus 25; The Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 536.

74. See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Avadim VIII.

75. Deuteronomy 15:12-15, 18. The prophet Jeremiah bitterly condemned those who tried to flout the laws of release. See Jeremiah 34:14. The Code of Hammurabi also included laws for release. The Code provided that one enslaved because of debt would be released after three years. The Code of Hammurabi, 117. See also Ginzberg, supra note 66, at 346.

76. See Deuteronomy 15:16, 17; Exodus 21:6.

77. See Leviticus 25:44-46; Hirsch, supra note 53, at 25.

78. See The Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 537.

79. Exodus 21:26, 27.

80. Deuteronomy 23:16, 17.

81. See Leviticus 25; The Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 537.

82. Leviticus 25.

83. Job 31:15.

84. It would be difficult to imagine a property structure in which rights were absolute. Even in the nineteenth century, American law recognized the tension between the principles damnum absque injuria (loss without legal injury) and sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas (use your own property without injuring others), in addition to eminent domain. Morton Horwitz examines the strength of private property rights claims in the late eighteenth century. He writes that “one is tempted to see a Machiavellian hand” working through the courts on behalf of powerful economic forces to redefine property rights. Horwitz succumbs to the temptation and, like Marx, sometimes falls into the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy in pointing to material forces as the cause of changing jurisprudential ideals. Horwitz, M., The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 34 (1977)Google Scholar.

85. See Demsetz, , Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347Google Scholar. Aristotle presents many prudential reasons for private property in arguing against Plato's more communal prescriptions. In particular, Aristotle warns of the free-rider problem and contends that people take better care of private possessions than public possessions. II Politics, chs. 3-7. Aquinas, who refers to Aristotle as “The Philosopher,” takes up Aristotle's position over 1,500 years later. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Qu. 66, Art. 1-2.

86. See Psalms 24:1; Leviticus 25:23, 38; Deuteronomy 8:12-18; Ezekiel 28:1-8. See also Guttierez, G., A Theology of Liberation 295 (1973)Google Scholar. Cf. Lauterbach, J., Rabbinic Essays 276 (1951)Google Scholar.

87. See Genesis 23:12-8; Genesis 33:18-19; Silver, M., Prophets and Markets 73 (1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88. See Encyclopedia Judaica, supra note 22, at 611.

89. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 72.

90. Maimonides, , Sefer Hamitzvot, Negative Commandment 57Google Scholar. See also Hirsch, supra note 53, at 12.

91. Genesis seems to recognize diminishing returns. Lot accompanies Abram to “the South.” Each brought his many flocks, herds, and tents. “And the land was not able to bear them, that they might dwell together.” Genesis 13:2-6. See also Whittaker, supra note 52, at 361. Deuteronomy 22:10 forbids yoking together an ox and an ass. See also Robinson, supra note 21, at 318.

92. See Leviticus 25:25-28; Numbers 27:5-11; The Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 534; Hirsch, supra note 53, at 10; Bell, supra note 27, at 15. A potential loophole was closed by Deuteronomy 21:15-17. The loophole would have allowed a person to adopt another's son and thus take possession of the son's inheritance. See Cross, D., Movable Property in the Nuzi Documents 5 (1937)Google Scholar; Jankowska, N.B., Extended Family, Commune, and Civil Self-Government in Arrapha in the Fifteenth-Fourteenth Century B.C. 245, In Ancient Mesopotamia Socioeconomic History (1969)Google Scholar.

93. See the story of King Ahab and Naboth, 1 Kings 21:1-3. Naboth states, “The Lord forbid it me, that I should give the inheritance of my fathers unto thee.” 1 Kings 21:3. See also Eichrodt, , Revelation and Responsibility, 3 Interpretation 393–94 (1949)Google Scholar. Bernhard Anderson interprets the story to imply equality before the law, even for kings. Anderson, supra note 29, at 256.

94. Leviticus 25:23. See also The Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 534.

95. See Leviticus 25:8-10; Vaux, R. de, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions 175–77 (1961)Google Scholar. Incidentally, the inscription on the Liberty Bell located in Philadelphia is from the Leviticus passage: “Proclaim liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof.” The Jubilee Year is such a radical introduction of morality and religion into economics that some doubt whether it was ever enforced, see e.g., Bell, supra note 27, at 17 and de Vaux. Driver claims it is “impossible to think that (as has sometimes been supposed) the institution of the Jubilee is a mere paper-law—at least so far as concerns the land (for the periodical redistribution of which there are analogies in other nations), it must date from ancient times in Israel.” Driver, S.R., Introduction To the Literature of the Old Testament 57 (1913)Google Scholar. Ewald also maintains that “nothing is more certain than that the Jubilee was once for centuries a reality in the national life of Israel.” Ewald, quoted in the Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 532. See also Ewald, H., 1 The History of Israel 209 (1869)Google Scholar.

