Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dsjbd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T16:43:21.573Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Constitutional Projects for the Division of Powers in Mexico during Iturbide's Empire, 1821–1823

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 August 2014

CATHERINE ANDREWS
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article examines the division of powers established in a number of constitutional projects presented during the First Mexican Empire (1821–3). The essay rejects the idea, present in much recent historiography, that constitutional debate in Mexico was exclusively shaped by the experience of Spanish government. Instead it argues that the empire's politicians drew on a wide range of theories, ideas and examples from other constitutional systems.

Spanish abstract

Este artículo examina la división de poderes establecidos en cierto número de proyectos constitucionales presentados durante el Primer Imperio de México (1821–3). El ensayo rechaza la idea, presentada en mucha de la reciente historiografía, de que el debate constitucional mexicano fue configurado exclusivamente por la experiencia de gobierno español. Más bien, señala, los políticos del Imperio se basaron en un amplio repertorio de teorías, ideas y ejemplos de otros sistemas constitucionales.

Portuguese abstract

Este artigo examina a divisão de poderes estabelecida a partir de diversos projetos constitucionais apresentados durante o Primeiro Império Mexicano (1821–3). O ensaio rejeita a ideia presente em grande parte da historiografia recente de que o debate constitucional no México foi forjado exclusivamente pela experiência do governo espanhol. Argumenta-se, ao contrário, que os políticos do Império apoiavam-se em um amplo espectro de teorias, ideias e exemplos oriundos de outros sistemas constitucionais.

Keywords

Mexican EmpireAgustín de Iturbidemoderate monarchydivision of powersImperio MexicanoAgustín de Iturbidemonarquía moderadadivisión of poderesImpério MexicanoAgustín de Iturbidemonarquia moderadadivisão de poderes
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , November 2014 , pp. 755 - 784
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Exceptions are Barragán, José, Introducción al federalismo: la formación de los poderes en 1824 (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), 1978)Google Scholar; Calvillo, Manuel, La república federal mexicana: gestación y nacimiento (Mexico City: Departamento del Distrito Federal, 1974)Google Scholar; Anna, Timothy, El imperio de Iturbide (Mexico City: Alianza/CONACULTA, 1991)Google Scholar; del Arenal Fenochio, Jaime, Un modo de ser libres: independencia y constitución en México (1816–1822) (Mexico City: El Colegio de Michoacán, 2002)Google Scholar; Ávila, Alfredo, En nombre de la nación: la formación del gobierno representativo en México (Mexico City: CIDE/Taurus, 2002)Google Scholar; and Ávila, Alfredo, Para la libertad: los republicanos en tiempos del imperio, 1821–1823 (Mexico City: UNAM, 2004)Google Scholar.

2 The classic text is Heroles, Jesús Reyes, El liberalismo mexicano, 2 vols. (Mexico City: UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 1958)Google Scholar. Moreover, Reyes Heroles does not even consider the Iturbide period in his discussions of the antecedents of Mexican constitutionalism.

3 The most recent incarnation of this argument is Ivana Frasquet's hypothesis that Iturbide modelled his regime on Napoleon Bonaparte's imperial government. Although Frasquet frames her argument in terms of acceptance/rejection of the Cádiz Constitution, her conclusions do little to question the traditional interpretation of Iturbide as a despot: see Frasquet, Ivana, Las caras del águila: del liberalismo gaditano a la república federal mexicana, 1820–1824 (Castellón: Universitat Jaume I, 2008), p. 249Google Scholar. Frasquet also addresses constitutional ideas during Iturbide's empire in ‘La revolución contenida: la Constitución Imperial de México, 1822’, in Brian Connaughton (ed.), 1750–1850: la independencia de México a la luz de cien años. Problemáticos y desenlaces de una larga transición (Mexico City: UAM-Iztapalapa/Biblioteca Signos, 2010), pp. 417–48.

4 As a result, the republican constitutions of the United States and Latin America are not discussed. The US Constitution was very important in the constitutional debates that followed Iturbide's abdication, but it was only a minor reference point for imperial Mexico: see Andrews, Catherine, ‘Una alternativa para el modelo gaditano: la presencia del pensamiento constitucional anglosajón en México, 1821–1830’, in Rojas, Rafael, Luna, Adriana and Mijangos, Pablo (eds.), De Cádiz al siglo XXI: doscientos años de constitucionalismo en México y Hispanoamérica (1812–2012) (Mexico City: Taurus/CIDE, 2012), pp. 67–122Google Scholar.

