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Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988–2000

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2001

JOY LANGSTON
JOY LANGSTON
Affiliation:
Joy Langston is a member of the Political Studies Division at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico.
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Abstract

The traditional literature on Mexico's formerly hegemonic party, the PRI, notes the importance of the ‘informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate. This article argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them. However, this was a difficult process. President Salinas was able to overturn statutory reforms, while President Zedillo was not. Now that the PRI has lost the presidential elections, internal mechanisms of distributing selective benefits become even more important because of the loss of the omnipotent president who once exacted cooperation from all actors within the party and the regime.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , August 2001 , pp. 485 - 511
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

The author would like to thank Varun Sahni for his constant encouragement. Oscar Blanco, Paulina Gutiérrez and Rita Moch also helped a great deal with the research for this article.