Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2009
Constitutional issues are once again being considered from sociological and political perspectives, after many years of strictly juridical approaches. This renewed interest stems from both theoretical and practical concerns, raised by the multiplication of liberalisation and democratisation processes around the globe, as well as from the need to update and deepen the democratic content of stable democracies.
1 For the treatment of constitutional issues from an interdisciplinary approach see Ball, Terence and Pocock, J. G. A. (eds.), Conceptual change and the Constitution (Kansas, 1988)Google Scholar; Bogdanor, Vernon (ed.), Constitutions in Democratic Politics (London, 1988)Google Scholar; Elster, Jon and Slagstad, Rune (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldwin, Robert and Kaufman, Art (eds.), Constitution Makers on Constitution Making (Washington D. C, 1988)Google Scholar; Adam, Antal and Heinrich, Hans-Georg (eds.), Society, Politics and Constitutions: Western and East European Views (Budapest, 1987)Google Scholar; Banting, Keith and Simeon, Richard (eds.), Redesigning the State, The Politics of Constitutional Change (Toronto, 1985)Google Scholar; McWhinney, Edward, Constitution-making: Principles, Process, Practice (Toronto, 1981Google Scholar). An important example of this new interest is the Comparative Constitutional Project sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and Ford Foundation.
2 Full or partial revisions of the Constitutions are being considered in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela.
3 See Wolf, Ernesto, Tratado de Derecho Constitutional (Caracas, 1945Google Scholar); and Mariñas, Luis, has Constituciones de Venezuela (Madrid, 1965).Google Scholar
4 See Wolf, , Tratado de Derecho, pp. 19–37Google Scholar; and Soldán, José Pareja y Paz, ‘Antecedentes históaricos, apreciaciones y comentarios de la Constitución de Venezuela de 1961’, in de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas, Facultad, Estudios sobre la Constitución, Libro Homenaje a Rafael Caldera, vol. 1 (Caracas, 1979), p. 4.Google Scholar
5 The phrase ‘The Constitution serves any purpose’ was attributed to President Monagas' counsellor Dr Urbaneja to dissipate the President's hesitations about the convenience of derogating the 1830 Constitution. Oropeza, Ambrosio, La nueva Constitucion Venezolana, 1961 (Caracas, 1986), p. 92.Google Scholar
6 See Rey, Juan Carlos, ‘El problema de la creación de un orden democrático y la teoría de la dictadura latinoamericana’, in Rey, Juan Carlos, El futuro de la democracia en Venezuela (Caracas, 1989), pp. 111–81Google Scholar; Lanz, Laureano Vallenilla, Cesarismo Democrático, Estudios sobre las bases sociológicas de la Constitución efectiva de Venezuela (Caracas, 1929).Google Scholar
7 See Kornblith, Miriam, ‘Deuda y democracia en Venezuela: Los sucesos del 27 y 28 de febrero de 1989’, Revista del CENDES, no. 10 (1989), pp. 17–34.Google Scholar
8 Rey, Juan Carlos, ‘Los 25 años de la Constitución y la reforma del Estado’, Venezuela 86, no. 2 (1986), pp. 26–34.Google Scholar
9 Levine, Daniel, ‘Venezuela: the Nature, Sources and Prospects of Democracy’, in Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan and Lipset, Seymour (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries. Latin America (Colorado, 1989), p. 247.Google Scholar
10 For an interesting use of this approach see Karl, Terry, ‘Petroleum and Political Pacts: the Transition to Democracy in Venezuela’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 22, no. 1 (1987), pp. 63–94.Google Scholar
11 The works of J. C. Rey quoted throughout this article are a relevant example of this approach. For a critical analysis of the oil centred view see Levine, , ‘Venezuela: the Nature’, pp. 265–7Google Scholar; and by the same author ‘Paradigm Lost: from Dependence to Democracy’, World Politics, vol. 40, no. 3 (1988), pp. 117–394Google Scholar, for a critical view of the structural approach in the recent studies on ‘Liberalisation and Democratisation’.
