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Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967–1975

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2013

TANYA HARMER
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Abstract

Drawing on interviews, published sources and archival documents, this article examines Cuba's policy towards Latin America after Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara's death. It argues that as a result of this event and other setbacks in the region, Cuba reconceptualised its priorities, de-emphasised armed revolution and embraced new revolutionary processes. The results were mixed. By the mid-1970s, Havana was more disillusioned about revolutionary prospects in Latin America than ever before. However, it had also rejoined the inter-American system after more than a decade of isolation. This article asks how, why and with what consequences for Fidel Castro's stated pledge to ‘make revolution’ these shifts in Cuba's Latin American relations took place.

Spanish abstract

En base a entrevistas, publicaciones y archivos, este artículo examina la política cubana hacia América Latina tras la muerte de Ernesto ‘Ché’ Guevara. El trabajo señala que como resultado de tal evento y de otros reveses en la región, Cuba reconceptualizó sus prioridades, le quitó importancia a la revolución armada y adoptó nuevos procesos revolucionarios. Los resultados fueron mixtos. Para mediados de los años 70, La Habana estaba más desilusionada que nunca acerca de las posibilidades revolucionarias en América Latina. Sin embargo, también se había reintegrado al sistema interamericano luego de una década de aislamiento. Este artículo se pregunta cómo y por qué se dieron estos cambios en las relaciones de Cuba con América Latina, y qué consecuencias tuvieron estos en la intención declarada de Fidel Castro de ‘hacer la revolución’.

Portuguese abstract

Baseado em entrevistas, publicações e documentos de arquivo, este artigo examina a política de Cuba em relação à America Latina após a morte de Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. Nele se argumenta como o resultado deste evento e outros revezes na região fez Cuba reconceituar suas prioridades, tirando a ênfase da revolução armada e adotando novos processos revolucionários. Os resultados foram variados. Nos idos dos anos setenta, Havana estava mais desiludida sobre as perspectivas revolucionárias na América Latina do que nunca, no entanto ela havia se reaproximado do sistema inter-americano após mais de uma década de isolamento. O artigo questiona como, por que e com quais consequências para o empenho de Fidel Castro em ‘fazer revolução’ se deram estes ajustes na relação de Cuba com a América Latina.

Keywords

Cubaforeign policyrevolutionLatin AmericaCubarelaciones internacionalesrevoluciónLatinoaméricaCubapolítica externarevoluçãoAmérica Latina
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 61 - 89
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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References

1 United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘The Limits of Cuban Subversion in Latin America’, 28 Aug. 1974, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter CREST).

2 Office of Current Intelligence and Directorate of Operations, ‘The Status of Cuban Subversion in Latin America’, 2 May 1975, CREST. See also Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Cuban Support for Nationalist Movements and Revolutionary Groups’, July 1977, CREST; and Defense Intelligence Agency observations, 1975, quoted in Schoultz, Lars, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), p. 271Google Scholar.

3 Fidel Castro, ‘The Second Declaration of Havana’, 4 Feb. 1962, available at www.walterlippmann.com/fc-02-04-1962.pdf.

4 Blight, James and Brenner, Philip, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 19Google Scholar.

5 Ibid., pp. 35, 87–8, 96–7.

6 Ibid., pp. 86, 104.

7 Domínguez, Jorge, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 124–6Google Scholar.

8 ‘Cuba: A Fitting Answer to Latin America’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 28 (July 1968), p. 3.

9 ‘Revolutionary Struggle: The Fundamental Line of the Revolution in Latin America’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 18 (Sep. 1967), p. 15.

10 Ibid., pp. 17–18. See also Fidel Castro's address to OSPAAAL, 7 June 1966, quoted in Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, p. xxii.

11 Fidel Castro, 10 Aug. 1967, quoted in Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, p. 128.

12 ‘Revolutionary Struggle’, p. 16.

13 Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, ‘Message to the Tricontinental’, 16 April 1967, available at www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1967/04/16.htm.

14 Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Special Report No. 90, ‘Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America’, 14 Dec. 1981, CREST.

15 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, pp. 262, 271.

