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The import of Attic pottery to Corinth and the question of trade during the Peloponnesian war

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2013

Brian R. MacDonald
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Extract

Throughout the Peloponnesian War, no state remained as aggressively hostile toward Athens as Corinth. Following the affairs of Corcyra and Poteidaia, Corinth successfully argued that war be declared against Athens. After ten years of fighting, when Sparta agreed to the Peace of Nikias, Corinth refused to accept its terms and make peace with Athens. We know that Corinth and Athens were directly engaged in hostilities in 419 and 416 and were on opposing sides in the fighting between Epidauros and Argos in 418. After Athens sent forces against Sicily in the summer of 415, Corinth voted independently to support Syracuse and encouraged Sparta to increase hostilities against Athens in both Greece and Sicily. When the Peloponnesian War came to an end in 404 with the final Athenian defeat, Corinth continued to oppose peace with Athens and urged that the city be destroyed.

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Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 102 , November 1982 , pp. 113 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1982

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References

1 Thuc. v 17.2, 52.2, 115.3, 57.2. For Corinth's role in the battle of Mantineia in 418, see Thuc. v 75.2. The only official communication between Corinth and Athens during this period occurred in the summer of 421 when Corinthian envoys went to Athens to ask for a special truce, but their request was rejected (Thuc. v 32.5–6).

2 Thuc. vi 88.7–8.

3 Xen., Hell. ii 2.19Google Scholar.

4 Palmer, H. in Blegen, C., Young, R. S., and Palmer, H., Corinth xiii: The North Cemetery (Princeton 1964) 121Google Scholar.

5 Luce, S. B., AJA xxxiv (1930) 341Google Scholar.

6 Eliot, C. W. J. and Eliot, M., Hesperia xxxvii (1968) 347Google Scholar.

7 Herbert, S., Corinth vii Pt iv: The Red-figure Pottery (Princeton 1977) 4Google Scholar. Similarly, when Attic pottery dating to the war years is found at the Corinthian sanctuary of Perachora, Corbett, P., Perachora ii (Oxford 1962) 350Google Scholar, claims ‘it is not evidence for direct trade between Athens and Perachora' but only represents the gear of travelers, although the presence of some shapes such as kraters, jugs, and squat lekythoi suggests otherwise.

8 Corinth xiii, graves 259–63Google Scholar, 265–9, 271, 272, 273 (?), 274–302, 304–8, 320–47, 349, 351–5, 358–60, and deposits D7–D10, D47.

9 See Thuc. i 103.4.

10 Corinth xiii, graves 322–47Google Scholar, 349, 351–5, 358–60.

11 Corinth xiii, graves 348Google Scholar, 350, 356, 357, 361–74, 378–433, 435, 436, 438, and deposits D11–D22, D48–D51.

12 de Ste Croix, G. E. M., The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London/Ithaca 1972) 213Google Scholar, claims Megara's realignment with the Peloponnesian states in 446 marks a new phase in Corinthian–Athenian relations, a period ‘if not of friendliness, at least of indifference and neutrality’ (attested by Thuc. i 40.5).

13 Corinth xiii 152Google Scholar. Attic red-figure is also rare in the cemetery of Rhitsona in Boiotia: two cups (ARV 2 140, 381) have been excavated, both from grave 22. But unlike Corinth's North Cemetery, Attic pottery was never popular at Rhitsona during the fifth century. In graves 131, 22, 22a, 21, 113, 46, and 36 of the early fifth century, Attic imports, primarily black-figured lekythoi and skyphoi, represent less than 15% of the pottery offered. A few pots continued to be imported (see graves 52, 108, 76, 139) until the black-figured style came to an end in Athens; at that time local potters began producing their own black-figured imitations. Originally A. D. Ure suggested that introduction of this local ware was caused by a cessation of imports from Athens after the Peloponnesian War began, but noted later that the imitations began earlier than the war and came in response to changes in Athenian pottery, not politics; see BSA xli (1940–1945) 26Google Scholar. The most popular offering by far in Rhitsona's fifth-century graves was the local black-glazed kantharos, a shape not favored by contemporary Attic potters; see Sparkes, B. and Talcott, L., Athenian Agora xii (Princeton 1970) 113–17Google Scholar. For a bibliography of the Rhitsona graves, see Sparkes, , JHS lxxxvii (1967) 129–30Google Scholar.