5 Brown, Matthew and Paquette, Gabriel, ‘The Persistence of Mutual Influence: Europe and Latin America in the 1820s’, European History Quarterly, 41: 3 (2011), pp. 387–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Paquette, Gabriel, ‘The Dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic Monarchy’, Historical Journal, 52: 1 (2009), pp. 175–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). See also Gargarella, Roberto, The Legal Foundations of Inequality: Constitutionalism in the Americas, 1776–1860 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vanegas, Isidro, El constitucionalismo fundacional (Bogotá: Ediciones Plural, 2012)Google Scholar; and Brown, Matthew and Paquette, Gabriel (eds.), Connections after Colonialism: The Reconfiguration of Relations between Europe and Latin America in the 1820s (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2013)Google Scholar.

6 Antonio J. Valdés, ‘Constitución del imperio o proyecto de organización del poder legislativo por Antonio J. Valdés, individuo de la comisión de constitución de Congreso. México 1822’, in Calvillo, La república, pp. 621–5; ‘Proyecto de constitución presentado a la comisión de ella por uno de sus individuos que la componen’, in Calvillo, La república, pp. 629–48; Maldonado, Francisco Severo, ‘Constitución política de la república mexicana’, in El Fanal del imperio o miscelánea política, extractada y redactada de las mejores fuentes por el autor del Pacto Social, vol. 2 (Mexico City: L. L. H. H. Morán, 1822), pp. 6–180Google Scholar; and José María Couto, ‘Constitución del Imperio Mexicano: proyecto de José María Couto, Valladolid, 8 de enero de 1823’, in Calvillo, La república, pp. 669–74.

7 Bárquera, Juan Wenceslao, Lecciones de política y derecho público para instrucción del pueblo mexicano (Mexico City: UNAM, 1991)Google Scholar; de Lato-Monte, Ludovico, Catecismo de independencia en siete declaraciones por Ludovico Lado-Monte (Mexico City: M. Mariano Ontiveros, 1821)Google Scholar.

8 See Macías, Anna, Génesis del gobierno constitucional en México: 1808–1820 (Mexico City: SepSetentas, 1973)Google Scholar.

9 Rayón, Ignacio, ‘Elementos de la constitución’, in Lemoine, Ernesto, Morelos, su vida revolucionaria a través de sus escritos y de otros testimonios de la época (Mexico City: UNAM, 1965), pp. 219–27Google Scholar.

10 ‘Decreto Constitucional para la libertad de la América Mexicana’, available at www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/conshist/pdf/1814.pdf. All internet references were last checked in July 2014.

11 Anna, El imperio, pp. 13–38.

12 ‘Plan del Sr. Coronel D. Agustín de Iturbide’, art. 3, available at www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/mexico/iguala.html. All translations are my own.

13 ‘Tratados de Córdoba’, available at www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/conshist/pdf/tratcord.pdf.

14 The original members were: Mariano Mendiola, José María Fagoaga, José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, Toribio González, Rafael del Castillo, Francisco Sánchez de Tagle, Juan Ignacio Godoy, José San Martín, Francisco García Cantarines, Ignacio Esteva and Cayetano Ibarra. Membership of the commission was not constant, however. In May 1821, Francisco Argandar, Sebastián Camacho and Antonio José Valdés joined. According to the acts of Congress, Argandar and Camacho were appointed as temporary replacements for absent members. It is not clear whom they replaced. Valdés seems to have been a permanent appointment, but again the acts do not mention whether he was a substitute or a new addition: see Mateos, Juan A., Historia parlamentaria de los congresos mexicanos de 1812 a 1822, vol. 1 (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Legislativas, 1997), pp. 278, 500, 517Google Scholar. Sessions: 1 March, 22 May and 29 May 1822.

15 Mateos, Historia, pp. 886–7. Session: 29 Aug. 1822.

16 This proposal is not considered here as it was explicitly provisional in nature and was not supposed to provide a blueprint for any long-term constitutional project.

17 For more details on Iturbide's government, see Anna, El imperio; and Ávila, Para la libertad.

18 Secondat, Charles, de Montesquieu, Baron (trans. Nugent, Thomas, revised by Prichard, J. V.), The Spirit of Laws (G. Bell & Sons, 1914 [1752])Google Scholar, book 3, ch. 2, available at www.constitution.org/cm/sol.htm.

