Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T02:21:47.111Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Why Is It So Difficult to Reform Collective Labour Law? Associational Power and Policy Continuity in Chile in Comparative Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2020

Pablo Pérez Ahumada*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Sociology Department, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile, and Adjunct Researcher, COES, Chile
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected].

Abstract

Since Chile returned to democracy in 1990, centre-left governments have tried to reform the provisions on collective bargaining, strikes and unions established by the Pinochet dictatorship. Between 2015 and 2016 President Michelle Bachelet made the latest attempt to reform them. Despite favourable conditions, the changes were modest. This article explains why this is so. Drawing upon the notion of ‘associational power’ and through comparisons with labour reforms in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, this article suggests that the imbalance between workers’ and employers’ collective power is key for explaining why pro-labour reforms fail.

Spanish abstract

Spanish abstract

Desde que Chile retornó a la democracia en 1990, gobiernos de centro-izquierda han tratado de reformar las estipulaciones sobre pactos colectivos, huelgas y sindicatos establecidos por la dictadura de Pinochet. Entre 2015 y 2016 la presidenta Michelle Bachelet hizo el último intento por reformarlas. Pese a existir condiciones favorables, los cambios fueron modestos. Este artículo explica por qué. Partiendo de la noción de ‘poder de asociación’ y mediante comparaciones con reformas laborales en Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay, este artículo sugiere que el desequilibrio entre el poder colectivo de los trabajadores y el de los empleadores es clave para explicar por qué las reformas en pro de los trabajadores han fracasado.

Portuguese abstract

Portuguese abstract

Desde o retorno do Chile à democracia em 1990, governos de centro-esquerda tentam reformar as medidas sobre negociações coletivas, greves e sindicatos, estabelecidas durante a ditadura de Pinochet. Entre 2015 e 2016, a presidente Michelle Bachelet realizou a última tentativa de reforma. Apesar do momento apresentar condições favoráveis, as mudanças foram apenas modestas. Este artigo explica as razões pelas quais isso aconteceu. Mobilizando o conceito de ‘poder de associação’ e comparando a reforma chilena com as reformas trabalhistas na Argentina, Brasil e Uruguai, o artigo sugere que o desequilíbrio entre o poder coletivo dos trabalhadores e dos empregadores é a chave para compreender o fracasso das reformas pró-trabalhadores.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 ‘La Ministra del Trabajo, Javiera Blanco, asegura que el proyecto de reforma laboral es transversal’, El Mercurio, 4 Jan. 2015.

2 Feres, María Ester, ‘Los proyectos de reforma legal sobre la negociación colectiva: ¿Esfuerzos azarosos y logros marginales o infructuosos?’, in Negociación colectiva en Chile: La debilidad de un derecho imprescidible (Santiago: Dirección del Trabajo, 2009), pp. 109–48Google Scholar.

3 Posner, Paul W., ‘Labour Market Flexibility, Employment and Inequality: Lessons from Chile’, New Political Economy, 22: 2 (2017), p. 240CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Carnes, Matthew, Continuity Despite Change: The Politics of Labor Regulation in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014)Google Scholar; Cook, Maria Lorena, The Politics of Labor Reform in Latin America: Between Flexibility and Rights (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007)Google Scholar; Frank, Volker, ‘Living in the Past or Living with the Past? Reflections on Chilean Labor Unions Twenty Years into Democracy’, in Caraway, Teri L., Cook, Maria Lorena and Crowley, Stephen (eds.), Working Through the Past: Labor and Authoritarian Legacies in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), pp. 179–96Google Scholar.

5 Korpi, Walter, ‘Power Resources Approach vs. Action and Conflict: On Causal and Intentional Explanations in the Study of Power’, Sociological Theory, 3: 2 (1985), pp. 3145CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists’, World Politics, 58: 2 (2006), pp. 167206CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Murillo, María Victoria and Schrank, Andrew, ‘With a Little Help from My Friends: Partisan Politics, Transnational Alliances, and Labor Rights in Latin America’, Comparative Political Studies, 38: 8 (2005), pp. 971–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Aravena, Antonio and Núñez, Daniel, El renacer de la huelga obrera en Chile: El movimiento sindical en la primera década del siglo XXI (Santiago: ICAL, 2009)Google Scholar; Muñoz, Carolina Bank, Building Power from Below: Chilean Workers Take On Walmart (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017)Google Scholar; Santibáñez, Camilo and Gaudichaud, Franck, ‘Los obreros portuarios y la idea de “posición estratégica” en la posdictadura chilena (2003–2014)’, in Pinto, Julio, Ponce, José I. and Santibáñez, Camilo (eds.), Trabajadores y trabajadoras: Procesos y acción sindical en el neoliberalismo chileno, 1979–2017 (Valparaíso: Editorial Nuestra América, 2017), pp. 301–32Google Scholar.