14 Corinth xiii 120Google Scholar.

15 Corinth xiii 121Google Scholar. For earlier experiments in a white-ground style, see Pemberton, E., Archaeol. xxxi (1978) 27–33Google Scholar.

16 Corinth xiii 120Google Scholar.

17 Attic imports that can be dated between 445 and 430 include seven lekythoi, three skyphoi, one krater, and a miniature bowl (Corinth xiii, nos 356–5, 357–10, 361–6, 381–2, D11–c, D11–d, D11–e, D11–f, D11–g, D12–i, D13–C, D19–d). Palmer's historical analysis suggests that she would include in this group six lekythoi and one skyphos from three graves that she dates to ‘the third quarter of the fifth century’, but her discussion of the contents of graves 362, 363, and 364 permits a dating in the final years of the third quarter, as noted below, suggesting that the Attic pots may have been imported during the war years.

18 Corinth xiii 121Google Scholar.

19 Schilardi, D. U., The Thespian Polyandrion (424 B.C.) (Diss. Princeton 1977) 137, nos 34 and 35Google Scholar.

20 Corinth xiii, nos 365–6, 399–4, 403–8, 404–6, 404–7, 409–12, 418–14, 421–3, 422–13, 426–17, and 426–18Google Scholar.

21 Compare the rounded skyphos, Corinth xiii, no. 362–2Google Scholar, with other skyphoi, nos 367–6, 367–7, and 395–5.

22 Corinth xiii 138Google Scholar.

23 Palmer, , Corinth xiiiGoogle Scholar, compares no. 364–7 to the group VI skyphoi, nos 7 and 9, catalogued by Howard, S. and Johnson, F. P., AJA lviii (1954) 206Google Scholar.

24 For the skyphos and oinochoe, nos 364–5 and 364-6, see the comments of Palmer, , Corinth xiii 125–6, 238–9.Google Scholar

25 Hesperia xxxvii (1968) 345–67, nos 56, 57Google Scholar.

26 Ibid., no. 58. Herbert, , Corinth vii Pt iv, 16 n. 24Google Scholar, also prefers a date in ‘the last quarter of the 5th century’.

27 Corinth vii Pt iv, 16 n. 24Google Scholar, C-32-26 and C-32-142.

28 Shoe, L., Hesperia i (1932) 56–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar, nos MP93 (ARV 2 1245), MP113, MP125.

29 ARV 2 1375 and 1379.

30 Graves at Olynthos have produced a few Attic pots dating before and during the war; see Robinson, D. M., Excavations at Olynthus v (Baltimore 1933) nos 132Google Scholar, 152 (ARV 2 1401), 249 (ARV 2 1203), 250. Graves at Tegea have produced a more significant amount of Attic pottery dating throughout the last third of the fifth century, although here comparative material predating the war is absent; see Dugas, C., BCH li (1927) 320–44Google Scholar, with ARV 2 1325 and 1365, and Agora xii 94–6, 170–1Google Scholar, and 100 n. 3. Attic pottery was also found in the state burial for those Thespians slaughtered by the Athenians at Delion in 424 (Thuc. iv 96.3). Like the other grave goods, the various Attic imports can be dated to the decade or so before the burial and no wartime break is apparent (Schilardi, Thespian Polyandrion, nos 36, 70, 321, 356, 357, 380, perhaps 358 and 359); three kylikes (nos 130–2) may be imports from another enemy state, Euboia. In addition, Boiotian copies show familiarity with Attic pottery in the years just before the war—a Polygnotan-style krater and lekythoi imitating the Achilles Painter's work; and in the war's first decade—a pyxis imitating the Washing Painter's style, white-ground lekythoi, and black-glazed cup-skyphoi (nos 1, 8–10, and 37, 30–2, 169–71). However, like the grave goods at Rhitsona, the Attic or Attic-inspired pottery represents a small fraction of the total, and the most common offering is again the local black-glazed kantharos.