16 On the idea that Cuba swapped ‘idealism’ for ‘Realpolitik’, see Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), pp. 107–32Google Scholar.

17 Erisman, H. Michael, Cuba's Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2000)Google Scholar, pp. 4, 20, 42, 48, 83.

18 For example, see Castañeda, Jorge, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (London: Bloomsbury, 1997)Google Scholar; and Gleijeses, Piero, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003)Google Scholar.

19 Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, pp. 129–31, 138–9.

20 Erisman, Cuba's Foreign Relations, pp. 73, 75, 82–3.

21 Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, pp. 224–7.

22 See Harmer, Tanya, Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), pp. 39–46, 56–64Google Scholar.

23 See Gott, Richard, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 235Google Scholar; and Wright, Thomas C., Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (revised edition, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001)Google Scholar.

24 Salazar, Luis Suárez (ed.), Manuel Piñeiro: Che Guevara and the Latin American Revolutionary Movements (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2001), pp. 45–6Google Scholar.

25 Focos were central to Che Guevara's widely disseminated theory of guerrilla warfare, published after the Cuban Revolution and formalised by Régis Debray. This theory argued that small mobile guerrilla forces (focos) could ignite revolutionary conditions in countries where they did not necessarily exist and generate mass support among the population, thereby leading to large-scale guerrilla warfare and the seizure of power. See Guevara, Ernesto ‘Che’, Guerrilla Warfare (London: Harper Perennial, 2008)Google Scholar; and Debray, Régis, Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America (Middlesex: Penguin, 1968)Google Scholar.

26 Interviews with Patricio de la Guardia, senior member of Cuba's Tropas Especiales, Havana, 21 April 2011; and Felix Huerta, Chilean member of the ELN, Santiago, 23 March 2010. On rhetoric, see Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, p. 125.

27 Message of Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL, 28 March 1968, Tricontinental Bulletin, 27 (June 1968), pp. 3–5. The message mentioned Venezuela, Guatemala and Colombia as being ‘active scenes’ of revolutionary struggle. On reactions to Che's death, see ‘The Death of Che Guevara’ and ‘World Repercussion on the Death of Che’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 21 (Dec. 1967), pp. 5, 11.

28 Ostria, Gustavo Rodríguez, Sin tiempo para las palabras: Teoponte, la otra guerrilla guevarista en Bolivia (La Paz: Grupo Editorial Kipus, 2006), pp. 22–5Google Scholar, 31, 42, 60.

29 Interview with Luis Fernández Oña, Cuban intelligence official, Ministry of the Interior (MININT), Santiago, 6 April 2011.

30 Interview with Patricio de la Guardia. On Chile's involvement, guerrilla training in Cuba and Cuban support, see also Rodríguez Ostria, Sin tiempo para las palabras, pp. 45–52, 68–83, 112–34, 137–50.

31 Ibid., pp. 183–235.

32 ‘Venezuela: A Difficult Year’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 33 (Dec. 1968), pp. 14–19.

33 Message of Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL, 28 March 1968, p. 3.

34 Wright, Latin America, pp. 77–8, 103, 104.

35 See Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Cuban Support for Nationalist Movements’. On Cuba's failed support for guerrilla insurgencies, see also Brands, Hal, Latin America's Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 52–6.Google Scholar

36 Urgent Note, ‘Notes on the Conversations with Roa’, 30 June 1971, wiazka 3/40/75, Archiwum Ministerstwa Sparw Zagranicznych, Warsaw (hereafter AMSZ). My thanks to Anita Prazmowska for her help in locating Polish documents used in this article and translating them for me.

37 Rodríguez Ostria, Sin tiempo para las palabras, pp. 220–1.

38 Anonymous source quoted in Karen Wald, ‘Cuban Line Stays Revolutionary’, National Guardian, 8 Aug. 1972.

39 CIA Office of National Estimates, ‘The Changing Revolutionary Process in Latin America’, Memorandum, 23 Feb. 1971, CREST.

40 Oleg Darusenkov, quoted in Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, pp. 110–11.

41 Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, pp. xxii–xxiii, 33–4, 35, 121–45.

