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Fascist Propaganda and the Italian Community in Peru during the Benavides Regime, 1933–39

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Orazio A. Ciccarelli
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Extract

In the second half of the 1930s, confidential information from and concerning Latin America reaching Washington promoted the suspicion, and ultimately the conviction, that the security of much of Latin America, and by extension that of the United States, was imperiled by the Axis powers. Officials in Washington were convinced that the Axis menace to the Western Hemisphere was not in the form of a direct military threat, but rather through the use of propaganda and subversion. Such concern – based in part on fascism's appeal to Latin America's elites – was aroused particularly by the efforts of the Axis powers to organise their own national communities in Latin America into instruments of their foreign policy and by the simultaneous mounting of a propaganda campaign intended to win over public opinion in the Americas and to weaken the support for democracy.1

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , November 1988 , pp. 361 - 388
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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References

1 Haglund, David G., Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936–1940 (Albuquerque, 1984), p. 16.Google Scholar Haglund argues that it was such security concerns in Latin America that eventually led the United States to abandon neutrality and enter the Second World War.

2 For a comparative look at the question of propaganda see Zeman, Z. A. B., Nazi Propaganda (London 1964), pp. 54–75, 104–17.Google Scholar By 1939 German radio broadcasts to Latin America amounted to twelve hours daily, higher than to any other region of the world. Childs, Harold L. and Whitton, John B. (eds.), Propaganda By Short Wave including Charles A. Rigby's The War on the Short Waves (Princeton, 1942).Google Scholar It contains essays on short-wave propaganda by Germany, Britain, Italy, France, and the United States. Frye, Alton, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933–1941 (New Haven, 1967), pp. 31Google Scholar, passim; Taylor, Philip M., The Projection of Britain. British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda (London, 1981), pp. 181–259Google Scholar; Lavine, Harold and Wechsler, James, War Propaganda and the United States (New York, 1972).Google Scholar

3 Beals, Carlton, The Coming Struggle for Latin America (New York, 1938), p. 92Google Scholar; ‘Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities up to March 1938’, U.S. National Archives (USNA), US State Department (USSD), file no. 3850.

4 In 1937 United States Ambassador Fred Dearing had reported that Benavides was proving to be a ‘poorer and poorer neighbor every day’. In the next 18 months Washington believed that matters had deteriorated as Benavides strengthened economic and political ties with Italy and Germany. See Haglund, , Latin America, pp. 103–4Google Scholar; Laurence A. Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 9 Oct. 1937, (USSD) file no. 723.65/7; R. M. Lambert to Secretary of State, Lima, 12 June 1937, (USSD) file no. 723.65/7; Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 5 Nov. 1937, (USSD) file no. 710, Italy–Peru, no. 98; Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 8 Nov. 1937, (USSD) file no. 800 B; ‘Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities’.

5 This conclusion is based on a reading of Italian Foreign Ministry documents between 1922 and 1935. See also ‘Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities’, p. 9; Haglund, Latin America, p. 55.Google Scholar

6 Santarelli, Enzo, ‘I fasci italiani all'estero’, Ricerche sul fascissmo (Urbino, 1971), p. 124Google Scholar; Bastiniani, Guiseppe, Gli italiani all'estero (Milan, 1939), pp. 46–53.Google Scholar

7 Cannistraro, Philip V., La fabbrica del consenzo: fascismo e mass media (Rome-Bari, 1975), pp. 102–4, 106–7, 120–1Google Scholar; Ledeen, Michael A., Universal Fascism. The Theory and Practice of the Fascist International, 1928–1936 (New York, 1972), pp. 62–3.Google Scholar

8 Cole, Taylor, ‘The Italian Ministry of Popular Culture’, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 2 (07 1938), p. 426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Peru 1935–6, Direzione Generale Affari Politici (DGAP). Ministero degli Affari Esteri (MAE). This document reviews the attitudes of Latin American nations towards the League of Nations stand against Italy and their position regarding recognition of the Italian empire.