31 Graves at Halicis, for example, a state that switched sides and accepted an Athenian garrison for part of the war beginning in 424/3 (IG i3 75), have produced Attic pottery dating throughout the fifth century; see Dengate, C., ADelt xxxi (1976) 274–324Google Scholar. It is also difficult to correlate pottery imports with the sporadic periods of hostilities in the West. We can note, however, the continued presence of Attic pottery throughout the second half of the fifth century, irrespective of the political situation, in the cemetery of Vassallaggi, an inland site approached through Sicily's southern coast; see Orlandini, P., Vassallaggi. Scavi 1960, i: La necropoli meridionale, NSc suppl. xxv (1971)Google Scholar.

32 Pease, M. Z., Hesperia vi (1937) 257–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar, hereafter Pease.

33 Pease, nos 17 (ARV 2 1017); 10 and 14 (ARV 2 1025); and 6, 18, and 20.

34 Pease believes an Attic-type skyphos, no. 28, is taller and thinner than examples of the third quarter of the fifth century and signals the changes that are to take place in the shape toward the end of the century. A Corinthian-type skyphos from the well, no. 37, compares with one from the Athenian agora dated around 425 (Agora xii, no. 320).

35 Pease, nos 61 (with Agora xii, no. 228) and 54.

36 Pease, nos 40–4, compares their decoration with a Rheneia cup (Agora xii, no. 463) dated around 425; for the shape, see Agora xii, no. 541, dated around 420.

37 Pease, nos 53, 48, and 64, compares the shape of the low bowl with a salt cellar from Athens (Agora xii, no. 913), the latter dated from 430 to 400; bowls with a ring foot and similar underside decoration, such as Agora xii, no. 871, have a similar dating range. And Pease compares the mug to one found on Rhodes in a context dating to about 400.

38 As noted by Herbert, , Corinth vii Pt iv, 17–18Google Scholar: ‘many of the Attic vases date to the decade 430–420 … in spite of the Peloponnesian War, Attic pottery was still being imported in some quantity’.

39 The Suessula Painter's emigration to Corinth parallels the movements of other Attic-trained potters who left Athens to establish pottery schools elsewhere during the late fifth century; see MacDonald, B. R., AJA lxxxv (1981) 162–3Google Scholar.

40 Morgan, C. H., AJA xli (1937) 547–8Google Scholar and fig. 11. Herbert, , Corinth vii Pt iv, 18Google Scholar, discusses four late fifth century skyphoi and Beazley, J. D., BSA xli (1940–1945) 17Google Scholar, has catalogued a squat lekythos from this largely unpublished well.

41 Herbert, , Corinth vii Pt iv, 3Google Scholar.

42 Boulter, C. G. and Bentz, J. L., Hesperia xlix (1980) 295–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar, nos 31 (ARV 2 1095), 32 (ARV 2 1095), 33 (Para. 459), 34, and 35 (Para. 477); McPhee, I. D., Hesperia xlv (1976) 380–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, nos 2, 6, 7, 21,23,29, 36, 41, 46; and Hesperia l (1981) 264–84Google Scholar, nos 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 57 (McPhee 279–80 also refers to an unpublished deposit of Attic black-glaze that spans the fifth century).