12 Elazar, Daniel, ‘Constitution-Making: the Pre-eminently Political Act’, in Banting and Simeon, Redesigning the State, pp. 232–48.Google Scholar
13 Riker, William and Ordeshook, Peter, Introduction to Positive Political Theory (New Jersey, 1973). PP. 1–7.Google Scholar
14 There are relevant similarities between the Venezuelan and the recent Spanish Constitutional experiences. For similar studies see Encinar, Juan José González, ‘Las Constituciones españolas de 1931 y 1978: un análisis comparado’, in Nohlen, Dieter and Solari, Aldo (eds.), Reforma Político y Consolidación Democrática, Europa y Estados Unidos (Caracas, 1988), pp. 123–41Google Scholar; Villarroya, Joaquín Tomás, ‘Proceso Constituyente y nueva Constitución. Un análisis crítico’, Revista de Estudios Polítics:, no. 10 (1979), pp. 59–85Google Scholar; Gunther, Richard and Blough, Roger, ‘Conflicto Religioso y consenso en España: Historia de dos constituciones’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, no. 14 (1980), pp. 65–109.Google Scholar
15 Information and analysis of the Assembly in Kornblith, Miriam, Concepción de la politica y conflicto antagónico en el trienio: Su estudio a través de los debates de la Asamblea Constituyente de 1946–47 (Caracas, 1988).Google Scholar
16 See Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, Diario de Debates (Caracas, 1946–1947), 6 vols.Google Scholar; Cárdenas, Rodolfo José, COPEI en la Constituyente, La tentación totalitaria de Acción Democrática (Madrid, 1987).Google Scholar
17 Information and analysis of the events related to the ousting of Pérez Jiménez and the return to democracy can be found in Plaza, Helena, El 23 de enero de 1958 y el proceso de consolidación de la democracia representativa en Venezuela (Caracas, 1978)Google Scholar; and Velázquez, Ramón José, ‘Aspectos de la evolutión política de Venezuela en el último medio siglo’, in Venezuela Moderna, Medio Siglo de Historia, 1926–1979 (Caracas, 1979), pp. 194–225.Google Scholar
18 Levine, , ‘Venezuela: the Sources’, p. 257.Google Scholar
19 Velázquez, , ‘Aspectos’, p. 220.Google Scholar
20 For an assessment of the relevance of the Pact, see Rey, Juan Carlos, ‘El sistema de partidos venezolanos’, in Rey, Juan Carlos, Problemas socio-políticos de América Latina (Caracas, 1980), pp. 255–338.Google Scholar
21 The non-democratic forces were the rightist groups within the Armed Forces that conspired against the new order and the Communist party. Initially the PCV accepted the consensus and justified its exclusion from ideological considerations on the basis of the thesis of ‘gradualism’ and the need to form broad national fronts (Plaza, 1978, pp. 133–9). But the marginalisation of the PCV soon proved extremely disruptive. As a consequence Acción Democrática splintered and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) was formed. Both parties launched an armed insurrection against the new regime. The organisations were declared illegal and the Armed Forces were charged with suppressing the revolutionary movement.
22 The Commission was composed of eight representatives from AD, four from COPEI, four from URD, three from the PCV and three independents. Information about the Commission and the making of the Constitution is in de la República, Congreso, La Constitutión de 1961 y la evolución constitucional de Venezuela. Actas de la Comisión Redactora del Proyecto, vol. 1 (Caracas, 1971), p. xxiiiGoogle Scholar and de la República, Congreso, X Aniversario de la Constitución de 1961 (Caracas, 1971).Google Scholar
23 The Junta de Gobierno adopted the 1953 Constitution until the enactment of the 1961 Constitution. The 1953 Constitution was enacted under dictatorial rule, but was indefinitely suspended by its ‘Third Transitory Provision’ which conferred on the President dictatorial powers ‘while the legislation on individual guarantees was completed’ (Constitución Nacional, 1953).
24 For a discussion of these considerations, see Oropeza, , La Nueva Constitutión, pp. 129–37Google Scholar; and Gustavo Planchart, ‘The making of the Venezuelan Constitution’, in Goldwin, and Kaufman, , Constitution Makers, pp. 353–78.Google Scholar
25 In Arcaya, Mariano, Constitución de la República de Venezuela. Constitución de 1961, vol. 1 (Caracas, 1971), pp. 22–3.Google Scholar
26 Betancourt decreed the suspension of guarantees for the first time on 29 November 1960. The justification for the Decree was the threat of a rightist coup and a leftist armed insurrection. Since the threats were still in effect, Betancourt resorted to the new Constitution to maintain the suspension of the guarantees once the 1953 Constitution was derogated. See Juan Carlos Rey, ‘La Democracia ante las situaciones de excepción’, in Rey, , El futuro, p. 137.Google Scholar After Betancourt's government, guarantees were not suspended again until the riots in February–March 1989.