7 Donoso, Sofia and Bülow, Marisa von, Social Movements in Chile: Organization, Trajectories, and Political Consequences (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 ‘Senador Quintana anuncia “retroexcavadora” contra modelo neoliberal’, EMOL, 25 March 2014.

9 Wright, Erik O., ‘Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise’, American Journal of Sociology, 105: 4 (2000), pp. 9571002CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Durán-Palma, Fernando, Wilkinson, Adrian and Korczynski, Marek, ‘Labour Reform in a Neo-Liberal “Protected” Democracy: Chile 1990–2001’, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 16: 1 (2005), pp. 6589CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Frank, ‘Living in the Past or Living with the Past?’.

11 Feres, ‘Los proyectos de reforma legal sobre la negociación colectiva’.

12 Ibid.; Durán-Palma et al., ‘Labour Reform in a Neo-Liberal “Protected” Democracy’.

13 Antía, Florencia, ‘The Political Dynamic of Redistribution in Unequal Democracies: The Center-Left Governments of Chile and Uruguay in Comparative Perspective’, Latin American Perspectives, 46: 1 (2019), pp. 152–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Posner, ‘Labour Market Flexibility, Employment and Inequality’, pp. 237–56.

14 For an exception, see Haagh, Louise, ‘The Emperor's New Clothes: Labor Reform and Social Democratization in Chile’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 37: 1 (2002), pp. 86115CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Bank Muñoz, Building Power from Below; Santibáñez and Gaudichaud, ‘Los obreros portuarios y la idea de “posición estratégica” en la posdictadura chilena (2003–2014)’.

16 Korpi, ‘Power Resources Approach vs. Action and Conflict’.

17 Murillo, María Victoria, Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Murillo and Schrank, ‘With a Little Help from My Friends’.

18 Fairfield, Tasha, Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America: Business Power and Tax Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Bril-Mascarenhas, Tomás and Maillet, Antoine, ‘How to Build and Wield Business Power: The Political Economy of Pension Regulation in Chile, 1990–2018’, Latin American Politics and Society, 61: 1 (2019), pp. 101–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fairfield, Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America.

20 Offe, Claus and Wiesenthal, Helmut, ‘Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form’, Political Power and Social Theory, 1: 1 (1980), pp. 67115Google Scholar.

21 Fairfield, Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America.

22 Schneider, Ben Ross, Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Traxler, Franz, Blaschke, Sabine and Kittel, Bernhard, National Labour Relations in Internationalized Markets: A Comparative Study of Institutions, Change, and Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Wright, ‘Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise’, p. 962.

24 Lukes, Steven, Power: A Radical View (London: Palgrave, 2005 [1974])CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 Wright, ‘Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise’, p. 962.

26 Schmalz, Stefan, Ludwig, Carmen and Webster, Edward, ‘The Power Resources Approach: Developments and Challenges’, Global Labour Journal, 9: 2 (2018), pp. 113–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 Brookes, Marissa, ‘Power Resource in Theory and Practice: Where to Go from Here’, Global Labour Journal, 9: 2 (2018), p. 256CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Ibid., p. 255. On a relational view of power, see also Schmalz et al., ‘The Power Resources Approach’; Wright, ‘Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise’.

29 Schmalz et al., ‘The Power Resources Approach’.

30 Brookes, ‘Power Resource in Theory and Practice’, p. 256.

31 Seawright, Jason and Gerring, John, ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options’, Political Research Quarterly, 61: 2 (2008), pp. 294308CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Ibid., p. 302

33 Ermakoff, Ivan, ‘Exceptional Cases: Epistemic Contributions and Normative Expectations’, European Journal of Sociology, 55: 2 (2014), pp. 223–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Fairfield, Tasha, ‘Structural Power in Comparative Political Economy: Perspectives from Policy Formulation in Latin America’, Business and Politics, 17: 3 (2015), pp. 411–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 Congreso Nacional, ‘Historia de la Ley N° 20.940: Moderniza el sistema de relaciones laborales’ (Santiago: Gobierno de Chile, 2018).