43 Luce, , AJA xxxiv (1930) 334–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar, nos 1 (ARV 2 1367) and 7.

44 ARV 2 1164 and 1330.

45 Excavations of settlement contexts of other states at war with Athens have produced Attic pottery but provide limited information compared with Corinth. Attic pottery dating before and during the war, for example, has come from Olynthos; see Olynthus v, nos 101, 107, 114, 115, 117, 118, 120 (ARV 2 1100), 121, 122, 124, 129, 131, 161 (ARV 2 1092); Robinson, , Olynthus xiii (Baltimore 1950) nos 10, 14, 41Google Scholar (ARV 2 1164). Excavations at Sparta ‘produced a number of Attic black-glazed ware or a fabric indistinguishable from it, ranging from the middle to the end of the fifth century’; see Cook, J. M. and Nichols, R. V., BSA xlv (1950) 291Google Scholar. Kythera, normally controlled by a Spartan garrison but seized by Athens in 424 and held perhaps until 409, presents an interesting mixture of late fifth-century material including various Attic, Lakonian, and Corinthian wares and Chian and Thasian wine amphorae; see Coldstream, J. N. and Huxley, G. L. (eds), Kythera (London/Park Ridge, N.J. 1972) 37–8, 159–65, 202–3Google Scholar. Attic pottery dating through the second half of the fifth century has also been excavated at sanctuaries located within enemy states; see Wolters, P. and Bruns, G., Das Kabirenheiligtum bei Thebes (Berlin 1940) 85–6Google Scholar; Mallwitz, A. and Schiering, W., Olympische Forschungen v (Berlin 1964) 248–66Google Scholar; and Perachora1 ii 350–8Google Scholar.

46 Agora xii, nos 1546, 1556, 1676, 1677, 1679, 1683, 1687, 1730, 1731, 1833, 1841, 1845, 1860, 1865, 1897, 1907, 1914, 1915; and nos 168–70.

47 Archaeological evidence has been used to suggest state interference in the trade of other items during the war but such evidence, while not contrary, is not persuasive. For example, Kraay, C. M., Archaic and Classical Greek Coins (London/Berkeley 1976) 83–4Google Scholar, postulates that the limited production of Corinthian mints in the second half of the fifth century was the result of interference by the Athenian fleet during the war: Corinth's silver could have come ‘from many commercial sources, but all of it had to come from abroad and was dependent upon the seaward approaches to Corinth remaining open’. His theory is seriously weakened, however, by the appearance of a major series of staters initiated by Sikyon around 430/20. Curiously, Kraay (p. 99) suggests that Sikyon became the principal mint of the Spartan alliance during the war because she was ‘secured from all but occasional Athenian attack by her position deep within the Gulf of Corinth’. Because silver continued to be shipped to the northeast Peloponnese, the decline of the Corinthian mint at this time is due to some reason other than Athenian interference.

48 Thuc. ii 67.4, with the comments of Marchant, E. C., Thucydides: Book II (London 1891, repr. 1961)Google Scholar.

49 Thuc. ii 93.4, 94.3; iii 51.

50 Thuc. ii 69.1.

51 Thuc. vii 17.3–4, 19.3–5.

52 Old Oligarch, ii 2–4, 11–12. According to Theophrastus, areas producing shipbuilding timber include parts of Italy, Sicily, and Corsica; Macedonia, Thrace, and Arkadia; lands around Phrygian Ida, Sinope and Amisos, Mysian Olympos, and Cilicia; and Cyprus, , Syria, , and Phoenicia, (Hist. Pl. iii 7.1Google Scholar; iv 1.2, 5.5; v 7.1, 8.1–3). Suitable timber also grew elsewhere on the numerous mountain ranges (Hist. Pl. iv 5.1; iii 2.5), and Theophrastos indicates that shipbuilders could use various woods for the different parts of a ship and usually could draw on local resources (Hist. Pl. iii 10.1; v 4.3, 7.1–5; also Pl. Laws 705c). Against the mistaken notion of extensive deforestation in antiquity, see Rowton, M. B., JNES xxvi (1967) 261–77Google Scholar, and Bintliff, J. L., Natural Environment and Human Settlement in Prehistoric Greece (Oxford 1977) 59–86Google Scholar. Unlike many regions, however, Attica was without extensive forest cover because of geological and climatic conditions, so here timber had to be imported. Waldbaum, J. C., From Bronze to Iron (Göteborg 1978) 59–66Google Scholar, concludes that iron deposits sufficient for local needs were available almost everywhere in Greece, Anatolia, and the Near East, and copper ores were also widespread but most abundant in Cyprus, Palestine, and Anatolia. Metal sources were also adequate in the West. Flax grew in Palestine, Egypt, Colchis, Carthage (Hdt. ii 105, vii 25.1; Hermippos fr. 63; Xen., Kyn. ii 4Google Scholar), and regions in Italy, Spain, Gaul, and Germany (Pliny, NH xix 1–25Google Scholar). Flax was probably common in Greece as well, but our evidence cites only the western Peloponnese; see Ventris, M. and Chadwick, J., Documents in Mycenaean Greek (Cambridge 1973) 131, 413, 471Google Scholar; Thuc. iv 26.8; Paus. vi 26.6; and Chadwick, , Minos vii (1963) 129Google Scholar.