27 For a detailed treatment, see Kornblith, Conceptión de la política.
28 See Diario de debates; Hernán Petzold, ‘Modelo ideológico de la Constitución de 1961’ and Figueroa, Luis B. Prieto, ‘Las garantías económicas en la Constitución venezolana de 1961’, both in Universidad del Zulia, La Constitución de 1961. Balance y perspectivas, pp. 84–5 and p. 33.Google Scholar
29 Bethell, Leslie and Roxborough, Ian, ‘Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 20, part 1 (1988), pp. 167–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
30 Miranda, José, Reformas y tendencias constitucionales recientes de la América Latina (Mexico, 1957).Google Scholar
31 This was a critical issue in the New Spanish Constitution: ‘…to accept and regulate ideological pluralism in society was one of the obsessions of the Spanish Constitution of 1978’. See Cremades, Juan José Gil, ‘Las ideologías en la Constitución Española de 1978’, in Ramírez, Manuel (ed.), Estudios sobre la Constitución española de 1979 (Madrid, 1979). P. 78.Google Scholar
32 The following considerations are widely inspired by Rey, , ‘25 años’, pp. 57–69.Google Scholar
33 Juan Carlos Rey, ‘El futuro de la democracia en Venezuela’, in Rey, , El futuro, p. 261.Google Scholar
34 For a critical view on ‘pactismo’, see Karl, ‘Petroleum and Pacts’; and Talavera, Eduardo Arroyo, Elecciones y Negociaciones, Los límites de la democracia en Venezuela (Caracas, 1988).Google Scholar
35 Juan Carlos Rey, ‘Ideología y cultura política: El caso del populismo latinomericano’, in Rey, , Problemas socio-políticos, pp. 125–66.Google Scholar
36 Rey, Juan Carlos, Proyecto de investigación ‘Eficacia y eficiencia del sistema político (EFIVEN)’ (Caracas, 1981Google Scholar); and Rey, , ‘El futuro’, pp. 257–61.Google Scholar
37 These arguments are presented by Rey in different texts. See notes 22, 35, 36.
38 Underlined in original. Caldera, Rafael, A los 15 años de la Constitución, p. 10Google Scholar, quoted in Estudios sobre la Constitución, vol. 1, p. xxvii.Google Scholar
39 These considerations are greatly inspired by Schmitt, Carl, Teoría de la Constitución, pp. 29–57.Google Scholar
40 Ibid., pp. 49–50.
41 Ibid., pp. 52–7.
42 Rey, , ‘Los 25 años’, pp. 29–30Google Scholar. In making the new Spanish Constitution, a similar set of formulae was used. See Miñón, Miguel Herrero del, ‘Verdaderas y falsas vías del consenso constitucional’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, no. 9 (1979), pp. 73–97.Google Scholar
43 Loewenstein, Karl, Teoría de la Constitución (Barcelona, 1986), pp. 211–13.Google Scholar
44 Miñón, Herrero del, ‘Verdaderas’, pp. 79–80.Google Scholar
45 Exposición de motivos, in Arcaya, , Constitución de 1961, p. 31.Google Scholar
46 See Kornblith, , Concepción de la política, pp. 131–44.Google Scholar
47 For a treatment of the differences between majoritarian and consensual democracy, see Lijphart, Arend, Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (Yale, 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
48 See Dahl, Robert, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956Google Scholar). Additionally, the North American Constitution combines precepts which originated in classical humanism, natural and common law, Puritan Calvinism, Lockean radicalism, Enlightenment rationalism and Scottish political science. See Farr, James, ‘Conceptual Change and Constitutional Innovation’, in Ball, and Pocock, (eds.), Conceptual Change, pp. 27–8.Google Scholar
49 McWhinney, , Constitution-making, p. 134.Google Scholar
50 Rey, , ‘Los 25 años’, p. 26.Google Scholar
51 Raúl Leoni, ‘Presentación’, in Oropeza, , La Constitución de 1961, p. xii.Google Scholar
52 Rey, , ‘Los 25 años’, pp. 29–30.Google Scholar
53 See Exposición de motivos, p. 41; Caldera, Rafael et al. , Sobre la democracia, (Caracas, 1979), p. 26Google Scholar; Rey, , ‘Los 25 años’, p. 33.Google Scholar
54 Betancourt, Rómulo, El 18 de octubre. Génesis y realizaciones de una revolución democrática (Barcelona, 1979), p. 346.Google Scholar
55 Levine, Daniel, Conflict and Political Chage in Venezuela (Princeton, 1973).Google Scholar
56 For an analysis of the impact of democratic decision-making on the formulation of public policies see Nairn, Moisés and Piñango, Ramón (eds.), El caso Venezuela: Unailusión de armonía (Caracas, 1984Google Scholar) and Martz, John, ‘The Frailties of Venezuelan Policymaking’, in Hughes, Steven and Mijesky, Kenneth (eds.), Politics and Public Policy in Latin America (Boulder, Colorado, 1984), pp. 101–17.Google Scholar
57 Intervention in the Chamber of Deputies (26 October 1960) while discussing the gratuity of public higher education. Arcaya, , Constitución de 1961, vol. 1, p. 451.Google Scholar
58 Exposición de motivos, p. 54.
59 Ibid., pp. 35–6.
60 Congreso, , Actas de la comisión, vols, 1, 2.Google Scholar
61 Rey, , ‘El futuro’, pp. 283–5.Google Scholar