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The So-Called Koine Eirene of 346 B.C.1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

G. T. Griffith
G. T. Griffith
Affiliation:
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge
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Extract

It was inevitable that somebody should suggest a Koine Eirene in the year 346 B.C. True, no ancient document or author records one. But these two words were much in the mouths of Greek statesmen in the 4th century, and much valuable work has been done on the subject in recent years. Indeed it is an interesting comment on the history of our own times that it has been reserved for the present generation of historical writers to reconstruct and understand the chapter in Greek experience which these words represent. It is probably true to say that few Greeks in the 5th century (or even earlier) regarded war as anything but a bad thing; but on the Greeks of the 4th century the greatest war of their history had left its mark without leaving an immunity from further visitations of the same disease, and as a result responsible statesmen (and not merely ordinary men and women) were now agreed that war was a very bad thing, to be preferred, in fact, only to a worse thing still, namely (for small states) to loss of autonomy, and (for the great states) to a fatal loss of prestige. The visible outcome of these feelings was a new kind of peace, Koine Eirene.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 59 , Issue 1 , 1939 , pp. 71 - 79
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1939

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References

2 For the whole literature, see Wüst, especially pp. 20 and 177. For the present question (the Peace of 346) the most important works are F. Täger, Der Friede von 362–1 (reviewed by Berve, H. in Gnomon, 1933, pp. 301sqq.Google Scholar): Momigliano, A. in Riv. Fil. Class. xii, 1934, pp. 482sqq.Google Scholar, and Filippo il Macedone, p. 122: de Sanctis, G., Riv. Fil. Class. xii, 1934, especially p. 150Google Scholar: Hampl, F., Die griechischen Staatsverträge des 4 Jahrhunderts, especially pp. 56sqq.Google Scholar

3 Diod. xvi, 60, 3 (quoted below).

4 This has been well shown by Wüst, pp. 21 sq.: see especially Aeschines iii, 69 sqq.; Demosth. xviii, 22.

5 Hampl, op. cit. pp. 64 sq.; Wüst pp. 177 sq. (a reply to Hampl).

6 [Demosth.] vii, 30 sqq.

7 Syll. 3 224 (request by Messene and Megalopolis to be granted membership of the Amphictyony); [Demosth.] xii, 6, cf. Philochorus apud Didymum viii. 5 sqq., and Diod. xvi. 441. These points are cleverly made by Wüst (pp. 25 sq. and 29 sqq.), but in my view, though the passages make sense by his interpretation, they present, equally, not the slightest difficulty to an interpretation assuming no K.E. in existence.

8 [Demosth.] vii, 30 sq. shows Athens still, in 343, trying to ‘improve’ the Peace of 346 by expanding it into a K.E.: this Hampl recognises as a decisive argument against there being a K.E. already in existence. Wüst, however (pp. 76 sq. and 178), seems to argue that Athens is now in 343 proposing an alternative K.E. to one already existing, the object being to achieve a K.E. under Athenian auspices or leadership, and not under Philip's (the Amphictyony). This argument seems to me to show a misunderstanding both of the nature of K.E. in general and of the political situation in the years 346–3.

9 Cf. Diod. xv. 38. 1 sq. (375–4 B.C.)—.

Cf. Diod. xv. 50. 4 (371)— (cf. 51. 1).

Cf. Diod. xv. 70. 2 (369)—(the K.E. did not materialise).

Cf. Diod. xv. 76. 3 (366)— (for criticism, see Hampl pp. 62 sqq.).

Cf. Diod. xv. 89. 1 (362–1)— It is, surely, impossible not to see a difference between these passages and the passage referring to the settlement of 346, and in the circumstances Wüst's treatment of the matter seems to me a trifle disingenuous—‘Leider ist der Bericht über dieselbe bei Diodor sehr knapp wie übrigens auch die übrigen Berichte Diodors vom Abschluss einer κοινὴ εἰρήνη’ (p. 22). Diodorus says nothing at all of the establishment of the K.E. of 338–7, but that is because he loses it in the more spectacular συμμαχία directed against Persia which was concluded very soon afterwards (if not simultaneously): cf. Diod. xvi. 89. 1 sqq., and (especially) Wilcken, U. in S.B. Berlin 1927Google Scholar, and Schwahn, W., Heeresmatrikel und Landfriede pp. 36sqq.Google Scholar

10 The Amphictyons were probably still in session at Delphi when the speech was delivered (Demosth. v. 14). That it was delivered, nobody now doubts, though Libanius doubted it (Demosth. v. ὑπόθεσις), on the ground that in a later speech (xix. 111) Demosthenes accused Aeschines of having been on this occasion the only speaker to speak in favour of agreeing to Philip's election to the Amphictyony. The contradiction is more apparent than real, because Demosthenes in his speech ‘on the Peace’ never says a word in favour of electing Philip, he merely shows himself clearly in favour of avoiding war. The implication, of course, is that the Athenians must agree to the election; but it remains an implication throughout, most probably because Demosthenes was already collecting stones to throw at his adversaries and had no intention of preparing a house of glass for himself.