10 ‘Peru, situazione politica nel 1935’, pp. 7–9; Quaderno no. 51 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Guiseppe Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8.

11 See El Comercio, La Prensa, La Crónica, and El Universal particularly for the months of March through July 1936. For an analysis of the treatment of the Spanish Civil War in the Peruvian press see Gamboa, Willy F. Pinto, Sobre fascismo y literatura. La guerra civil española en La Prensa, El Comercio, La Crónica (1936–1939) (Lima, 1983).Google Scholar

12 La Crónica, 7 May 1936.

13 Gino Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

14 Vittorio Bianchini to MAE, Lima, 13 June 1936 (DGAP), Peru 1936, busta 3.

15 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8.

16 Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. Bianchini also paid for the translation and publication of one of José de la Riva Agüero's books. Riva Agüero was one of the most vocal and articulate defenders of Italian fascism.

17 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8.

18 For a complete listing of recipients of the Nucleo's funds see Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8. In 1936 one dollar equalled S/.4.3 and Lit. 12.5 respectively. In 1937 the value of the sol had risen to 3.7 to the dollar while that of the lira had fallen to 19.1 to the dollar.

19 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Ministero per la Stampa e Propaganda (MSP), Lima, 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Emanuele Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937 busta 5.

20 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8; Talamo to MSP, Lima, 18 and 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

21 The literature on the Italian community in Peru – particularly for the period before 1914 – is growing. The more significant works are Sequi, Emilio and Calcagnoli, Enrico, La vita italiana nella repubblica del Peru; statistica, biografie (Lima, 1911)Google Scholar; Worral, Janet, ‘Italian immigration to Peru: 1860–1914’ (Ph.D Diss., Indiana University, 1972)Google Scholar; Franceschini, Antonio, L'emigrazione italiana nell' America del Sud (Rome, 1908)Google Scholar; Chiaramonti, Gabriella, ‘Empresarios italianos y proceso de industrializatión en el Perú entre finales del siglo XIX y la primera guerra mundial’, in Actas de la sexta reunión de historiadores latinoamericanistas europeos (Stockholm, 25–26 05 1981), pp. 551–99.Google Scholar

22 Chiaramonte, , ‘La migración italiana en Amérìca Latina. El caso peruano’, Apuntes, no. 13 (Lima, 1983), p. 23.Google Scholar

23 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 16 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. In 1936 the Italian minister in Lima conducted an extensive survey of Italian economic holdings in Peru and its findings were reviewed in this despatch. See also Chiaramonti, , ‘Empresarios italianos’, pp. 552–77.Google Scholar

24 ‘Peru,’ Fortune, vol. 17:1 (Jan. 1938), p. 128. Statistics on Italians in Peru are imprecise but they show the progress of the community over a seventy year period. The 1876 Peruvian census put the size of the Italian colony at 6,990; by 1891 the population had declined to 4,511 as a result of the War of the Pacific and of the economic and political crises that followed it; by 1906 the community reached its peak with 13,000; by 1927 Italians in Peru numbered about 8,000 and by 1940 only about 5,000 according to Italian estimates and 3,774 according to the Peruvian official census. All these numbers, with the exception of the first and the last, come from Italian sources. They may not reflect accurately the real size of the community because they tend to include Peruvian-born children of Italian residents who were legally Peruvian. Peruvian statistics between 1876 and 1940 are even less reliable as no formal census was taken between those years.

The decline in the number of Italian residents occurred mostly outside of Lima. In the Peruvian capital the size of the community declined less dramatically, from a high of 3,283 in 1876 to a low of 2,491 in 1940.

The size of the Italian community in Peru was miniscule compared to Argentina (1,100,000 in 1924) and Brazil (285,000 in 1940), but its national importance was not.

