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Property, predation and socialist reality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2019

Peter J. Boettke
Peter J. Boettke*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, George Mason University, MSN 1A1, Fairfax, VA22030, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Economics as a social science is about exchange and the institutions within which exchange relationships are formed and transactions are executed. Yoram Barzel's contribution to economics and political economy reflect this focus on exchange and institutions. In this paper, I will sketch a theory of real-existing socialist economies from a property rights/public choice perspective. Then I present the puzzles in political economy that such a system confronted in attempting to create a prosperous, regenerating and competitive economic system. I then conclude with a short discussion of the future for a progressive research program in political economy that takes institutional change seriously.

Keywords

Yoram Barzelsocialismproperty rights
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 16 , Special Issue 2: Honour of Yoram Barzel , April 2020 , pp. 185 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2019

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