37 ‘Bárbara Figueroa, presidenta de la CUT: “Ésta es la reforma laboral más importante de los últimos 25 años”’, El Siglo, 9 Jan. 2015.

39 Interviews with CUT (Chile) leaders Nolberto Díaz, José Figueroa, Horacio Fuentes, Jorge González, Arturo Martínez, Etiel Moraga, Laura San Martín, Pedro Muñoz, Valentín Vega and Claudio Urrutia (Sept.–Nov. 2015).

40 The 4x4 also comprised the Sindicato Interempresa Nacional de Trabajadores de la Construcción (Inter-Firm Construction Workers’ Union, SINTEC) and the Federación de Trabajadores de la Construcción y la Madera (Forestry Workers’ Federation, FETRAFORMA).

41 Interviews with six 4x4 and TMRL workers (Aug.–Dec. 2015).

42 ‘Laboral: Otra reforma estructural’, El Mercurio, 30 Dec. 2014.

43 ‘CPC: Reforma laboral impone una “sindicalización automática encubierta”’, El Mercurio, 13 Jan. 2015; Interviews with 13 businessmen (May–Dec. 2015).

44 ‘Reforma laboral se endurece en la Cámara de Diputados y senadores ven lejano un acuerdo político’, El Mercurio, 10 May 2015.

45 ‘Gobierno cierra las puertas a negociación por rama para no afectar el crecimiento’, El Mercurio, 2 April 2015.

46 ‘Alfredo Ovalle: “A Salas le pediría una actitud más rígida”’, La Segunda, 7 Aug. 2015. In interviews, CPC leaders and staff members claimed to be aware of these criticisms.

47 Francisca Skoknik, ‘Los forados a favor de la elusión que dejó el acuerdo tributario de Arenas con la derecha’, CIPER, 2014, available at https://ciperchile.cl/2014/07/17/los-forados-a-favor-de-la-elusion-que-dejo-el-acuerdo-tributario-de-arenas-con-la-derecha/, last access 20 Aug. 2020.

48 ‘José Antonio Guzmán analiza el escenario económico y gremial’, El Mercurio, 18 Jan. 2015.

49 ‘Necesitamos hechos: Que el diálogo público-privado no sea un diálogo de sordos’, La Tercera Negocios, 17 May 2015.

50 Juan Vergara, ‘Reforma laboral (XIX): Las modificaciones introducidas por la Comisión de Trabajo del Senado’, ProSindical, 2016, available at https://prosindical.wordpress.com/2016/01/22/reforma-laboral-xix-las-modificaciones-introducidas-por-la-comision-de-trabajo-del-senado/, last access 20 Aug. 2020.

51 Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral, ‘Carta a Ximena Rincón’, Santiago, 2015.

52 Lemaître, Fernando Atria, Larraín, Guillermo, Benavente, José Miguel, Couso, Javier and Rondón, Alfredo Joignant, El otro modelo: Del orden neoliberal al régimen de lo público (Santiago: Debate, 2013), pp. 94–5Google Scholar; Fuentes., Claudio El Pacto: Poder, constitución y prácticas políticas en Chile (1990–2010) (Santiago: Ediciones UDP, 2012)Google Scholar.

53 ‘CPC: Reforma laboral impone una “sindicalización automática encubierta”’, El Mercurio, 13 Jan. 2015.

54 Tribunal Constitucional de Chile, ‘Sentencia al requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad (boletín N° 9835-13)’ (Santiago: Tribunal Constitucional de Chile, 2016).

55 ‘Empresarios valoran decisión del TC: “Reafirma los principios de la libertad”’, La Tercera, 28 April 2016.

56 ‘Hermann von Mühlenbrock: “Chile no puede jugarse a que la mediocridad actual la resuelva un presidente que llegue en dos años más”’, La Tercera Negocios, 26 June 2016.

57 Frías, Patricio, Los desafíos del sindicalismo en los inicios del siglo XXI (Buenos Aires: CLACSO/OIT/Universidad Central, 2008)Google Scholar.

58 Schneider, Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America; Silva, Eduardo, ‘Organized Business, Neoliberal Economic Restructuring, and Redemocratization in Chile’, in Durand, Francisco and Silva, Eduardo (eds.), Organized Business, Economic Change and Democracy in Latin America (Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, 1998), pp. 217–52Google Scholar.