25 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 16 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9; Faralli, Ugo, Italiani al Peru (Rome, 1941), pp. 42–43.Google Scholar According to Talamo the community's weakened ties to Italy were explained in part by the very little effort and money spent by Italian governments on efforts to maintain the cultural integrity of resident Italians.

26 By the end of 1937 the Lima Fascio, reorganised and revitalised by Talamo, numbered only 403 card-carrying members many of whom, according to Talamo, seemed not to demonstrate the proper enthusiasm for fascism. See Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9.

27 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 10 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5.

28 Ibid.; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 16 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9.

29 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9.

30 Faralli, , Italiani nei Peru, pp. 42–3.Google Scholar

31 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 10 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5. On a number of occasions community leaders had warned Talamo that too close an identification by Italy with the Benavides regime might bring about anti-Italian measures by the government that would succeed it.

32 For interesting insights into Peruvian politics during the Benavides regime see Davies, Thomas M. and Villanueva, Víctor (eds.), 300 documentos para la historia del APRA (Lima, 1978)Google Scholar; Davies, Thomas M. and Villanueva, Víctor (eds.), Secretos electorales del APRA: correspondencia y documentos de 1939 (Lima, 1982).Google Scholar The 1936 presidential election was nullified by Benavides and rescheduled for 1939.

33 The Italian government made no serious attempt to establish close ties with important rightist political groups opposed to Benavides. Italy believed that the Peruvian president afforded the best opportunity for Italy to enhance its interests there.

34 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MSP, Lima, 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5.

35 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8. The Nucleo's debt had more than doubled by July 1937. Bianchini had continued to finance the debt personally although he had resigned himself to the probability of never being repaid. See Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. The only solution offered by Rome was to use part of the meagre S/.550 per month appropriated to pay off the debt to Bianchini. See Guido Rocco to Talamo, Rome, 4 Aug. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

36 Knox., MacgregorMussolini Unleashed, 1936–1941. Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War (London, 1982), pp. 30–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In 1938 the reserves of the Bank of Italy had shrunk from over 20,000 million lire in 1927 to under 3,000 million in 1939. The Ethiopian war and the subsequent pacification campaign, plus intervention in Spain, had drained the treasury. From 1934–5 to 1939–40 over 51% of Italy's state expenditures of 249,000 million lire went to Ethiopia, Spain, Albania and other colonies, and to the military. In 1940 Foreign Minister Ciano warned that Italy was broke, that its reserves were down to ‘1,400 miserable millions’ and that when they were spent ‘we will have nothing left but our eyes to cry with’.

37 Between 1922 and 1936 the Italian Foreign Ministry had remained relatively untouched by the establishment of the fascist regime in Italy. In 1936 the appointment of Count Galeazzo Ciano signified the beginning of the Ministry's shift towards fascism with personnel and policy changes reflecting more faithfully its goals and ideology. See H. Stuart Hughes, ‘The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism’, and Gilbert, Felix, ‘Ciano and His Ambassadors’, in Craig, Gordon A. and Gilbert, Felix (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919–1939 (Princeton, 1953).Google Scholar

38 Talamo to MSP, Lima, 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

39 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8; Talamo to MSP, Lima, 18 and 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

40 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

41 Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

42 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 3 April 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

43 Talamo enlisted the able and patriotic Bianchini to scale down the Nucleo's budget in order to make it more palatable to Rome. Bianchini proposed to El Universal a budget calling for drastic reductions, eliminating subsidies to certain editors and government officials, and transferring support of Italia Nuova to private sources. Although these measures would have cut in half (to S/. 1090) the Nucleo's budget, they also were rejected as too extravagant. Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 15 and 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

44 Galeazzo Ciano to MSP, Rome, 9 Dec. 1936 (DGAP), Peru 1936, busta 3.

45 Rocco to Grazzi, Rome, 24 Feb. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

46 Ibid.

47 Grazzi to Talamo, Rome, 3 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

48 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5.

49 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 9 Aug. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 7.

50 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 16 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5.