19 Vile, M. J. C., Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998), p. 14Google Scholar; Rivera, José Antonio Aguilar, En pos de la quimera: reflexiones sobre el experimento constitucional atlántico (Mexico City: FCE/Colmex, 2000), pp. 95–128Google Scholar.

20 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, El contrato social o principios de derecho político (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1987)Google Scholar, book 3, ch. 1, pp. 30–3.

21 Putterman, Ethan, ‘Realism and Reform in Rousseau's Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica’, Political Studies, 49 (2001), pp. 481–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schwartzberg, Melissa, ‘Voting the General Will: Rousseau on Decision Rules’, Political Theory, 36: 3 (2008), pp. 403–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Putterman, Ethan, ‘Rousseau on the People as Legislative Gatekeepers, Not Framers’, American Political Science Review, 99: 1 (2005), pp. 145–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Andrews, Catherine, ‘El proyecto constitucional de Antonio J. Valdés, 1822’, Estudios Jalicienses, 87 (2012), p. 58Google Scholar.

23 Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 195–217. Fernández Sarasola demonstrates that the template for the division of powers in 1812 was the 1791 French Constitution. Spanish liberals tried to disguise this in a variety of ways as ‘a manoeuvre to avoid being accused of following the French model’, due to the unpopularity of France in Spain: see Sarasola, Ignacio Fernández, La Constitución de Cádiz: origen, contenido y proyección internacional (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2011), pp. 164–79Google Scholar.

24 Ibid., p. 162.

25 Ibid., p. 163.

26 Constitución política de la monarquía española, Cádiz 1812 (Mexico City: Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, 2012).

27 Each session lasted two years.

28 ‘Estatuto de Bayona (6 de julio de 1808)’, available at http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/2/804/10.pdf.

29 Sarasola, Ignacio Fernández, ‘La primera constitución española: el estatuto de Bayona’, Revista de Derecho, 26 (2006), pp. 89–109Google Scholar.

30 ‘Charte octroyée’ is a term used in constitutional law to describe a constitution imposed via the governing authority rather than one drawn up by an elected constituent power. The most famous example is the 1814 Napoleonic Constitution; the term is also generally used to describe the Bayonne Statute in Spanish legal history.

31 ‘Sénatus-consulte organique de la Constitution du 16 thermidor an X’, art. 55; and ‘Sénatus-consulte organique du 28 floréal an XII’, arts. 61–7, in Les constitutions de la France depuis 1789, introduction by Jaques Goechot (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1979), pp. 174, 196–7. Morán, David Pantoja discusses the transcendence of Sieyès’ thought in Mexico in El supremo poder conservador: el diseño institucional en las primeras constituciones mexicanas (Mexico City: El Colegio de México/El Colegio de Michoacán, 2005)Google Scholar.

32 Andrews, Catherine, ‘Los primeros proyectos constitucionales en México y su influencia británica (1821–1836)’, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 27: 1 (2011), pp. 12–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pons, André, Blanco White y España (Oviedo: Instituto Feijoo de Estudios del Siglo XVIII/Universidad de Oviedo, 2002) pp. 199–224Google Scholar.

33 Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Lexington, KY: Forgotten Books, 2010), pp. 146–7Google Scholar.

34 Ibid., p. 268.

35 Ibid., p. 154.

36 de Dijn, Annelien, ‘Aristocratic Liberalism in Post-Revolutionary France’, Historical Journal, 48: 3 (2005), pp. 661–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jaume, Lucien, ‘Le libéralisme français après la révolution, comparé au libéralisme anglais’, Historia Constitucional, 4 (2003), pp 383–93Google Scholar; and Laquièze, Alain, ‘Benjamin Constant et l'acte additionnel aux constitutions de l'empire du 22 Avril 1815’, Historia Constitucional, 4 (2003), pp. 197–234Google Scholar.

37 ‘La charte constitutionnelle du 4 juin 1814’ and ‘L'acte additionnel du 22 avril 1815’, in Les constitutions, pp. 217–24; 231–9.

38 Vile, Constitutionalism, p. 226.

39 Ibid., pp. 233–62; Bogdanor, Vernon, The Monarchy and the Constitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 1–41Google Scholar.

