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The close relation between organization theory and Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economics: a theory of the firm perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 August 2010

BERNARD BAUDRY  and
VIRGILE CHASSAGNON
BERNARD BAUDRY
Affiliation:
University of Lyon, Department of Economics (LEFI), France
VIRGILE CHASSAGNON*
Affiliation:
University of Lyon, Department of Economics (LEFI), France
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

This article deals with the contribution of organization theory to transaction cost economics from an examination of Williamson's theory of the firm. Borrowing and applying some conclusions of organization theory, Williamson rightly differs from other theories of the firm, particularly in his analysis of hierarchical authority, intra-firm conflicts, organizational atmosphere, and the farsighted contracting. Having shed light on the complementary and divergent thoughts of these two different disciplinary approaches to the firm, the article recalls Williamson's project of building a ‘science of organization’.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , December 2010 , pp. 477 - 503
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2010

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