51 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 28 Aug. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 3. Talamo pointed specifically to APRA as the principal source of anti-totalitarian propaganda. He referred to the party as ‘the school for anti-fascism’.

52 Haglund, , Latin America, p. 2.Google Scholar

53 Ibid., p. 16.

54 Ibid., pp. 34, 52–3, 56, 65–6. It was after February 1937 that United States officials started to sense that matters were not going well in the Western Hemisphere and that the danger of Nazi and fascist penetration was growing. Such concerns were deepened when late in 1937 Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact of Germany and Japan, and Getulio Vargas established a dictatorial regime viewed on both sides of the Atlantic as representing a definite shift by Brazil towards the Axis.

55 Ibid., p. 78. Ironically, while the United States believed that the Axis powers were making headway in Latin America, Italy, Germany, and Japan were equally convinced that the United States was making greater advances. In the case of Peru, Italian ministers there had repeatedly informed Rome of the dominant position enjoyed by the United States and of the unlikelihood that it could be dislodged.

56 Adding greatly to United States concern was the appeasement policy practised by England and France culminating in the Munich agreement. The outcome of the conference had raised doubts in Washington about the reliability of England. It had also increased the probability, as seen by United States officials, of an Axis attack on America. See Haglund, , Latin America, pp. 52–3.Google Scholar

57 Ibid., pp. 51–2. Some of the more influential Latin American works were: Giudici, Ernesto, Hitler conquista América (Buenos Aires, 1938)Google Scholar; Arbaiza, Genaro, ‘Are the Americas Safe?’ Current History, vol. 47, no. 3 (12 1937), pp. 29–34Google Scholar; Seoane, Manuel, Nuestra América y la guerra (Santiago de Chile, 1940)Google Scholar; Artucio, Hugo Fernández, The Nazi Underground in South America (New York, 1942).Google Scholar

58 Haglund, , Latin America, p. 78Google Scholar; Inman, Samuel Guy, Inter-American Conferences, 1826–1954: History and Problems (Washington, 1964), pp. 160–95.Google Scholar For an official response to cultural penetration in Latin America see Espinosa, J. Manuel, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936–1948 (Washington D.C., 1976), pp. 1–157.Google Scholar

59 R. M. de Lambert to USSD, Lima, 9 Oct. 1937 (USSD), file no. 710, no. 5192.

60 Steinhardt to USSD, Lima, 9 Oct. 1937 (USSD), file no. 723.65/7.

61 Ibid.

62 ‘Memorandum on Italian Fascists and German Nazi Activities’, file no. 3850.

63 The list of works is particularly long after 1937 when the alarmist tone described was assumed even by some of the period's well known Latin Americanists. See, for example, Inman, Samuel Guy, Democracy Versus the Totalitarian States in Latin America (Philadelphia, 1938)Google Scholar; Carlton Beals, The Coming Struggle; Beals, , ‘Totalitarianism in Latin America’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1 (10 1938), pp. 78–89Google Scholar; Beals, , ‘Black Shirts in Latin America’, Current History, vol. 49, no. 3 (11 1938), pp. 32–4Google Scholar; Gunther, John, Inside Latin America (New York, 1941)Google Scholar; Herring, Hubert, Good Neighbors. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Seventeen Other Countries (New Haven, 1941)Google Scholar; Effron, David, ‘Latin America and the Fascist Holy Alliance’, Annals of the American Academy, vol. 204 (07 1939), pp. 17–25Google Scholar; Behrendt, Richard F., ‘Foreign Influence in Latin America’, Annals of the American Academy, vol. 204 (07 1939), pp. 1–8Google Scholar; Nerval, Gaston, ‘Europe Versus the United States in Latin America’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 15, no. 4 (07 1937), pp. 636–45Google Scholar; Weyl, Nathaniel, ‘Latin America Faces Fascism’, The New Republic, vol. 96, no. 1243 (28 09 1938), pp. 209–10Google Scholar; McDonald, N. P., ‘The Axis in South America’, Fortnightly, vol. 151 (1938), pp. 336–43.Google Scholar

For one of the few non-alarmist tracts on the subject, see Rippy, J. Fred, ‘The New Pan Americanism and the Fascist Threat’, in McNicoll, Robert E. and Owre, J. Riis (eds.) Lectures Delivered at the Hispanic American Institute, no. 1 (Coral Gables, 1939).Google Scholar Rippy minimises the fascist threat as well as the Latin Americans' attraction to that ideology.

