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Political Party Decline and the Failure of Liberal Democracy: the PRD in Dominican Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Michael J. Kryzanek
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Extract

The decade of the 1970s has brought a number of changes to Latin America and in particular to the Latin American political scene. The extensive proliferation of harsh, military-run governments, the increasingly strident cries of nationalism and anti-Americanism, the violent demise of the Marxist- oriented regime of Chile's Salvador Allende and the disappointing performance of the Alliance for Progress programs and its modernizing ideology are now all familiar characteristics of Latin America in the modern era.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , May 1977 , pp. 115 - 143
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

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References

1 Two works which describe very effectively the changing atmosphere of Latin American politics are Onis, Juan de and Levinson, Jerome, The Alliance that Lost Its Way; A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress (New York, Quadrangle Press, 1970)Google Scholar and Tannenbaum, Frank, The Future of Democracy in Latin America (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1974).Google Scholar

2 For background development of the liberal democratic reform movement, see Ameringer, Charles, The Democratic Left in Exile: The Antidictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean 1945–1959 (Coral Gables, Univ. of Miami Press, 1974);Google ScholarHilliker, Grant, The Politics of Reform in Peru: The Aprista and Other Mass Parties of Latin America (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971),Google ScholarKantor, Harry, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement (BerkeleyUniv. of California Press, 1953)Google Scholar and Martz, John, Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela (Princeton, N.J., Princeton Univ.Press, 1966).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 The most up to date analysis of the reform parties and the problems they have encountered is contained in Alexander's, RobertLatin American Political Parties (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973).Google Scholar

4 Russel Fitzgibbon in ‘Seven Dilemmas of Latin America's National Revolutionary Parties’, Orbis (Sept 1970), outlines many of the problems faced by the reform parties.Google ScholarPetras, James in Politics and Social Structure in Latin America is also extremely critical of the so-called ‘democratic left’ parties and the ‘democratic alternative’ that was sponsored by the academic community in the United States. See pp. 330–I.Google Scholar See also Wiarda, Howard J. ‘The Crisis of the Latin American Democratic Left’, Dissent, 16 (11–12 1969), pp. 529–36.Google Scholar

5 For the most authoritative discussion of the PRD in Dominican politics, see Wiarda, Howard, Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration: Politics and Social Change in the Dominican Republic (Ann Arbor, Xerox Microfilm, 1975)Google Scholar and Bosch, Juan, The Unfinished Experiment: Democracy in the Dominican Republic (New York, Praeger, 1965).Google Scholar

6 See Kryzanek, Michael J. ‘Diversion, Subversion and Repression: The Strategies of AntiOpposition Politics in Balaguer's Dominican Republic’. Paper presented at the Dominican Republic 10th anniversary seminar, New York Univ., 24 Apr. 1975.Google Scholar

7 For some theoretical background with respect to the problem of decline in the PRD, see Huntington's, Samuel discussion of coherence-disunity in modernizing systems, the lapse into political decay and the importance of party organization in his article ‘Political Development and Political Decay’, World Politics, vol. 17 (1965).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Martin, John B. in Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Republic From the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War (New York, Doubleday and Co., 1966) offers the best description of the poor relations developed by Bosch with his friends and adversaries.Google Scholar

9 Wiarda, Howard in a chapter entitled ‘Interest Aggregation: Political Parties and Party Systems’ in Dictatorship, Development and Disintegration: Politics and Social Change in the Dominican Republic, describes Bosch's problems with his PRD supporters.Google Scholar

10 Ibid.

11 The most complete discussion of the 1965 civil war can be found in LowenthaI, Abraham, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1972).Google Scholar See also Slater, Jerome, Intervention and Negotiations: The United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York, Harper and Row, 1970).Google Scholar

12 Petras, James in ‘Dominican Republic: Revolution and Restoration’, New Left Review (11–12 1966; 01–02, 1967) provides a detailed presentation of the Dominican Republic and the PRD after the civil war.Google Scholar

13 See Kemble, Penn, ‘Why Bosch Lost’ in Chaing-Rodriguez, Eugenio (ed.), The Lingering Crisis –A Case Study of the Dominican Republic (New York, Las Americas Publ., 1969).Google Scholar

14 El Nacional, 7 Jan. 1967.Google Scholar

15 El Caribe, 3 Feb. 1967.Google Scholar

16 Ahora, 7 Aug. 1967. As a result of Pena Gomez's action to appease the moderate middle class elements, Juan Bosch resigned his honorary post as party ‘asesor’, stating that his decision was ‘irrevocable’.Google Scholar

17 Bosch, Juan, El Próximo Paso: Dictadura con Respaldo Popular (Santo Domingo, Cine y Artes C por A, 1970).Google Scholar

18 An analysis of Bosch's thesis can be found in Wiarda's, Howard ‘The New Developmental Alternatives in Latin America: Nasserism and Dictatorship with Popular Support’, Western Political Quarterly (09 1972).Google Scholar

19 Many of the issues that would surface at the 1970 party convention were first aired at an important PRD meeting in Benidorm, Spain, in 1969. In a document which bears the name of the city in which it was signed, PRD leaders agreed to a compromise position which stressed the need for diversity of opinion in the party, but also pledged the PRD to remain out of the future elections. See Boletín Buro Coordinudor de la International Socialista en América Latina. Primer Trimestre (1969), p. 201.Google Scholar

20 Ahora, 9 Mar. 1970.Google Scholar

21 Casimiro Castro first used this term in an interview in Ahora, the magazine, 15 July 1968, and maintained his position in 1970.Google Scholar