42 Ibid., p. 139.

43 See Gott, Cuba, pp. 235–48; Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s; and CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, ‘Cuba's Foreign Policy Apparatus and How It Works’, July 1977, CREST.

44 Memcon, Igor Bubnov (counsellor, Soviet embassy), Madison M. Adams Jr. (economic officer, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs) et al., State Department, 11 May 1970, Box 223, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

45 Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, pp. 138–9.

46 Tombs, David, Latin American Liberation Theology (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 110Google Scholar.

47 Ibid., pp. 93, 99, 110.

48 Fidel Castro, quoted in ‘Latin America: The Rebelion [sic] of the Clergy’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 43 (Oct. 1969), p. 30. See also ‘Solidarity with Latin America’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 50–1 (May–June 1970), p. 44; ‘Christianism and Marxism’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 66 (Sep. 1971); and Castro, Fidel and Betto, Frei, Fidel Castro and Religion: Castro Talks on Revolution and Religion with Frei Betto (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 18, 245–7Google Scholar.

49 On urban guerrillas, see Brands, Latin America's Cold War, pp. 101–4.

50 See Wright, Latin America, pp. 99–199, 103, 104–7; and Brands, Latin America's Cold War, pp. 97–105.

51 See Tricontinental, 16 (Jan. 1970), pp. 15–56; and ‘Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 56 (Nov. 1970). On support for urban guerrillas, see also message of Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL, 28 March 1968, pp. 5–6; ‘Brazil: The Armed Struggle will Oust the Dictatorship’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 30 (Sep. 1968); and ‘Tupamaros: If There Isn't a Homeland for All, There Won't be a Homeland for Anybody’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 57 (Dec. 1970). Marighella's Minimanual was also published in Santiago (Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971) and London (Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 13: 3 (1971), pp. 95–100) as well as being reviewed in Time, 2 Nov. 1970.

52 CIA Office of National Estimates, ‘The Changing Revolutionary Process’.

53 ‘Latin America: Rebel Presence in the Valleys and Mountains’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 46 (Jan. 1970), p. 35.

54 It has been suggested that Castro established contacts a month before the coup, although it is not clear what impact this had. See Ramírez, Dariel Alarcón, Memorias de un soldado cubano: vida y muerte de la revolución (Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, 2003), pp. 195–9Google Scholar.

55 See Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, pp. 121, 225.

56 Interview with Luis Suárez Salazar, Cuban intelligence analyst, Havana, 10 Dec. 2004.

57 Edwards, Jorge, Persona non grata (4th edition, Santiago: Tiempo de Memoria, 2000), pp. 55–6Google Scholar.

58 ‘Notes on the Conversations with Roa’, AMSZ.

59 Ibid.

60 See Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 221; and Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, pp. 110–11.

61 Interview with Juan Carretero, Cuban intelligence official, MININT, Havana, 18 April 2011. On the negotiations themselves, see also interview with Michel Vázquez Montes de Oca and Nelly A. Cubillas Pino, Cuban Ministry of Foreign Commerce, Havana, 11 Sep. 2005.

62 Castro also oversaw plans for an exhibition about Cuba in Chile which coincided with Salvador Allende's election. This exhibition then provided cover for Cuban intelligence officials to travel down to Chile by boat with exhibition materials in October 1970. See interview with Carretero.

63 Fidel Castro, April 1970, quoted in Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, p. 249.

64 ‘Solidarity with Latin America’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 50–1 (May–June 1970), pp. 43–4.

65 Interview with Luis Suárez Salazar, Havana, 12 Sep. 2005; Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, pp. 107, 115.

66 Fidel Castro, speech at Plaza de la Revolución, Havana, 26 July 1970, Castro Speech Database, available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html.

67 ‘Account of the delegation of the PZPR [Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, Polish United Workers Party] in the Republic of Cuba’, 24 June 1971, wiazka 5/40/75, AMSZ.