53 Thuc. vii 25.2.

54 Thuc. iii 86.4.

55 Thuc. ii 69.1; viii 35.2–3; Xen., Hell. ii 1.17Google Scholar.

56 That Athens stored reserved stocks of grain at Byzantion is implied in the Methone decree (IG i3 61), as noted by ML 180. Because Athens wished to keep Methone within her sphere of influence, the Methoneans were able to exact a number of favors from the Athenians, including access to these grain reserves. Aphytis gained similar privileges (IG i3 62). Grain may have normally been stockpiled at Byzantion to insure against a shortage at Athens, or to serve as a supply center for troops in the area (cf. Xen., Hell. iii 2.11Google Scholar, Dem. iv 32). Stockpiling grain for either reason could predate the war. Athens probably had garrisons in the area for some time (certainly after Byzantion revolted in 440), whose duty it was to keep watch over the strategic Hellespontine district. Although the hellespontophylakes referred to in the Methone decree are usually seen as some special board of Athenian officials regulating trade or rationing grain, the term simply refers to the forces stationed in the region and its use can be compared with references to phylakes on other Athenian decrees, such as those concerning Euboia, Erythrai, Miletos, and Aigina; as Lewis, D. M., BSA xlix (1954) 24Google Scholar, points out, the basic meaning of phylake in these inscriptions is abstract, something like watch, defense, or blockade. Also see Thuc. viii 62.3, 80.4, Xen., Hell. i 1.22Google Scholar and 36 concerning the Hellespont. As with the rest of the decree, the Athenians were here guaranteeing the Methoneans special treatment at the hands of these Athenian forces stationed in the Hellespont.

57 Thuc. iii 2–6.

58 To pay for the blockade of Mytilene, Athens had to levy a special tax on her own citizens and raise extra funds from her allies. In addition to the naval blockade the Athenians were forced to build a wall around Mytilene to eliminate her access to the countryside. Mytilene still held out for a year (Thuc. iii 6.2, 18.3–19, 27.1).

59 Gomme, A. W., JHS liii (1933) 23Google Scholar.

60 At the second meeting of the allies at Sparta, the Corinthian delegate was probably referring to the threat of such an Athenian naval blockade when he claimed that if the inland states did not come to the aid of those on the coast, they would eventually have more difficulty in exporting and importing (Thuc. i 120.2). Clearly, the inland states had less to fear from Athens' sea power.

61 Andok. ii 11, 14 (cf. Dem. xix 286).

62 Antiphon v 78, with discussion and references in Gomme, A. W., HCT i 238 n. 3Google Scholar.

63 IG i3 89, 117.

64 IG i3 174, 182, and 98.

65 Walbank, M. B., Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century B.C. (Toronto 1978) 280–4Google Scholar, for bibliography and commentary.

