All law is relatively coarse after its initial implementation as the legislature cannot foresee all contingencies that can arise in the actual application of the law. Therefore, decisions need to be made by street-level administrators as novel and particular circumstances arise. Economists have largely ignored the political science literature on street-level bureaucrats, such as policemen, welfare case managers, or regulatory agents. I present a case study in the context of market entry regulation in Germany. Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that bureaucratic discretion exists, that is, administrative actions can be found on different ends of a decision space, and that its effects are potentially large. Administrators do not apply legislation in a uniform manner and we observe a systematically different application of rules across subnational jurisdictions.

I analyze institutions of prison subculture that mitigate potential violent confrontations among inmates, in contrast to Hobbesian-Zimbardo default spontaneous violence. The games that are relatively rarely played in prison are Chicken and other violent confrontation games. Incoming rookie inmates are subject to initiation tests that allocate them into different subcultural groups, which signals their toughness and disincentivizes fighting. Most experienced inmates develop the eristic skills utilizing prison argot, use informal conflict adjudicators, and fake aggression toward rookies. All inmates form defensive coalitions. Finally, when inmates commit self-injuries, they follow well-rehearsed protocols to minimize the damage to their bodies and to maximize the impression made on the authorities. The secret knowledge of the associated rules, tricks, and cons is passed down over generations of prisoners through informal schooling. The material for this study comes from two Polish prisons, where the author spent 5 months as a political prisoner in 1985.

Several existing studies have documented a negative relationship between firm financial constraint and export activities but do not attempt to examine factors that could attenuate this relationship in Africa. In this paper, we examine the effect of financial constraint on exports in Africa and explore how the level of trust in countries where firms are located shapes this relationship. We combine the World Bank Enterprise Surveys with different measures of country-level personal and interpersonal trust computed from the Afrobarometer surveys of 19 African countries. Our results show that financial constraints negatively affect export activities. However, this negative effect is attenuated for firms that are located in trust-intensive societies. These findings are robust to different specifications. Interestingly, we find that small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa are more likely to be affected by financial constraints but also more likely to benefit from a higher level of both personal and interpersonal trust, while for larger firms only interpersonal trust matters.

We test the effect of institutional quality on capital structure in the microfinance setting. In doing this, we rely on data from 532 microfinance institutions (MFIs) located in 73 countries dotted across the six microfinance regions in the world. We observe that institutional quality exhibits a robust negative and statistically significant relationship with capital structure in both the short and long run, implying that MFIs in countries with a better institutional environment are less likely to utilize more debt. Our moderation analysis furnishes us with evidence that the presence of women on the board of an MFI significantly moderates the relationship between institutional quality and its capital structure. We show that in the presence of more female representation on the boards of MFIs, the tendency of MFIs using less debt is higher.

In this study, we investigate the mediating effect of institutional networking on the relationship between perceived corruption and the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We also examine the moderating impact of financial slack on the relationship between perceived corruption and institutional networking. We test our moderated mediation model using data from 212 SMEs operating in Ghana. The findings from the study show that perceived corruption is positively related to institutional networking and this relationship is amplified when levels of financial slack are greater. The findings also show that institutional networking positively mediates the relationship between perceived corruption and SME growth. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Individualistic values are often presented as promoting economic development; however, their links to relevant behaviour and preferences at the micro-level remain under-explored. Here we investigate the relationship between individualistic values and personal attitudes towards reporting corruption. Unlike much of the previous research which focuses on attitudes towards corruption, we analyse the micro-level mechanisms relating to one's willingness to escape the status quo and act against corruption. We also focus on a region associated with persistently high levels of perceived corruption. Our findings indicate that individualism is associated with a greater likelihood to act against corruption. The effect estimated is small but highly significant and robust to changes in estimators and specifications. We also find evidence that institutional trust and individualism strengthen each other to generate greater willingness to report corruption.

We can all agree that institutions matter, though as to which institutions matter most, and how much any of them matter, the matter is, paraphrasing Douglass North's words at the Nobel podium, unresolved after seven decades of immense effort. We suggest that the obstacle to progress is the paradigm of the New Institutional Economics itself. In this paper, we propose a new theory that is: grounded in institutions as coevolving sources of economic growth rather than as rules constraining growth; and deployed in dynamical systems theory rather than game theory. We show that with our approach some long-standing problems are resolved, in particular, the paradoxical and perplexingly pervasive influence of informal constraints on the long-run character of economies.

