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Liberalism after Burczak: redistribution, worker self-management and the market process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 August 2010

DAVID EMANUEL ANDERSSON
DAVID EMANUEL ANDERSSON*
Affiliation:
Institute of Public Affairs Management, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

In Socialism after Hayek, Theodore Burczak uses Hayekian insights to argue in favor of a socialist society with real markets, but also with wealth redistribution and prohibition of wage labor. In so doing, he offers not only a socialist vision but also asks questions that may challenge Hayekian liberals to reformulate their institutional analyses. A critical assessment that combines Austrian and institutional theories leads to the conclusion that some redistributive policies may enhance the knowledge-disseminating function of markets, but that a market order that is limited to worker-managed firms diminishes the knowledge dissemination properties of the market process.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , December 2010 , pp. 529 - 542
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2010

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