66 Ach. 819–20, 911–14.

67 De Ste Croix (n. 12) 238, sees the evidence not only as historical but logical as well. Lipsius, J. H., Das Attische Recht und Rechtverfahren (Leipzig 1905–1915) 312–13, n. 13Google Scholar, attempts to support Aristophanes with Isok. xvii 42, in which a man is denounced in the early fourth century for loaning money on a ship that belonged to a Delian. Lipsius suggests the ship's cargo was denounced as polemia because Delos was hostile toward Athens during the Corinthian War, but there is no evidence that Delos was aligned against Athens or involved in the war. Hasebroek, J., Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece (London 1933) 170 n. 3Google Scholar, suggests that denunciation was for loaning money on a ship not destined to return to Athens, a violation of Attic law recorded in [Dem.] xxv 50–1; also see [Dem.] lvi 6 and Lykourg, . Leok. 26–7Google Scholar. The reference to a law that enemy goods seized belong to the state, following the seizure of a Naukratite's ship in the mid-fourth century, is cryptic since Athens was not at war with Naukratis at this time (Dem. xxiv 12). The seizure appears to be an act of piracy by some enterprising Athenian officials (cf. Dem. ii 28, li 13, Aischin. ii 71).

68 In addition to these specific charges of polemia, the status of goods from Megara and Boiotia as forbidden imports is implied elsewhere by complaints of their absence because of the war (Peace 1000–5, Ach. 890, Lysistrata 700–3). Only Aristophanes' joke about ‘Lakonian’ shoes in Wasps 1157–69 refers to polemia not from these two neighboring states.

69 Ach. 914–24. Interestingly, although laws of polemia and polemioi would seemingly be reciprocal, there is no suggestion when the Megarian or Boiotian is bartering for Athenian goods that either will be returning home with polemia.

70 As noted by Knorringa, H., Emporos (Amsterdam 1926) 127–8Google Scholar.

71 See Velissaropoulos, J., Les nauclères grecs (Geneva 1980) 205–22Google Scholar, for a discussion of state taxes on trade.

72 For example, with respect to a quantity of building timber shipped from Thurii to Athens, referred to in 408/7 (IG i3 387), Erxleben, E., Klio lvii (1975) 373Google Scholar, believes that Corinth would not have permitted its transit through her territory—apparently on the basis of its destination; certainly not its embarkation since Thurii and Corinth were then allied, both at war with Athens (Thuc. viii 61.2). On the other hand, with respect to the 10% transit tax instituted by Athens at Chrysopolis in 410, Velissaropoulos (n. 71) 212 believes that politics would not determine who passed but rather who paid; according to his interpretation of Xen., Hell. i 1.22Google Scholar, the toll would be levied only on ‘cargos des cités ennemies’ (that part of the cargo already destined for enemy ports?), but not on ships headed for Athens or allied ports (what about ships headed for neutral ports?). That states would attempt so to categorize merchants and cargoes and then forgo the collection of revenues on the basis of political considerations of no consequence is unlikely.

73 Fourth-century references to warfare adversely affecting the collection of state revenue suggest that such losses would result not from laws prohibiting import and export but from threatened naval blockades (Dem. xxiii 110–12, xix 153); and Demosthenes' claim that a blockade would remove Philip's principal source of income refers not to tax revenue but to Philip's plundering of merchant ships (iv 32–4). That military interference in trade could also have a reciprocal effect on the home port is suggested by Athens' loss of tax revenues during the Social War (Isok. viii 19–21, Xen., Poroi v 12)Google Scholar; a scholiast commenting on Dem. xxi 173 notes that at that time Athens had voted to carry out piracy against those of her enemies sailing the seas, even if they were merchants.

74 In the well-protected city of Aineas the Tactician, the activities of almost all outsiders, including merchants, are to be officially monitored (x 6–10). On the other hand, Xenophon recommends that merchants be employed as spies, since states always welcome those who import goods; however, Xenophon also cautions against depending on such information (Hipp, iv 7–8Google Scholar). See Starr, C. G., Political Intelligence in Classical Greece (Leiden 1974) 43Google Scholar, and Adcock, F. and Mosley, D. J., Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (London/N.Y. 1975) 174–7Google Scholar.