This scoping paper addresses the role of financial institutions in empowering the British Industrial Revolution. Prominent economic historians have argued that investment was largely funded out of savings or profits, or by borrowing from family or friends: hence financial institutions played a minor role. But this claim sits uneasily with later evidence from other countries that effective financial institutions have mattered a great deal for economic development. How can this mismatch be explained? Despite numerous technological innovations, from 1760 to 1820 industrial growth was surprisingly low. Could the underdevelopment of financial institutions have held back growth? There is relatively little data to help evaluate this hypothesis. More research is required on the historical development of institutions that enabled finance to be raised. This would include the use of property as collateral. This paper sketches the evolution of British financial institutions before 1820 and makes suggestions for further empirical research. Research in this direction should enhance our understanding of the British Industrial Revolution and of the preconditions of economic development in other countries.

Economic history has recently emphasised the impact of economic shrinking on long-term economic growth, but economic theories do not provide explanations for how and why some countries avoid economic shrinking. In this case study of institutional change in post-independence Indonesia, we examine how the country managed to reduce the frequency of shrinking during the authoritarian regime and beyond. We argue that the state's autonomy, measured by macroeconomic policymaking, and accountability, measured by food security, were two key social capabilities that enabled Indonesia to reduce the frequency of economic shrinking. During this period, the ‘doorstep conditions’ for the transition into a democracy and stable economic growth emerged. More specifically, Indonesia managed to diversify its revenue base and make public resources more available for the broader common good. Loosening the connection between macroeconomic policymaking and elites opened up greater opportunities for the emergence of private enterprises. However, to date, the country is still far from a full-fledged open access society.

We develop a theory of state formation shedding light on the rise of the first stable state institutions in Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Our analysis suggests that the mix of adverse production conditions and unforeseen innovations pushed groups favored by old technologies to establish the state by granting political and property rights to powerless individuals endowed with new and complementary skills. Through these reforms, the elite convinced the nonelite that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public spending and, thus, to cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation. Different from the main alternative theories, we stress that: (1) group formation is heavily shaped by unforeseen shocks to the returns on both risk-sharing and innovation; (2) complementarity in group-specific skills, and not violence, is key determinant of state formation; (3) military, merchant and, especially, religious ranks favored state formation and culture accumulation.

Does inequality affect outcomes? To answer, we use the microcosm of Olympic competitions by asking whether a country's level of inequality diminishes its performance. If it does, is it conditional on institutional factors? We argue that the ability of economically free societies to win medals will not be affected by inequality. In these societies, institutions generate incentives to invest in the talents of individuals at the bottom of the income distribution (potential athletes otherwise constrained in the ability to expend resources on training). These effects mitigate those of inequality. The incentives that promote investments in skills across the income distribution are weaker in unfree societies and they cannot mitigate the effects of inequality. Using the Olympics of 2016 in combination with the Economic Freedom data, we find that inequality only matters in determining medal numbers for unfree countries. We link these results to inequality and its effects on economic outcomes.

Corruption is widely believed to have an adverse effect on the economic performance of a country. However, many East-and-Southeast-Asian countries either achieved or currently are achieving impressively rapid economic growth despite widespread corruption – the so-called East-Asian-Paradox. A common feature of these countries was that they were autocracies. We re-examine the corruption-growth relationship, in light of the East-Asian-Paradox. We examine the role of political regimes, in mediating corruption–growth relationship using panel data over 100 countries for the period 1984–2016. We find clear evidence that corruption–growth relationship differs by the type of political regime, and the growth-enhancing effect of corruption is more likely in autocracies than in democracies. The marginal effect analysis shows that in strongly autocratic countries, higher corruption may lead to significantly higher growth, while this is not the case in democracies. Alternatively, democracy is not good for growth if there is a high level of perceived corruption. We provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism by which corruption is growth-enhancing in autocracies is through the perceived credibility of the commitment of ruling political elites to economic freedom, thereby providing confidence to the firms to invest, leading to long-term growth.

This contribution commemorates Geert Hofstede, who recently passed away, as a pioneer in the study of culture and institutions. It does so by touching on some of the details of his personal life and connecting these with his professional career. The latter was devoted to developing the paradigm of national cultures based on empirical analysis, and to relate it to organisational behaviour. Closer scrutiny reveals that four distinct phases may be identified. Hofstede first started as an ‘undercover’ engineer and next moved to social psychology. During the second phase, he developed the first four dimensions of natural culture. During the third, Hofstede connected these national dimensions to organisational ones. During the last, he added two new cultural dimensions and developed additional practical applications. Finally, the article considers the reception, criticism, and further elaborations of Hofstede's contributions.