68 For a detailed study of Cuba's relations with Allende, see Harmer, Allende's Chile.

69 CIA Office of National Estimates, ‘The Changing Revolutionary Process’.

70 Interviews with Michel Vázquez Montes de Oca and Nelly A. Cubillas Pino, and Luis Suárez Salazar. See also interviews with Luis Fernández Oña, Havana, 3 Sep. 2005; and Luis Fernández Oña and Neida Guerra, Havana, 19 April 2011.

71 See ‘MLN Position on the Broad Front’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 62 (May 1971), p. 44; and Wright, Latin America, p. 100.

72 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Bulletin, 28 Aug. 1971, CREST.

73 Wright, Latin America, pp. 99–100, 104, 106.

74 CIA Office of National Estimates, ‘The Changing Revolutionary Process’.

75 ‘Notes on the Conversations with Roa’, AMSZ.

76 Ambassador Marian Renke, Polish embassy, Havana, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, memorandum, 15 March 1972, wiazka 3/12/78, AMSZ. See also ‘Notes on the Conversations with Roa’, AMSZ.

77 See ‘Bolivia: People Aplenty, but They Lacked Arms’, Tricontinental Bulletin, 68 (Nov. 1971), p. 7; and Harmer, Allende's Chile, pp. 125–6.

78 See Fidel Castro, 27 Aug. 1971, quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), ‘Trends in Communist Propaganda’, 1 Sep. 1971, CREST; and Rodríguez Ostria, Sin tiempo para las palabras, pp. 582–3.

79 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Cuban Support for Nationalist Movements’.

80 FBIS, ‘Trends in Communist Propaganda’.

81 Wright, Latin America, pp. 100–1.

82 Fidel Castro, press conference, Havana, 10 Nov. 1971, published as ‘Entrevista’, in Castro, Cuba –Chile (Havana: Ediciones Políticas, Comisión de Orientación Revolucionaria del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 1972), p. 14.

83 Fidel Castro, speech, Santiago, 25 Nov. 1971, published as ‘Teatro Municipal’, in Castro, Cuba–Chile, p. 380; Castro, speech, 25 Nov. 1971, published as ‘Santa Cruz, Colchagua’, in Castro, Cuba–Chile, p. 365; and Castro, speech, 2 Dec. 1971, published as ‘Acto de Despedida’, in Castro, Cuba–Chile, p. 480.

84 Castro, dialogue with students, 29 Nov. 1971, published as ‘Universidad Técnica del Estado’, in Castro, Cuba–Chile, pp. 439, 444.

85 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Bulletin, 4 Dec. 1971, CREST.

86 Fidel Castro, press conference, Caracas, 1989, quoted in Halliday, Fred, Caamaño in London: The Exile of a Latin American Revolutionary (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2011), p. 50Google Scholar. On the reduction of Cuba's support for Caamaño, see also Alarcón Ramírez, Memorias, pp. 213–19.

87 Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, pp. 225–6.

88 Raul Roa, cited in Oficio, Chilean embassy, Havana, to Señor Ministro, 10 July 1972, Oficios Conf., Cuba, 1972, Archivo General Histórico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago.

89 See Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, pp. 16–21; and Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, p. 250.

90 Castro, Fidel, 26 July 1972, quoted in H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 53–4Google Scholar.

91 Manuel Piñeiro, speech to the Departamento General de Liberación Nacional (General National Liberation Department, DGLN) at the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, 5 Aug. 1972, in Suárez Salazar (ed.), Manuel Piñeiro, p. 98.

92 Interviews with Carlos Amat, Cuban diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX), Havana, 24 April 2006; and José Vierra, Cuban diplomat, MINREX, Havana, 28 April 2006.

93 Manuel Piñeiro, speech to the DGLN, 8 June 1973, in Suárez Salazar (ed.), Manuel Piñeiro, p. 102.

94 Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Latin America: The Aftermath of the Chilean Coup’, 15 Sep. 1973, CREST.

95 Dinges, John, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: The New Press, 2004), p. 56Google Scholar.

96 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Anti-Junta Activity Outside of Chile’, 12 Aug. 1974, CREST.