75 Thuc. ii 39; see Starr (n. 74) 40, and Mosley, D. J., Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (Wiesbaden 1973) 4Google Scholar.

76 When Thucydides (ii 6.2) claims, for example, that Athens had all Boiotians in Attica arrested at the start of the Peloponnesian War, we can assume that he meant all politically suspect Boiotians, since we know that Boiotian exiles were active at Athens during the war and were honored by the state; see Thuc. iv 76, and IG i3 73 and 97.

77 De Ste Croix (n. 12) 264–7. Not surprisingly, merchants were reputed to go wherever market conditions were to their advantage; see Xen., Oik. xx 27–8Google Scholar and [Dem.] xxxiv 36–7 and lvi 8–10. They might also follow campaigning fleets and armies (see for example Thuc. vi 44 or Xen., Hell. i 6.37Google Scholar), but their actions here as elsewhere were the result of economic not political motives.

78 In support of de Ste Croix's argument, (n. 12) 263–4, that much trade at Megara, as at Athens, was in the hands of metics and foreigners unaffected by the decree, see Xen. Hell. i 6.32, with Dem. xxiii 212; Dem. xxix 3; Lykourg, . Leok. 21–7Google Scholar; and Whitehead, D., The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (Cambridge 1977) 77, 90–1Google Scholar, for comments concerning the existence of the metoiken and prostates requirements at Megara.

79 Megara's small population may have been largely self-sufficient. Thucydides specifically identifies Athens' ravaging invasions of the Megarid as the cause of her suffering in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, in addition to similar raids by Megarian exiles based at Pegai (Thuc. iv 66.1, ii 31.2). No reference is made to Megarian distress caused by an elimination of commercial traffic through her western port in the years before 424, or by the Athenian occupation of Nisaia from 424 to perhaps 409 (Thuc. iv 69, 118.4, 119.2, Diod. xiii 65.1). Of course when the Megarian Decree was in effect Megara could work her land and had control of both Pegai and Nisaia. If Megarians wished to buy imported grain, sources within Greece included Boiotia, the Peloponnese, or Thessaly, while the quickest, most direct overseas route would be to the markets of Italy and Sicily. Ironically those who like to see a strong connection between politics and trade in the Megarian decree usually assume that Megara had a close, almost dependent, economic relationship with the Athenian Empire in the years before the decree's passage.

80 De Ste Croix (n. 12) 267–84. A commercial interpretation of the agora exclusion is also weak. In addition to the enforcement problems that exclusion from a large ill-defined market would entail, the nature of commercial activities in Athens' marketplace deserves consideration. All our sources suggest a local retail trade in which services were provided and natural and manufactured products were sold in small quantities to fulfill the needs of daily life; see Wycherley, R. E., The Athenian Agora iii (Princeton 1957) 185–206Google Scholar; Oikonomides, A. N., The Two Agoras of Ancient Athens (Chicago 1964) 83–100Google Scholar. Exclusion from such a market would have little impact on most Megarians as either buyers or sellers.

81 That the Peloponnesians were hoping to fragment the Athenian Empire is shown in their demands that Athens abandon Poteidaia, give Aigina her independence and the Hellenes their freedom; the call to repeal the Megarian decree, grouped with these other demands (Thuc. i 139.1, 140.3), apparently had the same goal in mind. Influential Megarians at, for example, Byzantion, Astakos, Chalkidon, Mesembria, Herakleia, or Selymbria may have achieved similar results to the Corinthians at Poteidaia. Perikles' demand that Sparta not expel politically suspect individuals (Athenians and their allies) and grant her allies political freedom corresponds to the Spartan demands (Thuc. i 144.2). That Athens had reason to fear Megarian interference in the Hellespontine district is shown by the surprisingly strong representation of Megarians in the area during the Dekeleian War (see Thuc. viii 6.1, 80.3; Xen., Hell. i 1.36, 3.15Google Scholar).