For some 25 years in revolutionary Haiti, most of the productive land was nationalized and run as state property. This paper shows that this economic system can be accurately described as agrarian socialism. Its life and death are compared with the experiences of 20th-century socialist regimes and their transition to a market economy, paying special attention to the kindred case of São Tomé. Haitian socialism is interesting because it was the unintended, accidental product of an emergency situation: the killing or flight of all the French landlords, which made their land vacant property and drove the state to run it in the public interest to defend the revolution. Therefore, it can be read as a natural experiment in socialism in the absence of a socialist ideology and of a socialist party that could hold the system together, constrain its income distribution, and control its eventual privatization.

The role of citizens' collective action for the emergence and consolidation of democracy is generally analysed within bottom-up theories. However, top-down theories show that elites might impede or promote both democracy and collective action through a set of strategies which are often unobserved and vary over time. Democratic persistence and change require then to be assessed in a dynamic framework which considers both citizens and elites' strategies. For such reason, on a large sample of countries in the period 1971–2014, we jointly estimate the probability of collective action and democracy using a Structural Dynamic Model. This allows us to account for the dynamic nature of the two political phenomena under investigation by controlling for their persistence, for initial conditions and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. We find that collective action matters for the emergence of democracy but not for its consolidation which seems to be related to more structural economic factors.

I investigate the historical development of limited liability – widely considered a cornerstone of the business corporation – and challenge the commonplace linear narratives about how limited liability evolved. I dismiss the claim that limited liability was invented with the very first joint-stock business corporations around 1600. I also reject the assertion that it became dominant with the limited liability acts of the mid-19th century. My argument is that it was only around 1800 that limited liability became a separate corporate attribute, distinct from legal personality, and that limited liability in the modern sense became a uniform attribute of all corporations only in the 20th century. Since corporations, stock markets and the corporate economy enjoyed a long and prosperous history well before limited liability in its modern sense became established and dominant, the economic theory of limited liability needs to be revisited. The paper opens a new set of conceptual, empirical and theoretical research questions, and points to new possibilities in terms of viable future liability regimes.

Little has contributed more to the emergence of today's world of financial globalization than the setup of the international monetary system. In its current shape, it has a hierarchical structure with the US-Dollar (USD) at the top and various other monetary areas forming a multilayered periphery to it. A key feature of the system is the creation of USD offshore – a feature that in the 1950s and 60s developed in co-evolution with the Bretton Woods System and in the 1970s replaced it. Since the 2007–9 Financial Crisis, this ‘Offshore US-Dollar System’ has been backstopped by the Federal Reserve's network of swap lines which are extended to other key central banks. This systemic evolution may continue in the decades to come, but other systemic arrangements are possible as well and have historical precedents. This article discusses four trajectories that would lead to different setups of the international monetary system by 2040, taking into account how its hierarchical structure and the role of offshore credit money creation may evolve. In addition to a continuation of USD hegemony, we present the emergence of competing monetary blocs, the formation of an international monetary federation and the disintegration into an international monetary anarchy.

This paper examines two potential mechanisms – access to credit and reduction in relational risks – through which social trust can affect R&D investments. Social trust can increase R&D investments by expanding firms' access to external finance with which they can use to fund promising R&D projects. It can also increase R&D investments by reducing relational risks that expose firms to ex-ante and ex-post holdups or expropriation risks. Using industry-level data on R&D investment intensities in 20 OECD countries, I test these mechanisms by evaluating whether more external finance dependent and relational risk vulnerable industries exhibit disproportional higher R&D investment intensities in trust intensive countries. The results indicate that external finance dependent industries and relational risks vulnerable industries experience relatively higher R&D investment intensities in trust-intensive countries. Therefore, the results underline access to external finance and reduction in relational risks as causal pathways linking social trust and R&D investments.

This paper introduces the notion of ‘cognitive’ institution and discusses its relevance to institutional economics. Cognitive institutions are conceptually founded on the philosophy of mind notion of extended mind, broadened to also include the distinctly social, institutional, and normative dimensions. Cognitive institutions are defined as institutions that not just allow agents to perform certain cognitive processes in the social domain but, more importantly, without which some of the agents' cognitive processes would not exist or even be possible. The externalist point of view of the extended mind has already had some influence in institutional economics: Arthur Denzau and Douglass North first introduced the notion of institution understood in terms of ‘shared mental models’, and relatedly philosopher Andy Clark introduced the notion of ‘scaffolding institution’. We discuss shared mental models and scaffolding institutions and go a step further by showing that the notion of cognitive institution can capture more fundamental and salient aspects of economic institutions. In particular, we focus on the market as an economic cognitive institution.