96. See Leviticus 25:16-16; Hirsch, supra note 53, at 32.

97. See The Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 535.

98. Yet certain families amassed wealth anyway and were condemned by the prophets for using their wealth selfishly and unfairly. The most eloquent plea comes from Amos who cries that moral action is superior to mere ritual: “I hate, I despise your feasts, and I will take no delight in your solemn assemblies … Take thou away from Me the noise of thy songs … But let justice well up as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream.” Amos 5:21-24.

99. See Leviticus 25:29-31.

100. See Leviticus 25:1-7; Hirsch, supra note 53, at 29, 31. Ewald reports confidently that the Israelites observed the Sabbatical Year centuries into the Persian rule. See Ewald, supra note 94, Vol. 5, at 167. For the contemporary controversy, see Ross, , Israel Can't Quite Separate Wheat From the Hassle, Los Angeles Times, 06 21, 1987Google Scholar.

101. Leviticus 25:21.

102. Deuteronomy 14:28-29.

103. Leviticus 19:9-10.

104. See Deuteronomy 14:27; Baron, supra note 9, at 16-17; Bell, supra note 27, at 20.

105. See Grant, supra note 11, at 90. After the return from Babylonia, the Israelites also had to pay taxes to the Persian rulers. See Baron, supra note 9, at 11.

106. Olmstead, A.T., History of the Persian Empire 82–85 (1948)Google Scholar. See also Silver, supra note 87, at 65.

107. Baron, supra note 72. See Harris, , Some Aspects of the Centralization of the Realm Under Hammurabi and His Successors, 88 J. Am. Oriental Soc'y. 727CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maloney, , Usury and Restrictions on interest-Taking in the Ancient Near East, 36 Catholic Biblical Q. 1, 2–10 (1974)Google Scholar; Meek, T., Mesopotamian Legal Documents, in Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament 169 (1969)Google Scholar.

108. Nelson, B., The Idea of Usury (1949)Google Scholar.

109. Exodus 22:24. See also Hirsch, supra note 53, at 85.

110. Deuteronomy 23:20-21.

111. See Leviticus 25:35-36; Deuteronomy 15:8. Maimonides in his writings establishes degrees of charity. The eighth degree, which is most meritorious, is to anticipate charity by preventing poverty, i.e., by assisting the reduced fellow man, either by giving a gift, a loan of money, or by teaching him a trade. Mishneh Torah, Matnot Aniyim X,7.

112. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Malveh Veloveh, Iv, 2.

113. See Deuteronomy 23:21; Hirsch, supra note 53, at 31.

114. See generally Nelson, supra note 108.

115. See The Pentateuch supra note 63, at 849.

116. Finkelstein, , Some New Misharum Material and Its Implications, 16 Assyriological Studies 233, 242 (1965)Google Scholar.

117. Siegel, supra note 44, at 72.

118. Id. at 73.

119. Weber, M., General Economic History 265 (1961)Google Scholar.

120. See Deuteronomy 19:14, Baron, supra note 9, at 7. Because of legal procedures, instability of property rights (and thus high transaction costs) would not be the impediment to economic growth that it was in other civilizations. See North, , Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: The Challenge of Karl Polanyi, J. Euro. Econ. Hist. 703 (1979)Google Scholar.

121. Long before Alexander, the Persians “had created a far-flung political regime that encouraged citizens to widen their horizons, to lengthen their trade arteries, and to jostle with people and ideas from other lands.” Anderson, supra note 29, at 564. Silver maintains that Deuteronomy represents an attempt to revise and expand old divine law code and thereby the legal practice in light of the more affluent society. Silver, supra note 87, at 230. The key point, though, is that the Deuteronomic Code does not become more sympathetic to market economics.

122. Even if the laws were divinely-bestowed, the Israelites did not have to obey God's law; they often chose not to. In this sense, I term the laws “self-imposed.”

123. The link between risk and interest rates is obvious. For an explanation of the link between remedies and risk, see Herskovits, supra note 4, at 228. For evidence of lending agreements between Babylonians and the exiled Israelites, see Baron, supra note 9, at 10.

124. Silver argues unconvincingly that there were regular commercial loans among Israelites. Analogies to gentile communities and some evidence from a Jewish colony on a distant Egyptian island do not make the case. Silver, supra note 87, at 65-68.

125. Citizens of other counties such as Assyria that restricted interest sometimes disguised interest payments by paying back with some labor. See Eichler, B., Incentive at Nuzi: The Personal Tidennutu Contracts and Its Mesopotamian Analogues 40–41 (1973)Google Scholar; Zaccagnini, , The Price of the Fields at Nuzi, 22 J. Econ. & So. Hist. Orient 7, 8 (1979)Google Scholar.

