This article analyses, first, the principal features of Spain's commercial policies towards Spanish America in 1797–1820, and, second, the value, nature and distribution of the trade that survived in this period, despite prolonged international warfare, the admission of neutral shipping, and internal strife from 1808 in both Spain and America. Like the author's earlier studies of ‘free trade’ in the period 1778–96, its principal sources are shipping registers and associated inter-ministerial correspondence in the Archivo General de Indias of Sevilla. Its main conclusions are that: (1) despite ambivalence and uncertainty in Spain about commercial policy, trade with Spanish America was more buoyant in 1797–1820 than previously realised; (2) nevertheless, by the first decade of the nineteenth century most parts of Spanish America were enjoying de facto, if not de jure, free trade with foreigners; (3) consequently, commercial discontent was not a key factor in the process of emancipation from Spain, particularly in the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru which received some 70% of exports from Spain in this period.

This article employs previously unused data sources and techniques in order to estimate labour productivity and total factor productivity in the Mexican cotton textile industry over the period 1850–1933. Our findings indicate: (1) substantial productivity growth prior to the Porfiriato; (2) rapid productivity growth throughout the Porfiriato; (3) a swift, though incomplete, recovery from the Revolution during the 1920s; and, (4) an insignificant impact on productivity from the Great Depression. We also find evidence that the large, joint stock, limited liability firms that were founded during the Porfiriato had higher levels of total factor productivity than privately owned firms, but only for a short period of time, which suggests that these firms might have been sub-optimally large. Our results also indicate that labour markets in Porfirian Mexico were efficient. This suggests that manufacturers may not have had the monopsony power in labour markets that the literature indicates.

By mid-1940, the Argentine economy seemed to be heading for a major crisis because many of her traditional export markets had suddenly become inaccessible. In response, Finance Minister Federico Pinedo and his team developed a wide range of initiatives. These aimed to overcome the crisis and restructure the Argentine economy in order to accommodate it to a changing and difficult international environment.

This article analyses the nature, successes and failures of these policies. It argues that while Pinedo's initiatives certainly entailed visionary elements which anticipated major problems of the Argentine and Latin American development of the post-war era, they should not be regarded as some ‘golden opportunity’ for sound economic modernisation that was missed only because Pinedo and his fellow conservatives failed to win political approval and were later pushed aside by the rising force of populism.

An analysis of the seven daily newspapers with the widest circulation in Argentina, including the Peronist La Epoca, shows the humanisation of capitalism and social justice as the main topics of discussion in Argentine society between 1930 and 1946. Newspapers and parties debated the foundations of a much desired democratic revival and depicted the government of F. D. Roosevelt as a model to be followed. By 1946 most Argentines supported the implementation of policies similar to those of Roosevelt. In the light of this, Perón and the Unión Democrática competed to present themselves as the Argentine version of the US president. The deciding factor in the 1946 elections was not the defence of national sovereignty but rather the impression of which candidate would be capable of developing a democratic system which included economic and social concerns.

In the ‘pre-history’ of Argentina's labour movement lie the mutual-benefit societies. Although these associations embraced almost half of the workers of Buenos Aires at the time of the Centenario (1910) little is known about them. The article explores the main parameters shaping the development of the mutual benefit societies, their relationship to the immigrant communities and their role in relation to social security. It traces, finally, the ambiguous relationship between the mutual benefit societies and the emergence of Peronist trade unionism in the mid-1940s.

The statistical evidence surveyed suggests that as an indicator of development the Human Development Index is directly related to the level of per capita income; that inequality is countercyclical; and that economic growth is poverty reducing. In the case of Guyana the data suggest that nearly 43 per cent of the population were below the poverty line (approximately US$1 per day per person); that poverty is predominantly rural; that most of the poor seek employment in agriculture or in the informal (self employed) sector; and that there is a direct relationship between the level of education, health and poverty.

One of the main conclusions of this commentary is that the Real plan – the stabilisation programme introduced in Brazil in July 1994 which was quite successful in bringing inflation down from the extremely high levels that prevailed before that period – did not attack the main cause of the country's inflation, that is, the large financial imbalance in the public sector. Instead, inflation was reduced in an indirect way, by freezing government-controlled prices and wages. In mid-1998, the programme still relies on extremely high interest rates and a tight control of the exchange rate. The main weakness of the plan is that, with the overvalued currency, trade deficits are accumulating. Also, very high interest rates have brought the economy to a halt and caused a sharp increase in the government debt.