40 Constant, Political Writings, pp. 221–4.

41 Ibid., pp. 186–7.

42 This subject is treated at length by Frasquet in Las caras.

43 Mateos, Historia, p. 269.

44 Anna, El imperio.

45 The Supreme Governing Junta had decided that the Constituent Congress should be bicameral but made no special arrangements for the election of a Senate. All members of Congress were to be chosen by the same process, and when Congress convened the representatives should divide themselves in order to form two chambers. In the event, members decided to ignore the Junta's indication and convened a unicameral Constituent Congress.

46 Indicación dirigida por la regencia del Imperio a Su Majestad la Soberana Junta Provisional (Mexico City: Imprenta Imperial de don Alejandro Valdés, 1821) pp. 1–2.

47 Pons, Blanco White, pp. 119–24.

48 Morange, Claude, Una conspiración fallida y una Constitución nonnata (1819) (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2006), pp. 197–301Google Scholar.

49 ‘Proyecto de constitución’, p. 632.

50 Ibid., p. 632. Frasquet argues that this project did not adopt the principle of national sovereignty, but rather imagined a political nation made up only of citizens (Frasquet, ‘La revolución’, p. 427). She bases her argument on arts. 1 and 2: ‘1. The Mexican nation is the society resulting from the aggregate and reunion of the inhabitants of Mexico's territory’; ‘2. This society is the supreme or sovereign authority of the state, in which all citizens participate as its members’. For Frasquet, art. 2 implies a reduction of the membership of the sovereign nation to just citizens. However, it is perfectly possible to interpret art. 2 to mean that only citizens participate in the exercise of sovereignty – that is, having passive and active rights as citizens. This makes more sense in the context of the preamble to the project, which reads: ‘The social pact that is supposed to have been celebrated between society and its members is the first principle from which all the maxims of civil law are derived. The social pact gives the supreme power its dignity, primacy and the right to govern as well as the obligation to ensure the common happiness of the individuals [who have made this pact], since it is supposed that they have given up their natural liberties and subordinated themselves to [the supreme power] with the aim of procuring their prosperity. For the same reason, in virtue of this pact, they [the individuals] also undertake the responsibility to obey and the right to have their tranquillity and well-being respected’ (p. 643).

The author makes a clear distinction between the rights of all inhabitants and the political rights of a citizen. In art. 94 he specifies that ‘Citizens' rights are limited to participating in society's government of which they are perfect members’. While there are echoes of scholastic pactism (affirming that the social pact is made between society and its members) and Catholic theology (society being ‘perfect’) in the author's reasoning, this is no reason to believe that he imagined a sovereign nation made up of anything other than all its inhabitants.

51 Barquera, Lecciones, pp. 161–2.

52 ‘Proyecto de constitución’, p. 632.

53 Frasquet affirms that the Cádiz Constitution did not allow the monarch to propose legislation. As a result she argues that this project gives more power to the emperor than was enjoyed by the Spanish king (Frasquet, ‘La revolución’, pp. 435–6). However, the king was granted this prerogative in Cádiz. The only amplification of the monarch's influence proposed here is the specification that all the government's bills should be discussed (‘Proyecto de constitución’, art. 27, p. 637). It is clear that the project reduces the monarch's powers, not least in terms of the veto. Under Cádiz a legislative project vetoed by the king could not be discussed again until the next session of the Cortes. In this proposal vetoes could be dismissed immediately.

54 Barquera, Lecciones, pp. 113–4.

55 Ibid., pp. 187–8.

56 Barquera did not give details on the requirements of this prerogative, although he noted that it would be important to establish ‘precautions’ to avoid its abuse: ibid., p. 188.

57 Ibid., p. 159.

58 Ibid., pp. 197–200.

59 Ibid., p. 200.

60 Ibid., p. 169.

61 Andrews, ‘Los primeros’, pp. 5–43.

62 Ibid., pp. 55–71.

63 El Sol, no. 2, 8 Dec. 1821, pp. 6–8.

64 El Sol, no. 45, 11 May 1822, pp. 202–4.

65 Lato-Monte, Catecismo, pp. 42–3.

66 Indicación, pp. 1–3.

67 Andrews, ‘El proyecto’, pp. 55–71.

68 A.[ntonio] J.[osé] V.[aldés], República mexicana, Puebla, 26 Oct. 1822 (Mexico City: En la oficina de D. Pedro de la Rosa, Impresor del Gobierno, 1822), p. 41.