22 This is the period of time when ‘little white books’ of Bosch's writings were distributed in large quantities to Dominican citizens. For a discussion of the PRD's official announcement of the reorganization and reorientation of the party, see El Nacional, 17 Oct. 1970.Google Scholar

23 Some of the most revealing discussions of the repression problem facing the PRD and the left-wing in Dominican politics can be found in a working paper entitled ‘La Banda – An Episode of Terror’, Organizing Packet on the Dominican Republic – Ecumenical Program for Inter-American Communication and Action (Washington, DC, 1975), p. 1.Google Scholar

24 El Caribe, 5 May. 1973.Google Scholar

25 See El Caribe for the period from 4 Feb. 1973 to 5 May. 1973 when Bosch came out of hiding and ‘unofficially’ ended the government manhunt.Google Scholar

26 El Caribe, 5 May. 1973.Google Scholar

27 For purposes of explanation in the PRO, the Permanent Commission is an elite body of seven party members headed by Juan Bosch, which controls the day-to-day activities of the PRD. The National Executive Committee is a body of some thirty members who serve as a review and ratification body and meet only every three months.Google Scholar

28 El Caribe, 12 May. 1973.Google Scholar

29 Bosch made his announcement on 18 Nov. 1973. For a discussion of the announcement and the new party, see Renovación, 30 Nov. 1973.Google Scholar

30 Times of the Americas, 9 June 1974.Google Scholar

31 El Caribe, 14 May 1974.Google Scholar

32 Ibid., 4 Apr. 1974.

33 A good example of Bosch's ‘futuristic’ political solution can be found in an interview he gave to Carlos Gutierrez which is contained in his book, The Dominican Republic:Rebellion and Repression (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 100 and pp. 113–14.Google Scholar

34 There is evidence available that the PRD legislative bloc between 1966 and 1970 was ableto curtail somewhat the oppressive policies of the Balaguer regime through effective use of the media. Also party moderates are of the opinion that the threat of PRD participation in presidential elections has had an effect on the Balaguer administration, especially in stimu. lating agrarian reform.Google Scholar

35 The most cogent example of this generation gap was brought home to me when I visited PRD headquarters on Avenida Independencia one day in connection with an interview with Casimiro Castro. After talking to Casimiro for a while on the status of the party, he asked if I would like some literature on the PRD. Casimiro ran into some trouble trying to convince a young radical worker in the party named Tonito to provide the literature. Tonito was not only suspicious of me, but was visibly at odds with Casimiro. It was as if the fatherly Casimiro was telling his young impetuous ‘son’, Tonito, the correct manner of making friends, even though the friend might be an American.Google Scholar

36 In an interview in El Nacional, 10 May 1970, Bosch emphasized that in his opinion the PRD was no longer in the mold of the Aprista type liberal democratic reform party, but was moving closer to the model of a mass-based revolutionary movement.Google Scholar

37 Stanley Plastrick in his article ‘Bosch and Balaguer; Dominican Roulette’, Dissent (Nov.–Dec. 1970) likens Bosch to the traditional Latin American caudillo figure with the only difference being that Bosch is in the opposition.Google Scholar

38 Robert Dix in ‘Latin America: Oppositions and Development’ in Dahl, Robert, Regimes and Oppositions (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973) comments extensively on the role that political party oppositions have played and can play in Latin American politics.Google Scholar

39 Plastrick, Stanley, op. cit.Google Scholar See also Petras, James, Politics and Social Structure in Latin America, pp. 292–3.Google Scholar

40 In conversations with the then PRD Press Secretary, Sr. Emmanual Espinal, the party presented as a large organization with a growing membership. When proof was requested, the response was that the PRD did not maintain files because of fear of retribution from the police and military if those files were ever confiscated. Interview with Emmanual Espinal, Santo Domingo, 9 July 1972.Google Scholar

41 As an example of such activity, see the Santiago daily El Sol for 3 & 9 June 1972 for a description of organizing activities aimed at recruiting new party members in the northern sector of the country.Google Scholar

42 The PRD has in the past received money from the Freidrich Ebert Foundation, an organization connected with the Social Democratic Party in Germany, and also from the Social Democratic Party in Sweden.Google Scholar

43 New York Times, 9 Nov. 1971, p. 49. The Times article describes the PRD in exile.Google Scholar

44 An editorial in the Times of the Americas, 2 Oct. 1974 is extremely critical of PRD leaders Gil Morales and Antonio Guzman for their appearance at a Washington DC news conference designed to gain support for the party and its cause. The author of the editorial, Clarence Moore, was of the opinion that the PRD spokesmen engaged in emotional attacks against the United States and Gulf and Western Corporation which did nothing to provide the audience with hard data, though the PRD could have strengthened its case for support.Google Scholar

45 Juan Bosch's radio program every mid-day in Santo Domingo was one of the more popular methods used by the PRD to present its message to the Dominican people. In fact, there were many occasions when a charge made by Bosch on the radio was answered immediately by Balaguer and, in some instances, corrective action was undertaken.Google Scholar

46 President Balaguer stated that Gen. Wessin could only return to the Dominican Republic if he were Victorious as the vice-presidential candidate.Google Scholar

47 Gutierrez, Carlos, op. cit. interviews Isa Conde and elicits some candid views on the party's efforts to work in the labor movement and make preparations for the eventual demise of the Balaguer regime. See pp. 115–29.Google Scholar

48 See Bodenheimer, Susan, ‘La Crisis del Movimiento Socialdemócrata en América Latina’ Estudios Internacionales, No. 12 (enero-marzo, 1970).Google Scholar