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How to measure informal institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2017

STEFAN VOIGT
STEFAN VOIGT*
Affiliation:
Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

There have been repeated claims that informal institutions play an important or even crucial role in economic development. Yet measuring informal institutions entails serious challenges. This paper identifies the difficulties in measuring informal institutions, critically discusses some attempts hitherto taken and encourages the more intensive use of experiments to measure them.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , February 2018 , pp. 1 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2017 

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