64 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 9 Feb. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 10 July, 7 Aug., 12 Nov., 10 Dec. 1937. Since 1934 Italian representatives in Lima had written hopefully of Benavides' fascist ‘sympathies’, ‘tendencies’ and ‘orientations’, continuously raising the possibility that Benavides would openly embrace his real ideological inclinations. Such an optimistic picture of the Peruvian president was permanently shattered by Talamo in 1937. In his despatches to Rome he increasingly questioned Benavides' usefulness to fascism and Italy and concluded finally that the president's ‘liberal–democratic background, age, and temperament precluded the possibility’ that he either would or could be a fascist.

65 Davies, and Villanueva, , 300 documentos, p. 24.Google Scholar The authors forcefully argue that the army was never opposed to Benavides and that it supported the president at every turn.

66 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 16 Nov. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 8 Sept. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8; Alcide Fusconi to Ministero dell'Aeronautica, Lima, 23 July 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 11; ‘Peru, Situazione politica nell'anno 1938’, Lima, 4 Apr. 1939 (DGAP) Peru 1939, busta 12; Steinhardt to USSD, Lima, 12 Nov. 1937, file no. 723.65/11.

67 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 9 Feb. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Ciano, Lima, 9 Aug. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 7. Two good examples of Peruvian fascists, according to Talamo, were Riva Agüero and Carlos Arenas Loayza. They, Talamo reported, understood fascism and could be counted on to assist its expansion in Peru. Talamo's remarks on the paucity of real fascists within the Peruvian elite is not shared by Soria, José Ignacio López who in El pensamiento fascista (1930–1945) (Lima, 1981)Google Scholar attaches the fascist label to a rather large segment of the Peruvian elite.

68 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 16 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 28 Aug. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 3.

69 The lack of clear direction was evident even in Brazil where Italy made a major effort in 1937 to extend its influence by supporting the Integralista party. See Seitenfus, Ricardo Silva, ‘Ideology and Diplomacy: Italian Fascism and Brazil (1935–38)’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 64, no. 3 (08 1984), pp. 503–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The author's conclusion is that, unlike Germany and the United States, Italy did not have a well-defined objective in its relations with Brazil.

70 Cassels, Alan, Fascism (Arlington Heights, 1975), pp. 79–80.Google Scholar

71 Haglund, , Latin America, p. 164–202Google Scholar; Faralli to MAE, Lima, 1 Aug. 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9. Faralli suggested to Rome that Italian efforts in Peru should be concentrated on ‘saving whatever was salvageable’. Faralli's pessimism stemmed from his perception of growing United States influence in Peru due largely to its propaganda efforts. The belief that the United States was dominant in Peru had been expressed by Italian representatives in Lima throughout the 1930s. It was also the view often expressed by Italian observers of Latin America – see, for example, Volpe, Gioacchino, ‘Italia e America Latina’ in Mediterraneo orientale, protocolli di Roma. Italia e America Latina. Le notizie prime. Società dele Nazioni (Milan, 1937), pp. 177–92.Google Scholar

72 Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1940, busta 16. Italian ministers in Lima saw Japan and Germany as competitors in Peru not allies. This point was made repeatedly in despatches whose content is summarised in the legation's annual reports on Peru's international relations.