60 Pablo Pérez Ahumada, ‘Business, Workers, and the Class Politics of Labor Reforms in Chile, 1973–2016’, unpubl. PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2017, pp. 345–54.

62 ‘La gente que hizo el programa creó la expectativa de que con voluntad se solucionaba todo a la vez’, La Tercera Reportajes, 16 Aug. 2016.

63 Marticorena, Clara, Trabajo y negociación colectiva: Los trabajadores en la industria argentina, de los noventa a la posconvertibilidad (Buenos Aires: Imago Mundi, 2014), pp. 56–7Google Scholar.

64 Senén, Cecilia, ‘La revitalización sindical en Argentina durante los Kirchner’, Revista Trabajo, 5: 8 (2011), pp. 3964Google Scholar.

65 Ibid., pp. 55–6; Marticorena, Trabajo y negociación colectiva, p. 96.

66 Quiñones, Mariela, ‘Gobiernos progresistas, sindicatos y trabajo en Uruguay’, Revista Trabajo, 5: 8 (2011), pp. 6582Google Scholar; Senatore, Luis A., ‘Uruguay 1992–2009: Las políticas laborales y el sujeto sindical’, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios del Trabajo, 14: 22 (2009), pp. 5376Google Scholar.

67 Quiñones, ‘Gobiernos progresistas, sindicatos y trabajo en Uruguay’, p. 77.

68 Etchemendy, Sebastián and Collier, Ruth B., ‘Down but Not Out: Union Resurgence and Segmented Neocorporatism in Argentina (2003–2007)’, Politics and Society, 35: 3 (2007), pp. 363401CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69 Levitsky, Steven and Roberts, Kenneth M., ‘Latin America's “Left Turn”: A Framework for Analysis’, in Levitsky, Steven and Roberts, Kenneth M. (eds.), The Resurgence of the Latin American Left (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2011), pp. 1314Google Scholar.

70 Florencia Antía, ‘Gobiernos de centro-izquierda y derechos colectivos del trabajo: Entre reformas marginales y reformas significativas en Chile y Uruguay en los años 2000’, in Carmen Midaglia, Gerardo Ordóñez and Enrique Valencia (eds.), Políticas sociales en América Latina en los inicios del siglo XXI: Innovaciones, Inercias y Retrocesos (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2018), pp. 139–68; Schneider, Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America.

71 Marticorena, Trabajo y negociación colectiva, pp. 103–5.

72 Antía, ‘Gobiernos de centro-izquierda y derechos colectivos del trabajo’; Fairfield, Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America.

73 Luna, Juan Pablo and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira, ‘Introduction: The Right in Contemporary Latin America: A Framework for Analysis’, in Luna, Juan Pablo and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (eds.), The Resilience of the Latin American Right (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2014), pp. 122Google Scholar.

74 Carneiro, Angela and de Oliveiro, Roberto Veras, ‘El sindicalismo brasileño en la era de Lula’, Revista Trabajo, 5: 8 (2011), pp. 83112Google Scholar.

75 Ibid., p. 96.

76 Mayer, Jean François, ‘The Limits of Labor Legislation Reforms: Rigidity, Growth, and Employment in Brazil, 1995–2010’, in Posner, Paul W., Patroni, Viviana and Mayer, Jean François (eds.), Labor Politics in Latin America: Democracy and Worker Organization in the Neoliberal Era (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2018), pp. 135–61Google Scholar.

77 Carneiro and Veras de Oliveiro, ‘El sindicalismo brasileño en la era de Lula’, p. 89.

78 Ibid., pp. 97–8; Cook, The Politics of Labor Reform in Latin America, pp. 101–2.

79 Schneider, Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America, Chapter 4.

80 Carneiro and Veras de Oliveiro, ‘El sindicalismo brasileño en la era de Lula’.

81 Ibid., p. 92.

82 Lawrence, Andrew, Employer and Worker Collective Action: A Comparative Study of Germany, South Africa, and the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 254CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

83 Walter Korpi, ‘Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism’, p. 206; Schmalz et al., ‘The Power Resources Approach’. On Latin America, see Antía, ‘The Political Dynamic of Redistribution in Unequal Democracies’; Fairfield, Tasha and Garay, Candelaria, ‘Redistribution Under the Right in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Organized Actors in Policymaking’, Comparative Political Studies, 50: 14 (2017), pp. 1871–906CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

84 Wright, ‘Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise’, p. 962; Schmalz et al., ‘The Power Resources Approach’, p. 115.