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How the Supreme Court Alters Opinion Language to Evade Congressional Review

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2022

Ryan J. Owens ,
Justin Wedeking  and
Patrick C. Wohlfarth
Ryan J. Owens
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Justin Wedeking
Affiliation:
University of Kentucky
Patrick C. Wohlfarth
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, College Park
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Abstract

We argue that actors can attempt to shield their policy choices from unfavorable review by crafting them in a manner that will increase the costs necessary for supervisory institutions to review them. We apply this theory to the US Supreme Court and demonstrate how justices strategically obfuscate the language of majority opinions in the attempt to circumvent unfavorable review from a politically hostile Congress. The results suggest that Supreme Court justices can and do alter the language of their opinions to raise the costs of legislative review and thereby protect their decisions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Law and Courts , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Spring 2013 , pp. 35 - 59
Copyright
© 2013 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

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