126. See Hirsch, supra note 53, at 24.

127. See Silver, supra note 87, at 236.

128. See Baron, supra note 9, at 5; Arkell, supra note 18; Gulhati & Smith, supra note 18.

129. For a contemporary perspective see Crafton, , An Empirical Test of the Effect of Usury Laws, 23 J. Law & Econ. 135 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

130. The prophet Amos may have condemned the feasts and conspicuous consumption, but there was little else a person could do with wealth besides give it away.

131. Posner, supra note 7, at 10-18.

132. For more extensive discussion of the insurance principle in societies see, e.g., Cheung, S., The theory of Share Tenancy, ch. 4 (1960)Google Scholar; Arrow, K., Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, ch. 8 (1971)Google Scholar.

133. Posner, supra note 7, at 15. In what way would an interest charge change the nature of the transaction? If it would, would Posner's theory not apply to systems in which there are mandatory loans with a fixed interest, for example? Are modern day emergency loans from the government not considered kinds of social insurance? The Federal Reserve Banking system rests partially on the principle that the Federal Reserve will loan funds to banks in times of emergency. Because the Fed charges interest does not mean that it is not a kind of insurer.

134. Posner, supra note 7, at 14, 16.

135. Silver, supra note 87, at 236.

136. See Leviticus 25:29-31.

137. Posner, supra note 7, at 5.

138. See Posner, supra note 7, at 14, 16.

139. The distinction between co-extensive and co-intensive elements was introduced and emphasized by St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). See, e.g., Copi, I., Introduction to Logic 154–58 (1982)Google Scholar.

140. See, e.g., Redfield, R., The Folk Culture of Yucatan (1941)Google Scholar; Redfield, R., A Village that Chose Progress: Chan Kam Revisited (1950)Google Scholar.

141. The Talmudic translation, pruz buli u-buti, meaning an advantage for the rich and the poor, may be incorrect. The Encyclopedia Judaica suggests prosbul as an abbreviation of a Greek expression meaning “before the assembly of counselors.” 13 Encyclopedia Judaica, supra note 22, at 1181. The dispute is over etymology, not substance.

142. For two classics on the consumption function see Friedman, M., A theory of the Consumption Function (1957)Google Scholar and Ando, & Modigliani, , The ‘Life Cycle’ Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 52 (1963)Google Scholar. These models have been changed somewhat after close empirical testing. See, e.g., Mayer, T., Permanent Income Wealth and Consumption (1972)Google Scholar for a review of alternative theories of consumption.

143. Archaeological evidence of Assyrian land sale agreements in the seventh century B.C. was found at Gezer. See Macalister, R.A., 1 The Excavations at Gezer 27 (1912)Google Scholar. For evidence on Egyptian and Mesopotamian land markets see Baer, , An Eleventh Dynasty Farmer's Letter to His Family, 83 J. Am. Oriental Soc'y 1, 11–14 (1963)Google Scholar; Leemans, , The Role of Land Lease in Mesopotamia in the Early Second Millenium, 18 J. Econ. & Soc. Hist. Orient 134 (1975)Google Scholar.

144. I refer to Rawls' “difference principle,” which provides that social and economic inequalities be arranged so they are reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage. Under Rawls' system of justice, as long as greater productivity would to some degree increase the welfare of the lowliest, a greater increase for higher strata would be permitted. See Rawls, J., A theory of Justice 303 (1971)Google Scholar. Although Rawls' theory is often characterized as egalitarian, it does not require equality—only a presumption that equality is preferred.

145. See Pryor, F., The Origins of the Economy 121–41 (1977)Google Scholar.

146. See supra note 97, Bell, supra note 27, at 17.

147. See supra notes 60, 61.

148. Leviticus 19:13.

149. Baron, supra note 9, at 7.

150. See Mansfield, E., Technology Transfer, Productivity and Economic Policy 9–10 (1982)Google Scholar.

151. See Gerschenkron, supra note 26.

152. Pryor finds evidence linking stability of primitive societies and equality in wealth. See Pryor, supra note 145, at 426-27; Posner, supra note 7, at 19.

153. Leviticus 25:18-19. See also The Pentateuch, supra note 63, at 534.

154. Kant, I., Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 635 (Smith, N.K. trans. 2d ed. 1963)Google Scholar. The questions pervade Kant's greatest works on epistemology, deontology, and teleology. See generally, Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)Google Scholar; Critique of Judgment (1790). The formulation of the epistemological question (the first question) originally appears as “What can I know?” Although Kant's view of religion was not especially charitable to Judaism, Kant's deontological principles closely resemble the prime tenets of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. For his criticism of Judaism, see Kant, , Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason, Bk. 3, div. 2 (1793)Google Scholar. For the Kantian categorical imperative and the Judaeo-Christian tradition, see Donagan, A., The theory of Morality (1979)Google Scholar.

155. Micah 6:8.