73 Haglund, , Latin America, pp. 164–202Google Scholar; Faralli to MAE, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1940, busta 16. According to Faralli, even among the more democratic sectors of Peruvian public opinion, Italy was not associated with its Axis allies, Germany and Japan – a situation Faralli found embarrassing.

74 Vivero, León de, Avance del imperialismo fascista en el Perú (Mexico D.F., 1938), pp. 11–13, 15–17, 19.Google Scholar

75 Ibid., p. 18.

76 Ibid. The total number of airplanes in the Peruvian arsenal was 110 and they were mostly of Italian, United States, and French make. See Livio Garbaccio to MAE, 4 Apr. 1939, p. 9 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 12.

77 Davies, and Villanueva, , Secretos electorales, pp. 68–72, 73–6, 79–80, 83–4.Google Scholar Haya de la Torre even attempted to engage the Chilean Nazi Party in the struggle against Benavides (pp. 21–4).

78 Ibid. See the document on pp. 21–4 as an example of APRA's efforts to alarm the United States about Benavides' supposed ties to the ‘black international’. Haya also presented himself and the party as supporters of a continent-wide alliance of all democratic forces against totalitarianism. See also Faralli to MAE, 11 Feb. and 10 May 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9. Faralli reported ‘violent attacks’ by the United States ambassador against Italian influence on the Peruvian press.

79 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 14 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937.

80 In the questionnaire to all legations and embassies circulated in 1940 by the Ministero delta Cultura Popolare – the ministry which in 1937 had replaced the MSP – one question enquired about the possibility of fascist success if active propaganda were pursued. The minister in Lima answered that the moment was not propitious for an open propaganda campaign because of the strong ‘ultra-democratic and ultra-nationalistic winds’ blowing across Peru. See Italo Capanni to Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MCP), Lima, 5 May 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1941, busta 17. The experiences of the Japanese community in Peru were a source of concern for the Italians. Throughout the 1930s the anti-Japanese campaign in Peru was fierce, leading to official restrictions on Japanese immigration and commercial activities. For an analysis of the forces behind the campaign see Ciccarelli, Orazio A., ‘The Anti-Japanese Campaign in Peru in the 1930s. A Case of Economic Dependency and Abortive Nationalism’, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism (spring 1982), pp. 113–33.Google Scholar

81 Italian ministers to Peru repeatedly and consistently referred to Benavides as a friend of Italy and admirer of Mussolini although they never labelled him a fascist.

82 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, 1 Sept. 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 12.

83 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 April 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

84 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, 1 July 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 12.

85 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, 1 Sept. 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1938–9, busta 13–15; Faralli to MAE, Lima, 8 Nov. 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 12.

86 Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 9.

87 Faralli to MAE, Lima, 18 March 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9; ‘Peru: situazione politica nell'anno XVII’, pp. 27–8, Quaderno no. 51 (DGAP), Peru 1940, busta 16.

88 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, 31 Aug. 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1938–9, busta 13–15; Capanni to MCP, Lima, 5 May 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1941, busta 17.

89 Faralli to MAE, Lima, 10 March 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 10.

90 Ibid.

91 Capanni to MCP, Lima, 5 May 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1941, busta 17.

92 See Italia Nuova for the years 1939–41. The Biblioteca National in Lima does not have the complete run of this weekly newspaper.

93 Talamo to MAE, Lima 16 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9. Talamo frequently commented on the difficulty of converting Italian institutions to fascism because of the resistance to it by community members.

94 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 5 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 11; Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1940, busta 16.

95 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9.

96 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 10 March 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 11; Garbaccio to MAE, ‘Peru, relazione annuale, 1938’, Rome, 4 April 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 12; Faralli to MAE, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1940, busta 16.

97 Capanni to MAE, Lima, 18 July 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1940, busta 16.

98 Ibid.

99 The curtailing of Italian activities had intensified throughout 1941, although the real target of the restrictive legislation had been Japan. See Minister Capanni's despatches for 1941 and early 1942.