97 Interview with Ulises Estrada, Cuban intelligence official, MININT, Havana, 19 April 2011.

98 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Cuban Support for Nationalist Movements’, July 1977; and ‘Anti-Junta Activity Outside of Chile’, 12 Aug. 1974. On Chilean left-wing divisions, see also Victor R. Figueroa Clark, ‘Chilean Internationalism and the Sandinista Revolution, 1978–1988’, unpubl. doctoral diss., London School of Economics, 2010, pp. 75–83.

99 Interview with Ulises Estrada. See also interview with Luis Fernández Oña, 6 April 2011.

100 Fidel Castro, speech at Havana's Plaza de la Revolución, 28 Sep. 1973, Castro Speech Database; and Manuel Piñeiro, speech to DGLN, 28 April 1974, in Suárez Salazar (ed.), Manuel Piñeiro, pp. 112, 107, 114.

101 See Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, quoted in Karen Wald, ‘Cuban Line Stays Revolutionary’, National Guardian, 8 Aug. 1972.

102 Manuel Piñeiro, speeches to DGLN, 28 April and 2 March 1974, in Suárez Salazar (ed.), Manuel Piñeiro, pp. 109, 105.

103 Manuel Piñeiro, speech to DGLN, 28 April 1974, in Suárez Salazar (ed.), Manuel Piñeiro, pp. 112, 107, 114.

104 Office of Current Intelligence and Directorate of Operations, ‘The Status of Cuban Subversion’. See also Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Cuban Support for Nationalist Movements’.

105 Manuel Piñeiro, speech to DGLN, 25 July 1975, in Suárez Salazar (ed.), Manuel Piñeiro, p. 120.

106 Piñeiro, speech to DGLN, 28 April 1974, in Suárez Salazar (ed.), Manuel Piñeiro, p. 113.

107 Brands, Latin America's Cold War, pp. 129–63.

108 Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Bulletin, 16 July 1973, CREST.

109 Robert J. McClintock, American embassy, Caracas, to secretary of state, 13 July 1974, Electronic Telegrams, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA, available at http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-description.jsp?s=4073 (hereafter DOS/CFP).

110 Sam Moskowitz, American embassy, San Salvador, to secretary of state, 30 Aug. 1974, DOS/CFP.

111 Francis E. Meloy, American embassy, Guatemala, to secretary of state, 13 Sep. 1974 and 20 June 1975, DOS/CFP.

112 McClintock, American embassy, Caracas, to secretary of state, 13 July 1974, DOS/CFP.

113 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, pp. 262–3.

114 Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, p. 227.

115 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, pp. 263, 271.

116 Ibid., p. 262.

117 Office of Current Intelligence and Directorate of Operations, ‘The Status of Cuban Subversion’. See also Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, pp. 271–3.

118 Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, p. 227. See also Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, p. 226.

119 On Castro's fierce opposition to détente, see Foreign Ministry report, ‘Initial Assessment of Comrade Fidel Castro's Visit to Poland’, 13 June 1972, wiazka 3/13/78, AMSZ.

120 Gott, Cuba, p. 245.

121 ‘Informe del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba al Primer Congreso, presentado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz, Primer Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Primer Ministro del Gobierno Revolucionario. Teatro “Carlos Marx”’, in Memorias: Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba (Havana: Departamento de Orientación Revolucionaria del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 1976), pp. 142–4, 149.

122 On Cuba's support for the Sandinista National Liberation Front and the Nicaraguan Revolution of July 1979, see Gary Prevost, ‘Cuba and Nicaragua: A Special Relationship?’, Latin American Perspectives, 17: 3 (1990), pp. 120–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

123 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Cuban Support for Nationalist Movements’.

124 Salazar, Luis Suárez, ‘The Cuban Revolution and the New Latin American Leadership: A View from Its Utopias’, Latin American Perspectives, 165: 36 (2009), pp. 114–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar. While acknowledging that tactical shifts occurred in Cuba's Latin American policies, Suárez Salazar cites Che's message to OSPAAAL as ‘the total destruction of imperialism’ (p. 124), omitting the original reference to achieving this through armed struggle.

125 On the idea of the Cold War as ‘a series of overlapping conflicts’, see Brands, Latin America's Cold War, p. 7.