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Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2007

MASAHIKO AOKI
MASAHIKO AOKI*
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Abstract:

This paper proposes an analytical-cum-conceptual framework for understanding the nature of institutions as well as their changes. First, it proposes a new definition of institution based on the notion of common knowledge regarding self-sustaining features of social interactions with a hope to integrate various disciplinary approaches to institutions and their changes. Second, it specifies some generic mechanisms of institutional coherence and change – overlapping social embeddedness, Schumpeterian innovation in bundling games, and dynamic institutional complementarities – useful for understanding the dynamic interactions of economic, political, social, organizational, and cognitive factors.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , April 2007 , pp. 1 - 31
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2006

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