11 Libanius, ὑπόθεσις to Demosth. v; Demosth. xix. 132, etc.; cf. Dion. Hal. Epist. ad Amm. i. 10, 737.

12 It seems clearly implied in the ὑπόθεσις that Athens was not represented at this meeting: had she been represented, there would have been no occasion for the Council to send its own representatives to Athens with this request. The intervention of Aeschines on behalf of the Phocians does not convince me that he was a member of an Athenian embassy accredited to the Council (see Wüst, p. 15).

On these events Wüst's chronological table (p. 181) is far from satisfactory: he has ‘telescoped’ too many things into this summer of 346, perhaps owing to his mistaken belief that the month Hecatombaeon is June–July (sic), and therefore, presumably, that the month Skirophorion, in which we have several fixed dates, is May–June. There is, in reality, not much time for the arrangement and ratification of a K.E., which was not as simple a matter as Wüst seems to suppose (he allows it a bare month). The date of Philip's entry into Phocis is certainly mid-July (Demosth. xix. 59 sq.), and one may suppose that the Amphictyonic Council would begin its sessions by the end of July (Diod. xvi. 59. 4—the Council had to be summoned). Demosthenes ‘Concerning the Peace’ cannot be dated with accuracy. My own impression is that it was delivered in August, before the Pythian Festival in which Athens took no part, an omission which cannot have pleased Philip and might well have been mentioned, if it had already occurred, by Demosthenes in this speech (e.g., at § 19); but I am aware that this argument is not a very strong one. But even if it was delivered as late as the end of September (so Wüst), two months is not a generous allowance for the arrangement and ratification of a K.E. My own position, however, is not altered if one argues that the K.E. might be under discussion but not yet ratified when this speech was delivered: my contention is, that in this speech we must expect Demosthenes to refer intelligibly to the project of a K.E., whether completed or not, if it existed at all.

13 Libanius and Demosthenes: see note 11.

14 Concerning the Peace, 14 and 19.

15 Id. 16; cf. 14 sq. for another hypothetical case of the same kind, that of a war between Athens and Philip.

16 Momigliano and Wüst assume the existence of such a clause.

386 B.C. (‘King's Peace’)—there is no evidence for the obligations of Greek cities, but the King of Persia guarantees the Peace by implication (see Hampl. pp. 8 sqq.).

375–4—the clause has been deduced, with certainty as it seems to me, by Hampl p. 17.

371—Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 1 sqq.

362–1—implied in Syll. 3 182 (hypothetical case of aggression by Persia).

338–7—Syll. 3 260.

Add [Demosth.] vii. 30, for this clause in the abortive Athenian proposals of 343.

17 Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 18; cf. Hampl, p. 17.

18 Op. cit. 19: he enumerates Argos, Messene, Megalopolis and ‘some of the other Peloponnesians’; Thebes, Thessaly, and Philip.

19 See above, note 12.

20 Id. 25.

21 Hyperides v. col. 31.

22 Wüst, pp. 21 sq. Athens was still anxious for a K.E. in 343 ([Demosth.] vii. 30 sqq.). I have already mentioned (note 8) that Wüst's interpretation of this passage does not convince me in the least. For a correct interpretation, see Hampl, p. 65

23 Hampl, p. 65, note 1, believes that it was not even, technically, a ‘Peace’ at all: ‘die amphiktyonischen Kriege nur Strafexpeditionen waren und dementsprechend nur durch ein Strafgericht, nicht durch einen “Friedensschluss” beendet wurden.’ This view seems to me legalistic almost to the point of being ridiculous. To call the Phocian War, a major war lasting ten years, a punitive expedition, or even a series of punitive expeditions, is worthy of certain modern schools of diplomats. There can be no doubt that everybody in Greece called the settlement of 346 at Delphi εἰρήνη, just as ordinary people in the near future will call the settlement that ends the present war in China ‘Peace,’ whatever Japanese politicians may call it.

24 E.g., the ‘King's Peace’ of 386, which worked in favour of Sparta, but was a hindrance limiting the revival of Athens as a ‘great power,’ as her well-known Treaty with Chios shows (Syll. 3 142; especially lines 20 ff.). Similarly, the K.E. of 371 after Leuctra was clearly designed to prevent the ‘landslide’ in the Peloponnese which did take place when the Theban invasion took place: I hope to be able to throw more light on this question in a future article.

25 Diod. xvi. 60. 5, probably from Theopompus; but the name of Theopompus does not make the statement immune from criticism, since Theopompus is no less liable than another to a judgment post eventum.

26 Isocrates v, passim: and the ideas expressed here are new only in their application to Philip.

27 See Demosth. xix, 132 for a good summary of Athenian dissatisfaction with the settlement of 346 and hostility to Philip at this time.

28 My thanks are due to Mr. N. G. L. Hammond for reading this article in proof and making some very helpful suggestions.