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The U.S. Imperial State in Cuba 1952–1958: Policymaking and Capitalist Interest*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Morris H. Morley
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The literature on American foreign policy tends to emphasize nonstructural (national security, ideological, strategic, bureaucratic, etc.) factors in seeking to account for the differing U.S. government responses to nationalist movements that challenge for and/or capture state power in the Third World. In those instances where structural (e.g. economic) factors are acknowledged to be significant, they are still generally accorded a secondary role in the shaping of policy actions. As a result, most interpretations are rooted in discrete policy actions linked to particular and time-bound events unrelated to any core concept that could serve as an organizing principle (e.g. a theory of capital expansion) for understanding the observed continuities in U.S. policy over historical time. In contrast, this study contends that a focus on the interface between permanent (economic) and short-term (non-economic) objectives provides a more adequate explanation of U.S. imperial state policy in specific conjunctures. It is proposed that while ‘national security’ concerns, strategic interests, ideological outlooks and bureaucratic conflicts may directly influence Washington's policy toward Third World nationalism, these factors must also be understood in a context in which they converge, or are intertwined, with underlying long-term economic concerns (investment, trade relations, access to strategic raw materials, etc.)

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , May 1982 , pp. 143 - 170
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1982

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References

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6 ibid., pp. 142, 147, 152.

7 Ibid., pp. 385–2.

8 American businessmen in Cuba viewed Batista ‘as representing a stabilizing interest’ who would control and, if necessary, repress nationalist tendencies in society. Personal Interview: U.S. Businessman (Havana Office of U.S. multinational insurance brokerage company), New York City, New York, July 14, 1975.

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50 Personal Interview: U.S. Department of State official (Havana Embassy), Washington, D.C., 05 19, 1976. Gardner was a wealthy businessman, widely believed to have received his ambassadorial appointment as a ‘payoff’ for major financial contributions to the 1952 Republican Party presidential campaign. Gardner's assessment of Batista was encapsulated in testimony before a U.S. congressional subcommittee: ‘…Batista had always leaned toward the United States. I don't think we ever had a better friend’. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security LawsGoogle ScholarPubMed, Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean, Part 9, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 08 27, 29, 30, 1960 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 665.Google Scholar

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52 Ibid.

53 Personal Correspondence: U.S. Department of State official (Santiago de Cuba Consulate), Florida, 03 29, 1975.Google ScholarPubMed

54 Personal Interview: U.S. Department of State official (Santiago de Cuba Consulate), Washington, D.C., 07 30, 1976.Google ScholarPubMed

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56 Herbert, L. Matthews, ‘Situation in Cuba Found Worsening: Batista Foes Gain’, New York Times, 06 16, 1957, p. 26.Google Scholar

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59 See Herbert, Matthews, ‘Situation in Cuba Found Worsening: Batista Foes Gain’, op. cit., p. 26. On the scope of the stepped-up repression by the dictatorial regimeGoogle Scholar, see Phillips, R. Hart, Cuba: Island of Paradox (New York, McDowell Obolensky, 1959), p. 316: ‘…killings and torture were going on in every town on the island, especially in Oriente Province’.Google Scholar

60 Michael, T. Klare, War Without End (New York, Vintage Books, 1972), p. 278.Google Scholar

61 From Havana Embassy to Department of State, Subject: ‘Revision of Operations Plan for Latin America’, 10 22, 1958, op. cit.Google Scholar

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66 Personal Interview: U.S. Department of State official, Washington, D.C., 07 5, 1973. Individual congressmen also voiced support for an arms embargo of the Batista government, but there is no evidence to suggest that their opposition to Batista had any substantive impact on the ultimate executive branch decision.Google Scholar

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