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Watch out for words: the wording of constitutions and constitutional compliance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2024

Jacek Lewkowicz Open the ORCID record for Jacek Lewkowicz [Opens in a new window] ,
Jan Fałkowski ,
Zimin Luo  and
Olga Marut
Jacek Lewkowicz*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Jan Fałkowski
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Zimin Luo
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Olga Marut
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
*
Corresponding author: Jacek Lewkowicz; Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In recent times, the economic and social relevance of constitutions and potential determinants of their validity have been increasingly debated. However, we still know little about the relationships between the text of a constitution and constitutional compliance. Does the wording of a constitution matter in this context? In this paper, drawing on a sample of democratic countries, we apply econometric and machine learning tools to provide some insights on these issues. The results suggest that shorter texts and placing more emphasis on punishments for transgressions seem to be positively correlated with the compliance level. Regarding the precision of constitutional text, in turn, we find mixed evidence. Econometric modelling suggests no statistically significant relationship with constitutional compliance, and machine learning models instead indicate this feature as a potentially important determinant of constitutional compliance.

Keywords

constitutional complianceconstitutionseconometricsinstitutional economicslaw & economicsmachine learningtext mining
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 20 , 2024 , e35
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Millennium Economics Ltd.

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