69 Valdés, República, p. 40.

70 Ibid., pp. 41–2.

71 Ibid., p. 40.

72 Ibid., p. 41.

73 Art. 27.

74 Andrews, ‘Una alternativa’, pp. 67–122.

75 ‘Constitución política’, pp. 6–180.

76 Maldonado, Francisco Severo, El nuevo pacto social propuesto a la nación española, nos. 1–2 (Guadalajara: Impreso en la oficina de doña Petra Manjarrés y Padilla, 1821)Google Scholar; and El nuevo pacto social propuesto a la nación española, no. 3 (Guadalajara: En la imprenta de Don Mariano Rodríguez, 1821).

77 Maldonado, Francisco Severo, El pacto social de los mexicanos, no. 4 (Guadalajara, 1821)Google Scholar.

78 Maldonado, Francisco Severo, ‘Contrato de Asociación para la República de los Estados Unidos del Anáhuac por un ciudadano del Estado de Xalisco’, in Calvillo, La república, pp. 755–830Google Scholar.

79 Maldonado, Francisco Severo, ‘Bosquejo de un plan de hacienda, capaz de cubrir todos los gastos del servicio público’, El Fanal del Imperio, vol. 1, nos. 7–8, pp. 289–435Google Scholar. Also see ‘Prospecto ó muestra de las incomparables ventajas que este código acarrea a todos los españoles europeos y americanos, sacada de un solo capítulo de los varios que componen el plan de Hacienda nacional’, in El nuevo pacto social propuesto a la nación española, no. 2, pp. 30–92; and Jesús Hernández Jaimes, La utopía antitributaria: el proyecto hacendario de Francisco Severo Maldonado (1822), unpubl. essay, cited with the author's permission.

80 Maldonado, ‘Bosquejo’, p. 396.

81 de Pradt, Dominique-Georges-Frédéric Dufour, L'Europe et l'Amérique depuis le Congrès d'Aix-la-Chapelle (Paris: Chez Béchet Aîné Libraire, 1821), pp. 64–7Google Scholar; Maldonado, ‘Bosquejo’, pp. 396–7.

82 Ibid., p. 398.

83 Maldonado, El nuevo pacto, no. 1, p. 6.

84 Ibid., no. 1, p. 9.

85 Hernández Jaimes, La utopía.

86 Maldonado, ‘Bosquejo’, pp. 404–5.

87 Ibid., pp. 134–8.

88 Ibid., p. 163.

89 ‘Plan for a Sequence of Official Promotions Embracing All Members of the Government’, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Proposed Reformation, 1772, ch. 13, available at www.constitution.org/jjr/poland.htm.

90 El Fanal del Imperio, vol. 2, pp. 166–71.

91 This recalls the powers given to the communes by the 1793 French Constitution (arts. 56–60).

92 Maldonado, El pacto social, p. 163.

93 Ibid., p. 163.

94 Some examples are Rodríguez O., Jaime E., ‘La constitución de 1824 y la formación del estado mexicano’, Historia Mexicana, 40: 3 (1991), pp. 507–35Google Scholar; and El proceso político de la independencia en México (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 1993); Frasquet, Ivana, ‘La “otra” independencia de México: el primer imperio mexicano. Claves para la reflexión histórica’, Revista Complutense de Historia de América, 33 (2007), pp. 35–54Google Scholar; Frasquet, Ivana and Chust, Manuel, La trascendencia del doceañismo en España y América (Castellón: Universitat Jaume I, 2004)Google Scholar; and Chust, Manuel (ed.), 1812. El poder de la palabra: América y la Constitución de 1812 (Barcelona: Acción Cultural Española/Consorcio para la Conmemoración del II Centenario de la Constitución de 1812/Lunwerg Editores, 2012)Google Scholar.

95 Morán, El supremo poder, p. 307.

96 Andrews, Catherine, ‘In the Pursuit of Balance: Lucas Alamán's Proposals for Constitutional Reform (1830–1835)’, Historia Constitucional, 8 (2007), pp. 13–37Google Scholar.

97 Andrews, Catherine, ‘El debate político de la década de 1830 y los orígenes de las Siete Leyes’, in Noriega, Cecilia and Salmerón, Alicia (eds.), México: un siglo de historia constitucional (1808–1917) (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora/Suprema Corte de Justicia, 2009), pp. 119–25Google Scholar.